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Focusing on the US-Singapore Free Trade Agreement (USSFTA), this study adopts a 
Global Production Network (GPN) framework in exploring the implications of this 
FTA on the strategies of electronics firms.  This approach casts its analytical lens upon 
the interplay of factors and relational geometries among actors in restructuring the 
GPNs of firms.  I argue that the USSFTA, as a form of radical rescaling of economic 
and geographical space, will result in strategic reorientations amongst firms, prompting 
a series of spatial restructuring in the organization and geography of production 
networks.  Findings illustrate intensification of flows as firms (re)centre their 
production geographies on the Indonesia-Malaysia-Singapore Growth-Triangle.  
Although shifting relationality under the USSFTA engenders new networks of 
reciprocity and opens new opportunities for Singapore’s firms in particular, issues of 
territoriality and historical specificity of the electronics production network continue to 
impose limits on power enhancement and magnify existing patterns of uneven 
development.  Altogether, this research presents insights on the relationships between 
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With the exception of a few scholars, the study of Preferential Trading Agreements 
(PTAs) has not moved beyond a narrow focus on economic indices and the modeling 
of impacts.  Often, economic statistics of rising trade and investments in PTAs are 
employed as a symbol proclaiming the success of the liberal project in generating 
growth through trade liberalization.  However, this relative neglect of firm strategies 
and their associated commercial activities presents an incomplete picture of economic 
development because the intrinsic territoriality and spatiality of firms generates 
differential spatial outcomes.   
 
Focusing on the US-Singapore Free Trade Agreement (USSFTA), this study adopts a 
Global Production Network (GPN) framework in exploring the implications of this 
FTA on the strategies of electronics firms.  The centrality accorded to the firm in this 
research is anchored in the idea that the organization of production draws firms and 
localities in a mutually constitutive relationship.  By approaching the understanding of 
regional economic blocs from the analytical lens of networks, previous notions of 
regionalism as a nested scalar logic will be recast for a more fluid and open approach.  
Notably, the production of the USSFTA space-economy highlights the interactive 
process between social actors as well as the intertwining of firm operations and 
institutional arrangements.  Rather than conceiving economic regionalism as a state-led 
process common in many studies, I assert that firms are key social actors in the 







From this dimension, this approach is attentive to the interplay of factors and relational 
geometries among actors in restructuring the GPNs of firms.  I argue that the 
USSFTA, as a form of radical rescaling of economic and geographical space, has 
brought a wave of spatial restructuring in the electronics production network, with the 
more flexible rules-of-origin and a more stringent intellectual property rights regime as 
the main driving forces behind changes to firm strategies.  Findings illustrate that the 
post-USSFTA production geographies highlight the rationalization of the electronics 
production networks with rising intensities of investment, information and material 
flows centred on the Indonesia-Malaysia-Singapore Growth Triangle (IMS-GT). 
 
Beyond broad geographies of production discussed, the USSFTA created new 
networks of outsourcing, contractual and partnership relations for all firms embedded 
in the electronics Regional Production Network (RPN).  This in turn produces new 
relational geometries of domination, subordination and reciprocity.  Although shifting 
relationality under the USSFTA engenders new power dynamics and opens new 
opportunities for Singapore's firms in particular, the historical specificity of the 
electronics production network, continued territorial biasness of the USSFTA, politics 
between institutional actors and firm cultures continue to shape the precise production 
network configuration and impose limits on power enhancement.  It is precisely how 
the network relations are played out that shapes the manner in which the market 
passivities of firms evolve and accentuate existing patterns of uneven development in 
the IMS-GT.  Altogether, my research is a foray into providing insightful analysis on 











Economic regionalism is certainly not a new phenomenon.  What makes 
regional economic blocs distinctive is its increasing dominance in the global economy.  
The fundamental basis of regional economic blocs is often Preferential Trading 
Arrangements (PTAs) involving “states agreeing to provide preferential access to their 
markets to other members of the regional group” (Dicken, 2003: 145).  Ultimately, 
PTAs are supposed to create a free trade area whereby trade barriers are eliminated, 
hence allowing for the unhindered flow of goods and services between the territories of 
PTA partners.  As shown in Figure 1.1, the number of PTAs notified to the WTO has 
been accelerating since 1992.  PTAs vary considerably in terms of its degree of 
economic and political integration.  The European Union (EU) is the earliest PTA 
notified to the WTO.  Together with the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA), they are two of the most significant PTAs due to their sheer magnitude and 
economic implications.   
Turning the focus to Singapore, its policy towards regional trading relations has 
been marked by extensive multilateralism. This multilateral principle can be witnessed 
most visibly in the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), implemented in 1993 as an 
offshoot of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), as well as the 
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Figure 1.1: Number of PTAs notified to the WTO 
Source: WTO1
 
towards PTAs has taken a bilateral twist.  Obvious strategic and macroeconomic 
considerations such as the need to secure guarantees to external markets should the 
WTO regime breakdown and fears of exclusion from existing trade blocs (Lim, 2001) 
undergirds the development of this new trade strategy.  Bilateral Free Trade 
Agreements2 (FTAs) have become a key trade liberalization apparatus undertaken by 
the state to expand Singapore’s external wing (MTI, 2003a).  According to Tommy 
Koh3, “Singapore is a small country, we will always be looking for opportunities to 
expand our economic space, and the FTAs are one way in which we can link our 
economy to the economies of ‘larger’ countries such as US, Japan”.  Singapore has 
since concluded FTAs with New Zealand, Japan, the European Free Trade Association 
(EFTA), Australia, the United States and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.  Most 
                                                 
1 Accessed online at < http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/regfac_e.htm> on 12 February 
2003.  
2 All Bilateral FTAs will heretofore be referred as FTAs, unless otherwise stated. 
3 Author’s personal interview with Tommy Koh, Principal negotiator of the USSFTA and Ambassador-
At-Large, 5th December 2002. 
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notably, the US-Singapore FTA (USSFTA) is perceived by Singapore’s state officials as 
the ‘jewel in the crown’, as it grants Singapore preferential access to one of the largest 
econom
 be elucidated.  To set the backdrop for discussion, 
is section also examines the significance of the electronics sector in Singapore’s 




ufacturing company may not just need to decide 
n expanding production facilities to meet export demand under an 
its manufacturing process so as to meet the FTA’s rules for 
exporting rather than commissioning or selling to a third-party there 
 
ch FTA partner; it has substantial impacts on the business 
environment.  Some of these changes may facilitate commercial activities, reduce 
                                                
ies in the world.  Policy innovations in this agreement are not only a key area of 
debate in many forums, but also an important aspect of research as it has enormous 
implications on issues of production and trade4.   
This introductory chapter provides the background into Singapore’s bilateral 
FTA strategy and current US-Singapore economic relations.  Key objectives and the 
core arguments of this thesis will
th
economy and discusses the importance of lo
firm-based perspective.   
CTIVES AND ARGUMENTS 
A business may see considerable opportunities, marketing 
possibilities and prospects for streamlining operations arising from 
an FTA… A man
o
FTA.  It may have to change its source of material supply or modify 
preferential treatment.  It may also consider alternative modes of 
(Wong, 2004a: 5). 
The USSFTA is an ‘excuse’ to spur domestic reforms in the laws, regulations and 
government practices of ea
 
4 Whilst this thesis is concerned with the role of the USSFTA in expanding Singapore’s economic space, 
the role of the USSFTA in expanding Singapore’s political space must also be highlighted.  Much 
discussion focused on the importance of the USSFTA as part of Singapore’s geopolitical strategy to 
engage the US in Asia (Liew, 2003; Rajan and Sen, 2002a; 2002b) 
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custom
t, will be crucial in shaping business strategies.  
Hence,
territoriality and spatiality such as differences in regulatory environments, on the 
 administration problems and enhance investment protection.  In turn, business 
decisions may be altered.   
To highlight, the USSFTA not only removes substantial trade barriers between 
Singapore and the US, but more importantly it institutionalizes the integration of economic 
activity.  With many policy innovations in the trade in goods chapter formulated to 
target specifically the electronics sector, a key engine of the Singapore economy, major 
changes in the structure and composition of this sector may be expected.  Moreover, 
with the increasingly global nature of electronics production networks, the USSFTA, as 
a certificate of guarantee to the US marke
 with regards to the implications of the USSFTA, many pertinent questions 
demand serious attention and research.   
At the heart of this thesis is the expansion of economic space through the USSFTA, 
or more critically, ‘the production of space’ (Lefebvre, 1991).  As aptly described by 
Tommy Koh, “the bottom line of our trade policy is to enlarge our spaces: we want to 
be the 51st state of the US” (Straits Times, 25 August 2002).  How is this economic space 
created and hence expanded?  How is this economic space qualitatively different from 
that in the past?  How has the USSFTA contributed to economic integration between 
Singapore and the US?  What are the implications of the USSFTA on the geography of 
production in the electronics industry?  How are different firms strategically 
repositioning themselves in response to the USSFTA?  How are intra- and inter-firm 
relationships changing under the USSFTA?  What is the role of the state and other 
institutional forces in shaping production networks?  What is the influence of 
 5
geography of production?  With the USSFTA, how is economic activity now organized 
in specific nodes of production?  How do varying power geometries amongst actors 
influenc
restructuring in the 
organiz
e regional economic development? 
Put simply, the focus of this thesis is to examine the implications of the 
USSFTA on firm strategies.  The centrality accorded to the firm in this research is 
anchored in the idea that the organization of production draws firms and localities in a 
mutually constitutive relationship.  By approaching the understanding of regional 
economic blocs from the analytical lens of networks, previous notions of regionalism as 
a nested scalar logic will be recast for a more fluid and open approach.  This approach 
yields greater insights into how firm strategies and activities will have significant 
implications on issues of production and development.  I argue that the USSFTA, as a 
form of radical rescaling of economic and geographical space, will result in strategic 
reorientations amongst firms, prompting a series of spatial 
ation of economic activity and geography of production.   
As I will substantiate empirically in various chapters, elements of input-
sourcing and production locales in the pre-USSFTA electronics production network 
are increasingly (re)centred within the Indonesia-Malaysia-Singapore Growth Triangle 
(IMS-GT).  I argue that this intensification of investments and material flows is a 
function of the more flexible USSFTA rules-of-origin and geographical proximity, 
which encourages increased production fragmentation.  With the changing regulatory 
terrain and relational geometries in the USSFTA, new gaps are created in the 
electronics RPN for Singapore firms in particular.  The changing partnership and 
contract relations engender new networks of reciprocity and recast the idea of market passivity 
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into a multi-dimensional one.  Mapping out this constellation of production networks 
directs attention to issues of territoriality, spatiality, economic activities and 
developmental implications.  Although shifting power dynamics have created new 
opportunities for firms and economic development, issues of territoriality and historical 
specificity of the pre-USSFTA electronics RPN continue to impose limits on power 
enhancement and sway development towards Singapore within the IMS-GT.  As 
Palpacuer and Parisotto have argued (2003:112), “A better understanding of how global 
production networks are structured and how particular sets of firms operate within 
them could provide a basis for developing a vision of what the local industry could 
ecome as globalization proceeds”. 
1.3 US-




SINGAPORE ECONOMIC RELATIONS 
Before launching into a formal analysis of the USSFTA, it is important first to 
understand and establish the existing economic relationship between the US and 
Singapore as an overview these relations, as well as the direction in which economic 
integration under the USSFTA will be reconfigured.  Singapore and the US have 
consistently been key economic and political partners of each other.  From a 
geopolitical angle, the containment of communist advance into Southeast Asia during 
the Cold War heightened the importance of US involvement in military and economic 
areas.  Hence Southeast Asia, espec
ring the Cold War period.   
From an economic angle, trade and foreign investments have been the 
cornerstones in Singapore’s development from a British colonial entreport to a global 
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economic hub for high value-added manufacturing and finance.  This is witnessed in 
Singapore’s relentless pursuit of an economic development strategy based on the influx 
of foreign capital.  From the 1960s to the 1970s, this outward-oriented strategy 
materialized in the form of labour-intensive export-oriented industrialization (MTI, 
2001).  This strategy allowed Singapore to plug into the “new international division of 
labour” as key US manufacturers scoured the global economy for new and alternative 
low-cost sites for their labour intensive activities.  This intimate economic relationship 
between the US and Singapore is still evident at present and intensifying.  In the 
preceding sections, I will analyze current US-Singapore economic relationship in terms 





In terms of external trade, US-Singapore bilateral trade has been relatively 
consistent throughout 1998-2003, though signs of decrease can be detected in the later 
period (Table 1.1).  Nevertheless, the US has been Singapore’s 2nd largest trade partner 
in 2003, where bilateral trade totaled S$64.5bn, making up 13.6% of total trade (Figure 
1.2).  Although Southeast Asian trade makes up almost a quarter of Singapore’s total 
trade, it must be reminded that Singapore’s position as a hub coordinating trade and 
manufacturing flows in Southeast Asia suggests that much of this trade is bound for 
developed economies such as the US.  A closer look at the trade statistics reveals the 
importance of the US as a destination for non-oil domestic exports (NODX).  A 
whopping S$21.3bn worth of NODX was exported to the US in 2003, constituting 
18.7% of total NODX, rendering the US the largest NODX destination (Figure 1.3).  
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Based on Table 1.2, electronics products make up 52.9% of Singapore’s NODX in 
2003.  A substantial proportion of these electronics products are bound for the US 
market.  Further analysis of Singapore’s electronics exports shows the US imported 
US$14.2bn worth of electronics from Singapore in 2000 (Table 1.3), making the US the 
largest market for Singapore’s electronics sector.  
 Bilateral n         US-Singapore  Trade (S$M ) 
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Total Trade $67,759.0 $69,259.0 $69,259.0 $67,670.6 $62,450.4  $64,520.3 
Exports $36,505.7 $37,214.8 $41,188.9 $33,533.6 $32,935.3  $33,460.1 
Non-Oil Domestic 
DX) $27,425.0 $28,023.4 $28,491.8 $21,608.0 $21,386.4  $21,255.4 Exports (NO




ingapore Bilateral Trade, 1998 to 2003 
ource: Compiled from the Yearbook of Statistics Singapore 2003, (2003a) and Economic Survey of Singapore 
2004, (2005a). 
 





















Figure 1.2: Share of Singapore’s Total Trade with Top Trading Partners in 2003 
So ce: Economic Survey of Singapore 2004, (2005a) ur
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Non-Oil Domestic Exports Pro n    by Major ducts (S$ M ) 




Electronics $67,558.0 $74,393.0 $58,964.0 $57,095.0  $60,019.2 52.9%
Integrated Circuits $14,190.0 $20,006.0 $13,431.0 $12,024.0  $15,999.5 14.1%
Parts of PCs $12,835.0 $13,067.0 $11,685.0 $11,727.0  $10,886.2 9.6%
Disk Drives $17,658.0 $16,013.0 $14,643.0 $15,764.0  $16,651.0 14.7%
Personal Comp $4,272.0 $3,652. 0  $1,230.3 1.1%uters 0 $2,689.0 $1,671.
Telecom Equip $2,516.0 $3,167. 0  $2,163.5 1.9%ment 0 $2,145.0 $2,093.
Others $16,087.0 $18,488.0 $14,3 $13,088.7 11.5%71.0 $13,816.0  
Non-Electronics $33,624.0 $38,679.0  $53,477.8 47.1%$37,764.0 $41,484.0 
Total $101,182. 13,07 96,728 $98,   $113,497.1 100%0 $1 2.0 $ .0 579.0
 
Table 1.2: Singapore’s Non-Oil Domesti rts by  Produ from 1 o 2003. 
mpiled from the Economic Surv apore uarter 20 (2004a Economic Survey of 
ngapore 2 a). 
apore's Electronics Products (US$Bn) 
c Expo  Major cts, 998 t




Key Export Markets of Sing
Markets 1996 2000 1996 2000 







US  $16.70 $14.20 12.1 6.1 
EU $ $ 5 10.50 11.10 .2 3.9 
Japan $4.10 $3.80 9.5 5.9 
Asia:  $13.90 $19.30 1 8.2 
  Taiwan $1.30 $2.90 7.2 7.4 
  South Korea $1.30 $2.20 6.8 5.4 
  Hong Kong $4.70 $5.30 11.1 9 
  Malaysia $4.10 $4.90 17 15 
  Thailand $1.10 $1.10 10.2 8.8 
  Philippines $0.60 $0.90 6.4 7.9 
  Indonesia $0.20 $0.07 8 9.3 
  China $0.70 $1.80 5 4.1 
 
Source: Economic Survey of Singapore 2001 (2002). 
 
From the US’s perspective, Singapore is its 11
Table 1.3: Key Export Markets of Singapore’s Electronics Products in 1996 and 2000 (US$Bn). 
: 
) and offers vast opportunities for US companies.  Over 1,500 US companies are 
ore, with more than 300 of these establishing in Singapore their 
th largest trading partner.  Current 




Asia-Pacific headquarters (USchamber, 2003: 6).  It is worth noting many of these US 
TNCs use Singapore as an export platform to Asia.  Thus, this confirms that a 
substantial proportion of Singapore’s Southeast Asian trade actually bears US origins. 
 
1.3.2 Investments 
 As mentioned earlier, substantial FDI flows between the US and Singapore.  
The US is Singapore’s largest source of cumulative FDI stock, totaling US$27.3bn or 
.2% of US investments abroad thus far (USchamber, 2003: 3).  In 2002, US FDI stock 
in Singapore totaled S$34.5bn, constituting 14.5% of total cumulative FDI stock in 
Sin po Table 1.4).  As s  .4, I do
concentra  in the financial services (43.9%, S$15.1bn) and manufacturing (38.7%, 
S$13.4bn) sectors.   
 
  f Singapor lat toc      
2
ga re ( hown in Figure 1  US FD was pre minantly 
ted
Top 10 Sources o e’s Cumu ive FDI S k (S$Mn)
Rank Country 
200
% t1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
2 in 
erms
1 US $22,976.0 $24,791.0 $31,814.0 $37,175.0 $34,483.0 14.5%
2 Japan $26,106.0 $28,130.0 $29,202.0 $29,954.0 $33,168.0 13.9%
3 UK $17,630.0 $11,863.0 $8,939.0 $14,784.0 $32,808.0 13.8%
4 Netherlands $9,480.0 $22,875.0 $29,156.0 $35,900.0 $24,031.0 10.1%
5 Switzerland $13,023.0 $15,698.0 $16,114.0 $15,669.0 $15,034.0 6.3%
6 British Virgin Islands $6,713.0 $9,268.0 $10,975.0 $13,859.0 $14,209.0 6.0%
7 Cayman Islands $5,178.0 $5,643.0 $7,007.0 $10,152.0 $11,315.0 4.7%
8 Bahamas $3,047.0 $2,748.0 $4,225.0 $7,877.0 $10,093.0 4.2%
9 Germany $2,125.0 $2,347.0 $4,230.0 $6,363.0 $7,240.0 3.0%
10 Bermuda $2,433.0 $6,398.0 $6,228.0 $5,835.0 $6,175.0 2.6%
  Others $36,243.0 $39,076.0 $47,026.0 $49,130.0 $50,026.0  21.0%
  Total $144,954.0 $168,837.0 $194,916.0 $226,698.0 $238,582.0 100.00%
 
Table 1.4: Top Sources of Singapore’s Cumulative Inward FDI Stock from 1998 to 2002. 
Source: Compiled from the Foreign Equity Investment in Singapore 2000-2001 (2003b) and Foreign Equity 
Investment in Singapore 2001-2002 (2004b). 
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ring sector (Table 1.5).  Approximately 
S l industries to 
e  capab  and den nge o oducts to be manufactured (SingStat, 
2003d: 70).  Though it must be noted US investments in Si  ma uring 
s ve d 3 0 . 0 1.5) argely 
to the global economic downturn (Post 9-11 and the burst of the dotcom bubble) and 
estment Commitments in Manufacturing by Country of Origin (S$Mn) 
 
Figure 1.4: Distribution of US Cumulative FDI Stock in Singapore’s Major Industries in 2002. 
Source: Foreign Equity Investment in Singapore 2001-2002 (2004b). 
 
 
Besides a key source of FDI, the US also shares the largest proportion of net 
investment commitments in the manufacturing industry.  In 2003, this amounted up to 
32.3% of total net investments in the manufactu
$2.4bn was committed in projects in the electronics and pharmaceutica
nhance ilities  broa the ra f pr
ngapore’s nufact
ector ha  decrease  from S$ .7bn in 2 00 to S$2 4bn in 20 3 (Table , due l
shifts in manufacturing investments to China.   
Net Inv
Source 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
2003 in % 
terms 
Local $2,615.9  $1,780.3 $1,973.6 $2,562.5 $1,969.7 $1,239.9  16.5%
US $2,293.0  $3,586.6 $3,692.1 $3,191.8 $2,432.2 $2,422.3  32.3%
Japan $1,822.2  $1,179.9 $1,513.0 $1,340.0 $1,778.2 $1,354.9  18.0%
Europe $1,040.0  $1,138.8 $1,721.7 $1,913.0 $2,122.8 $2,255.4  30.0%
Others $58.4  $351.8 $308.5 $164.4 $705.8 $238.5  3.2%
Total $7,829.5  $8,037.4 $9,208.9 $9,171.7 $9,008.7 $7,511.0  100.00%
 
(2005a). 
Table 1.5: Net Investment Flows in Manufacturing by Country of Origin from 1997 to 2003. 
Source: Compiled from the Singapore Yearbook of Statistics 2003 (2003a) and Economic Survey of Singapore 2004 
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In terms of Singapore’s outward FDI, the US is the 6th largest recipient of these 
investments constituting 5.5% of Singapore’s investments abroad in 2002 (Table 1.6).  
While, this statistic cannot measure up to that of US FDI in Singapore, it is noteworthy 
that Singapore is the 3rd largest Asian investor in the US after Japan and the Republic 
f Korea (BEA, 2005).  In addition, Singapore’s cumulative FDI stock in the US has 
more than doubled during the period 1998 to 2002, increasing from S$3.1bn t
S$8 bn trib f S e’s  th e rds
the na insurance serv to e 1 eiv al bn.  
Sim rly s financial a ra ice  is s r in 
the US, with investments of S$6.7bn (Figur  
 
stinations of Si  C  O D M
o
o 
.2  respectively.  The dis ution o ingapor  FDI in e US is sk wed towa  
 fi ncial and ices sec r (Figur .5), rec ing a tot  of S$6.5
ila , Singapore’ nd insu nce serv s sector  the large t investo
e 1.6).   
  Top 10 De ngapore's umulative utward F I Stock (S$ n)  
Rank 
2001 in 
%  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002  terms
1 British Virgin Islands $3,993.0 $4,848.0 $3,714.0 $16,818.0 $18,662.0 12.5%
2 China $12,186.0 $14,296.0 $15,710.0 $15,721.0 $18,046.0 12.1%
3 Malaysia $8,610.0 $8,517.0 $9,754.0 $11,239.0 $13,326.0 8.9%
4 Bermuda $1,281.0 $2,045.0 $3,815.0 $12,154.0 $13,657.0 9.2%
5 Hong Kong $7,668.0 $10,405.0 $8,508.0 $11,493.0 $11,975.0 8.0%
6 US $3,064.0 $4,197.0 $6,187.0 $7,329.0 $8,245.0 5.5%
7 Indonesia $4,485.0 $5,507.0 $5,462.0 $5,598.0 $7,694.0 5.2%
8 UK $3,276.0 $3,387.0 $4,903.0 $6,843.0 $6,974.0 4.7%
9 Mauritius N.A. $3,459.0 $4,917.0 $3,778.0 $5,419.0 3.6%
10 Australia N.A. $2,464.0 $2,592.0 $2,519.0 $3,325.0 2.2%
  Others $31,059.0 $33,595.0 $32,729.0 $40,120.0 $41,600.0 27.9%
  Total $75,622.0 $92,720.0 $98,291.0 $133,612.0 $148,923.0 100.0%
 
Table 1.6: Top Destinations of Singapore’s Cumulative Outward FDI Stock from 1998 to 2002. 





















Source: Singapore’s Investment Abroad 2003 (2005c). 
 
Figure 1.5: Singapore’s Cumulative Outward FDI Stock in the US by Activity Abroad in 2002. 
 


















Figure 1.6: Singapore’s Cumulative Outward FDI Stock in the US by Investor Activity in 2002. 
Source: Singapore’s Investment Abroad 2003 (2005c). 
 
 
Figure 1.7 maps the distribution of Singapore-originating businesses in the US.  
From the representation, it is clear many of these firms are in sectors related to 
electronics and information 
 
technology, with presence in key R&D centres such as 
ilicon Valley in California and Arlington in Texas.  Most of these Singapore-
gapore-originating firms have established a 
signific
S
originating establishments in the US are involved in sales and distribution as well as 
some R&D activities.  While many Sin
ant presence in the US, it should be noted the depth of penetration into the US 
economy is still rather shallow as compared to the scale of activities undertaken by 




Figure 1.7: Map of Singapore-Originating Businesses in the US 
Source: Business Times, 29 January 2005. 
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In the context of this close economic relationship between the US and 
Singapore, how will the USSFTA (re)shape the trade and investment map between 
these two economies, and within the region.  How will the quantity, nature and 
direction of trade and investment evolve?  Will there be changes to the re  
f and scale of ac s unde n by t usine blishm  loca
b  and Singap
 
 
1 ’S E N N U EC IL
OF ECONOMIC DEV E
 
ly the electronics industry has been 
ingapore’s key economic pillar.  Despite the phasing out of low-cost manufacturing 
conomies, the manufacturing sector will continue to be a mainstay in the Singapore 
conomy.  Jointly with the services sector, the manufacturing sector has been identified 
as one of th
focus now, is on high value-added manufacturing in which Singapore has a competitive 
advantage.  In the following discussion, I will lo
manufacturing sector, particularly the electronics i
ore’s manufacturing s a k ie ard m  
o by Table 1.7, 
manufacturing sector.  This proportion of cumulative FDI stock in the manufacturing 
sector has increased from S$52.7bn in 1998 to S$86.7bn in 2002.  On the other hand, 
S dustry s not a k  source o FDI (Ta e 1.8), contributing 
only 8.5% or S$12.7bn worth of total outward n 2 nstea ufac  
lative
ted in unctions tivitie rtake hese b ss esta ents
oth the US ore? 
.4 SINGAPORE LECTRO ICS MA UFACT RING S TOR: P LAR 
ELOPM NT 
The manufacturing sector, especial
S
activities in Singapore due to the lack of cost competitiveness as compared to other 
e
e
e twin engines in Singapore’s next phase of economic development.  The 
ok at some key developments in the 
ndustry. 
Singap ector is ey recip nt of inw  FDI fro  various
rigins.  Illustrated 36.3% of cumulative inward FDI stock is in the 
ingapore’s manufacturing in  i ey f bl
 FDI i 002.  I d, man turing
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s ad receive disproportio
total FDI stock or S$31.1bn) than that invested by Singapore’s manufacturers.  This is 
due to the changing classification of Singapore firms involved in manufacturing 
activities.  As these Singapore firms move up e l d n h  
e 
 recipient economies are largely developing countries (refer to Table 1.6), a 
ossible
Industrial Distribution of Cumulative Inward Foreign Direct Investment in Singapore (S$Mn) 
ectors abro nately more Singapore’s outward FDI (20.9% of 
the valu adder an partake i igh-end
activities such as R&D, these firms are reclassified as service establishments.  Sinc
many of the
p  explanation could be the outsourcing of low value-added, labour-intensive 
products and processes to lower cost neighbours.  Referring to Table 1.8, the absolute 
increase in cumulative FDI stock, from S$17.7bn in 1998 to S$31.1bn in 2002, received 
by foreign manufacturing sectors appears to confirm this trend.  In other words, the 
local non-manufacturing sectors investing in manufacturing sectors abroad, are 
inherently manufacturing establishments in actuality.     
 




Manufacturing $52,672.0 $57,655.0 $70,714.0 $83,315.0 $86,718.0 36.3%
Commerce $21,680.0 $27,153.0 $29,558.0 $32,943.0 $38,039.0 15.9%
Transport, Storage & 
Communications $5,436.0 $6,371.0 $8,610.0 $9,886.0 $10,599.0 4.4%
Financial & 
Insurance Services $53,000.0 $64,067.0 $69,999.0 $82,989.0 $83,925.0 35.2%
Real Estate $5,305.0 $5,621.0 $6,413.0 $6,151.0 $6,547.0 2.7%
Business Services $5,240.0 $6,393.0 $7,616.0 $8,989.0 $10,323.0 4.3%
Others $1,620.0 $1,576.0 $2,006.0 $2,424.0 $2,431.0 1.0%
Total $144,954.0 $168,837.0 $194,916.0 $217,282.0 $238,582.0 100.0%
 
T l Distribution of Cumulative in ore, 998 t
S d from Foreign Equity Investment in Singapore 2000-2001 (2003b) and uity Investment 





able 1.7: Industria  Inward FDI Stock Singap from 1 o 2002 
ource: Compile Foreign Eq
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Singapore's Cumulative Outward Foreign D ve (S$irect In stment Mn) 
Total $75, 2 9 $133,612.0 $148,923.0 100.0%622.0 $9 ,720.0 $ 8,291.0
         
Industry 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
2002 in 
% terms
              
BY ACTIVITY OF INVESTOR             
Manufacturing $12,846.0 $15,307.0 $10,103.0 $121,488.0 $12,653.0 8.5%
Construction $722.0 $709.0 $792.0 $840.0 $857.0 0.6%
Commerce $7,016.0 $9,419.0 $10,179.0 $9,677.0 $11,236.0 7.5%
Transport, Storage & 
Communications $4,781.0 $5,885.0 $7,334.0 $22,113.0 $24,039.0 16.1%
Financial Services $43,658.0 $53,876.0 $59,770.0 $81,541.0 $90,403.0 60.7%
Real Estate $4,334.0 $4,317.0 $5,493.0 $2,894.0 $3,417.0 2.3%
Business Services $2,102.0 $3,065.0 $4,480.0 $4,088.0 $6,152.0 4.1%
Others $165.0 $142.0 $140.0 $311.0 $166.0 0.1%
              
BY RECIPIENT ACTIVITY             
Manufacturing $17,686.0 $22,870.0 $25,969.0 $26,863.0 $31,090.0 20.9%
Construction $898.0 $797.0 $780.0 $680.0 $712.0 0.5%
Commerce $6,576.0 $7,614.0 $8,126.0 $9,759.0 $10,139.0 6.8%
Transport, Storage & 
Communications $2,917.0 $5,522.0 $6,185.0 $10,615.0 $13,424.0 9.0%
Financial Services $37,914.0 $44,717.0 $47,437.0 $73,872.0 $82,044.0 55.1%
Real Estate $6,091.0 $6,869.0 $7,019.0 $7,923.0 $7,285.0 4.9%
Business Services $2,447.0 $2,890.0 $2,251.0 $2,235.0 $2,411.0 1.6%
Others $1,094.0 $1,440.0 $1,525.0 $1,666.0 $1,818.0 1.2%
 
T ulative Outward FDI Stock, from 1998 to 2002. 




ted for 78.1% (SingSta
i in the m ctu ng se en ting im d S$7 n ue-
added and 14,000 jobs, of which 64% will be for profession and w ers 
(Singstat, 2003d: 70).  This attests to po nce of Singapore as a hub for higher 
v manufac  ac ties. nics industry received 56.2% of total 
net investment commi e manufacturing sector in 2003 (Table 1.9).  Though 
e total  
able 1.8: Industrial Distribution of Singapore’s Cum
rce: Compiled from Singapore’s Investment Abroad 2000-2001
Foreign sources accoun t, 2003a: 108) of the total 
nvestments anufa ri ctor, g era an est ate .5bn i val
al skilled ork
the im rta
alue-added turing tivi  The electro
tments in th
th output and value added (Figure 1.8) of this industry have decreased to
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S$63.5bn and S$11.7bn respectively due to the global economic downturn, the 
e y continues to generate t  highest output 
and value-added in the manufacturing sector.  Seen in Table 1.10, Singapore has 
consistently emerged as one of the top 10 el s rte e g n
occupies the 6th position globally in the area of ICs/semiconductors (Table 1.11).   
stment Commitments in Manufacturing by Industry Cluster (S$Mn) 
lectrical components and products industr he
ectronic  expo rs in th Asian re ion, a d 
 
Net Inve
Industry Cluster 2002 2003 Terms 2000 2001 
2003 in % 
Electronics $4,451.1 12.7 65 ,22 56.2% $4,6  $4, 2.2 $4 4.1  
Chemicals $2,156.7 $1,895.7 $2,027.1 $1,571.4  20.9%
Biomedical Manufact 06.1 43.7 $85 $85 11.3%uring $8  $8  3.5 1.5  
Precision Engineering  $960.6 $423.4 $984.6 $1,039.5  5.6%
Transport Engineering $516.1 $408.6 $302.1 $205.9  2.7%
General Manufacturin strie 94 71.5 $21 $2 3.1%g Indu s $2 .3 $3 3.2 34.7  
Total $9,208.9 $9,171.7 $9,008.7 $7,511.0  100.0%
 
Table 1.9: Net Investment Commitments in Manufacturing by Sectors of Activity, from 1998 to 2003. 
Source: Co piled from the Yearbook of Statistics Singapore 2003 (2003a) and Economic Survey of Singapore First 

































1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
 in
 S Total Output
Value Added
 
lectronics Industry from 1997 to 2003. 
Source: Compiled from the Yearbook of Statistics Singapore 2003 (2003a) and Economic Survey of Singapore 2004 
(2005a) 
 
Figure 1.8: Total Output and Value Added of E
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R g of Major Asian Electronics Exporters ankin
  1997 1998 1999 2000 
Market US$Bn  Rank US$Bn  Rank US$Bn  Rank US$Bn  Rank
World Market $644.1    $649.0   $728.0   $876.8    
                  
South Korea $33.9  7 $31.8 8 $42.9 6 $58.7  3 
Taiwan $38.6  5 $37.5 4 $44.3 4 $57.8  4 
Malaysia $36.3  6 $34.6 7 $44.3 5 $52.4  5 
China $21.5  11 $25.3 11 $30.1 10 $43.5  8 
Singapore $41.6  4 $36.7 5 $38.6 7 $41.6  9 
Thailand $14.1  15 $14.3 15 $15.2 14 $21.6  14 
Philippines $14.2  14 $18.6 13 $9.0 19 $9.7  20 
Indonesia $2.9  25 $2.4 28 $3.0 26 $7.3  21 
Hong Kong $5.2  21 $4.3 22 $3.6 24 $4.0  25 
 
Table 1.10: Ranking of Major Asian Electronics Exporters, from 1997 to 2000. 
Source: Economic Survey of Singapore 2001 (2002) 
Singapore's Worldwide Exports of Electronics       
 



















$16.30 3 9.6% $16.20 5 9.00% $14.50 5
PCBAs/ Ink 5.4%
Cartridges 
$7.50 4 7.0% $7.70 5 6.30% $7.80 8
Consumer 
Electronics 
$1.00 17 1.8% $0.80 17 1.40% $0.80 17 1.3%
Telecom 
Equipment 
$2.30 14 1.7% $2.60 18 1.70% $3.10 19 1.5%
ICs/ 
Semiconductors 
$9.50 7 5.3% $11.20 6 5.30% $15.40 6 5.8%
 
Source: Economic Survey of Singapore 2001 (2001) 
 
Table 1.11: Singapore’s Worldwide Exports of Electronics, from 1997 to 2000. 
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Whilst the electronics industry is a key economic pillar for Singapore, its market 
performance has been rather dismal in recent years.  Evidently, Table 1.11 reflects 
falling worldwide exports, especially in the PCs/disk drives and the telecom equipment 
segments.  Global shares in all the segments with the exception of ICs/semiconductors 
have also fallen.  On the other hand, other Asian electronics exporters such as South 
Korea and China have been rising up the global rankings (Table 1.10), in conjunction 
with decreasing exports of Singapore’s electronics exports to the traditional markets 
such as US, Japan and the EU (Table 1.3).  Hence, dwindling market shares of 
Singapore’s electronics exports worldwide have resulted in Singapore sliding down the 
in electronics production such as the 
creasing compartmentalization of technology and a shift towards outsourcing have 
created major upheavals in the production networks of electronic products and 
components (MTI, 2003a).  Electronics firms, especially TNCs now carry out 
production by modules in multiple locations and then transport all the parts to one 
platform for final assembly into end-products (Gourevitch et al, 2000).  This has 
global rankings from 4th to 9th position. 
 In tandem with declining exports to traditional markets, Singapore’s electronics 
exports to Asian economies have been increasing steadily.  From 1996 to 2000, 
Singapore’s electronics exports to the Asian economies rose from US$13.9bn to 
US$19.3bn (38.8% increase) (Table 1.3).  Particularly, a substantial proportion of the 
increase was contributed by the ICs/semiconductors segment, whereby Singapore’s 
exports of these products to the Asian markets rose from US$5.9bn to US$9.3bn 
(Singstat, 2002: 124).  In recent years, changes 
in
 21
resulted in the changing positions occupied by different economies in the production 
network (See further analysis in Chapter 3).   
In Singapore’s case, electronics production has been shifting away from low 
value-added and labour-intensive activities towards higher value-added and 
technologically-intensive activities.  Traditional assembly activities are no longer viable 
in Singapore as regional competitors are able to replicate these capabilities while 
offering lower costs of production simultaneously.  Hence, Singapore’s exports of end-
products especially consumer electronics such as PCs and colour TVs to both the 
traditional and Asian markets have declined (SingStat, 2002).  In contrast, the trend 
towards rising exports of intermediate components such as ICs/semiconductors and 
other electronic valves to both traditional and Asian markets may be observed.   
 in the 
lectronics global production network?  With this shift towards the production of the 
‘innards’ of electronics, Singapore is increasingly developing itself into a producer and 
supplier of high value-added electronics components which are necessary in other 
electronics production modules.  These components are subsequently assembled in 
another location and exported to the traditional markets.  As illustrated by Figure 1.9, 
this simplified representation encapsulates the emerging role of Singapore as a hub for 
the production of sophisticated intermediate products in the electronics global 
production networks.   
 My choice of the electronics industry in light of the USSFTA is not an 
accidental one; the various statistical indicators have stressed the importance of the 
electronics industry in the Singapore economy.  To reiterate, many of the USSFTA 
What does this trend represent in terms of Singapore’s position
e
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provisions are targeted at the electronics sector.  Hence, the issue is to analyze the 
effects of the USSFTA on firm’s strategies and the electronics production network.  
How will Singapore’s position in the production networks be different from the 
existing one shown in Figure 1.10?  How will the flow of products and components as 
indicated by the arrows alter with the USSFTA? 
 
 


















Source: Author’s own. 
 
1.5 THESIS STRUCTURE 
 This thesis is organized into five further chapters.  Chapter Two reviews 
existing literature on economic regionalism, particularly the experience of the EU and 
NAFTA with a focus on the inter-relation between regional blocs and firm strategies.  
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Consequently, this chapter continues with a critique of the conceptual lacuna within 
this literature.  Drawing on a relational approach coupled with the global production 
networks framework, economic regionalism is reconceptualized from a firm-centred 
standpoint, highlighting the importance of spatiality and differential power relations 
among actors.  This chapter concludes with a discussion of the methodological tools of 
een firm actors.  
In short, this chapter aims to unravel the intra-firm and inter-firm relationships 
connecting different segments of the IMS-GT production node.   
Chapter Four examines the role of firms in the production of regional spaces, 
especially in influencing the provisions covered by the USSFTA as well as the manner 
in which firms’ strategic reorientations shape the actual economic space of the 
USSFTA.  I hint that the manner in which different firms are integrated into various 
extra-firm networks necessarily have a conditioning influence on the eventual strategic 
reorientations.  An in-depth discussion of the various policy initiatives in the USSFTA 
and firm perceptions of the USSFTA will form the prelude to the next chapter. 
 Chapter Five discusses the impacts of changing firm strategies on geographies 
of production and relational organization in the USSFTA.  Through the examination of 
input-sourcing, locational, export and relational strategies, I analyze the reconfiguration 
enquiry used in this research. 
 Chapter Three presents a brief overview of firm strategies and broad 
geographies of production prior to the USSFTA as the necessary backdrop towards 
understanding firm relations and ensuing changes with the implementation of the 
USSFTA.   Here, the idea of market passivity will be explored.  My idea of market 
passivity seeks to contextualize the differential power geometries betw
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of production geographies on a macro-regional scale, particularly the IMS-GT.  The 
focus is not simply to map the lain the intentionality of actors 
and thei
  Having established the resultant changes, Chapter Six deals with issues related 
to value appropriation, development and power.  Here, the idea of market passivity will 
be revisited, and recast to allow for new and different meanings.  I will also look into 
certain in-built mechanisms in the USSFTA, outreach programmes by institutions 
aimed at educating firms, evolving inter-firm relationships and firm cultures.  The 
analysis will illustrate how differential power dynamics among actors have an inhibiting 
effect on the generation of value and the resultant geographical unevenness of 
development.   
 In the penultimate chapter, key findings will be summarized and critically 
evaluated.  Policy implications, in particular with respect to issues of development and 
broader links to Singapore’s economic development strategies will also be addressed.  I 
will look into the implications of this piece of research for our understanding of 
contemporary issues of multilateralism, globalization and regional development.  This 
thesis will thereby conclude with some suggestions for future research. 
changes, but also to exp




RESEARCH FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY 
 
2.1 PREAMBLE: ASIAN REGIONALISM 
Along with the proliferation of PTAs is the abundance of literature on 
regionalism from multiple perspectives.  Within this body of literature, the classic 
analysis of regional blocs concerns itself with trade diversion and creation, and the 
effects on multilateralism (e.g. Bhagwati, 1993; Bhalla and Bhalla, 1997; Frankel, 1997; 
Findlay, 2002; Drysdale and Ishigaki, 2002).  Categorical and comparative perspectives 
are frequently utilized in the documentation of regionalism in Asia (Katzenstein, 1997; 
Dickens, 1998; Higgot 1999).  For instance, Higgot (1999) proposed that Asian 
regionalism may be categorized into de facto or de jure regionalism5.  However, such 
categorizations have been deployed to compare and critique the embryonic state of de 
jure regionalism in Asia against the more advanced and institutionalized forms of 
regionalism in Europe and the US (Higgot, 1999; Bowles, 2002).   
Whilst the USSFTA and Singapore’s bilateral FTA strategy is still a relatively 
new phenomenon, a burgeoning literature nonetheless exists.  Much literature focuses 
on statistics and economic modeling of the impacts of the FTAs on the Singapore 
economy (MTI, 2000a; Lee, 2002; Khanna, 2003; Tongzon, 2003a; Khan, 2004; Sen, 
                                                 
5 This perspective reflects how globalization contributed to the spilling of ‘national’ capitalisms beyond 
traditional political boundaries.  From this angle, de facto regionalism may not be an entirely new 
phenomenon.  Colonialism was a product of similar spillovers of capitalisms beyond the territorial 
confines of the colonial power.  De jure regionalism refers to a state-led process with principal actors 
drawn from both public and private sector trans-regional policy communities (Higgot, 1999: 94).   
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2004), and the pros and cons of bilateralism (Rajan et al, 2001; Rajan and Sen, 2002a; 
2002b).  Beyond pure economics, scholars researching into Singapore’s bilateral FTAs 
also argue that these FTAs are political and economic regional governance projects 
(Bowles, 2002; Dent, 2002; Jayasuriya, 2003a; 2003b; Ravenhill, 2003)   
e removal of tariff 
arriers under the European Common Market, as well as physical, technical and fiscal 
ed trade between 
A key drawback of the above analysis on both Asian regionalism and 
Singapore’s bilateral FTAs is the tendency to overlook the influence of economic 
regionalism on firms’ activities.  The importance of this particular focus on firms is that 
the organization of production by firms sheds light on international trade patterns and 
the economic development of localities.  I argue that the presence of regional blocs 
have bearings on flows of investments by firms and the geographical organization of 
production. Thus, it is the interest of this section to review and critique a particular 
strand of literature concerned with the implications of regional integration on firm 
strategies.  
 
2.2 LOOKING TO THE EU AND NAFTA  
 When discussing regional integration, it appears the EU and NAFTA are two 
such economic blocs one cannot miss.  In the case of the EU, th
b
non-tariff barriers under the Single European Act of 1992 has liberaliz
member economies.  Over in the Americas, NAFTA, which entered into effect on 1st 
January 1994, has expedited economic integration in North America through the 
creation of a new North American economic space.   Under NAFTA, tariffs on trade 
and investments are reduced and non-tariff barriers are also harmonized to promote 
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conditions of fair competition and increase investment opportunities.  Furthermore, to 
qualify for NAFTA benefits, goods must be substantially produced in the NAFTA 
region and meet a minimum-content rule ranging from 30% to 60% dependent on the 
sector in question (Dicken, 2003).   
It is noteworthy that the very nature of NAFTA in juxtapositioning economic 
superpowers with a developing country presents NAFTA as a key intervening variable 
in the process of North American economic integration.  Principally, “by integrating 
two highly developed countries and one large developing country into a single free 
trade area it changes the economic map of North America quite radically” (Dicken, 
2003: 155).  Similarly in the case of the EU, the amalgamation of economies at various 
stages of economic development into a single economic space reorders geographical 
scale and fashions a significantly different economic, political and regulatory space for 
economic activities.  Hence, the EU and NAFTA, in influencing firm strategies, will 
inadvertently produce changes in the organization of economic activities and have 
development implications.  While these two economic blocs differ in terms of the 
specific policies implemented and multifarious perspectives emerged from these 
studies, some central themes and experiences of firms are apparent. 
 
2.2.1 Firm Strategies in the Changing Geography of Production 
 A key thread in the literature is the influence of national regulations on the 
strategies of firms before the formation of the economic blocs.  Prior to NAFTA, 
North American production had been influenced by the existence of various 
regulations, and thus had not been organized on a continental scale.  As demonstrated 
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by some scholars (Holmes, 1991; 1992; Yang, 1998; Kessler, 1999; Heron, 2002), 
regulations such as the US-Canada Auto Pact, Mexican Automotive Decrees and 
maquiladora provisions played a significant role in conditioning the form of production 
methods, the types of production activity and production alliances adopted by firms.  
Similarly prior to the Single European Market (SEM), production activities were not 
organized on a pan-European scale as it was heavily conditioned by the existence of 
national regulations (Dicken, 1992; Howells, 1992).  Clearly, the geography of 
production was driven not only by the strategic orientations of various firms and costs 
 engaging in specialization of product segments in different locations 
issues, but also by the institutional environments.  These limitations resulted in many 
plants operating below their full capacity and incurring significant costs. 
The post-NAFTA and post-SEM period saw the escalation of industrial 
restructuring efforts by various firms, especially in the auto, pharmaceuticals, garment, 
and electronics industry.  Discussions in many studies focused on relations between rules-
of-origin (ROO) and various trade regimes on firm strategies (e.g. Dicken, 1992; Sadler and 
Swain, 1994; Yang, 1998; Kessler, 1999; Britton, 2002; Begg et al, 2003).  These more 
liberal ROO prompted firms to adopt cost efficiency strategies through changes to 
their sourcing techniques, rationalizing their production chains through mergers and 
acquisitions, and
(e.g. Amin et al, 1992; Holmes and Kumar, 1998; Weintraub and Sands, 1998; Chapman 
and Edmond, 2000; Gertler et al, 2000; Studer-Noguez, 2002).  The enmeshing of these 
strategic tools have contributed to a changing geography of production, whereby a 
typical firm’s production shifts from relatively disjointed units to rationalized 
production chains stretching across each economic bloc.  Evidence of this increased 
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economic integration in North America is the increased intra-industry and intra-firm 
trade, conducted particularly by US-based TNCs (Holmes, 2000: 659).  A key 
implication of the SEM is the pan-European rationalization of secondary production 
facilities (labour intensive, batch tableting and packaging) and a shift of these 
operations to lower cost localities in the pharmaceuticals industry (Howells, 1992).  
Thus, economic integration under NAFTA and the SEM highlights the existence of 
overcapacity in various industries and also facilitates solutions to the problem as cross-
border acquisitions have preceded rationalization on a continental scale. 
 Another aspect of previous studies is the influence of geographical proximity on 
rm strategies.  Besides the role of ROO in shifting sourcing towards economies 
AFTA benefits, Japanese manufacturing capacities (both assembly and 
component base) were increasingly transplanted across the US and Mexico (Florida and 
fi
within the same economic bloc, geographical proximity of the member economies has 
created an incentive for firms to source within the economic bloc.  Particularly in 
NAFTA, empirical studies in the garment and auto sectors note increased sourcing 
activity in Mexico despite the lower quality of the component inputs.  While lower 
costs is one of the most commonly cited factors, geographical proximity among the 
NAFTA economies gives an added advantage of the tighter coordination of production 
chains and smoother production processes (Holmes and Kumar, 1998; Kessler, 1999; 
Heron, 2002).   
 Besides member firms, non-NAFTA and non-SEM firms have also responded 
to the challenges of each economic bloc.  Another key research theme was the strategic 






, 1994; 1995), and their sourcing strategies began to include North American 
suppliers (Holmes, 1992).  In Europe, the imminence of the SEM and a protectionist 
Fortress Europe accelerated Japanese investments in the early 1990s (Dicken, 1992; 
Smidt, 1992).  Furthermore, Japanese attempts to achieve an 80% local content 
affected the production and component sourcing geography of automobiles (Sadler 
and Swain, 1994).  Consequently, Japanese transplants had serious implications for the 
North American and European production system by stimulating the rationalization of 
the production chains of other firms to enhance competitiveness and subsequently 
effecting changes in the production geographies. 
 
 In short, both the SEM and NAFTA have numerous implications for firm 
strategies and in the process produced a string of changes in the geographies of 
European and North American production respectively.  However, a key critique of 
this body of literature is the predominant usage of a case study approach in examining changes 
in firm strategies (e.g. Dicken, 1992; Holmes, 1992; Howells, 1992; Kessle
Noguez, 2002).  No doubt a case study approach yields detailed insights into the 
changes involved.  Nevertheless, the generalization of these insights across the 
economy is not only erroneous; it also restricts further understanding of firm responses 
in different sectors.  I suggest the usage of a questionnaire survey methodology as a 
complement to a case study approach provides a better proximate on how economic 
blocs shape managerial perceptions and its accompanying influence on firm strategic 
responses.   
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Another critique is the big-firm bias in existing research.  Many studies focused 
on the restructuring strategies of TNCs in response to the formation of NAFTA and 
the EU   (e.g. Amin et al, 1992; Dicken, 1992; Holmes, 1992; 2000; Howells, 1992; 
Phelps, 1997; Chapman and Edmond, 2000; Hudson, 2003).  TNCs are the prime 
movers and shakers of the global economy and thus an in-depth comprehension of 
eir economic activities is crucial towards understanding geographies of production.  
g by TNCs arising from 
ic regionalism, the focus is often on the export 
implications economic blocs hold for SMEs (Pett and Wolff, 2003).  Instead, we need 
th
However, it appears ironic that with increased outsourcin
economic integration, the important role of SMEs in these changing strategies has been 
neglected.  In some industries, such as pharmaceuticals, the role of small biotechnology 
firms in innovation and developing new technologies has been crucial in spearheading 
changes in the industry.  Contrary to the subservient role attached to SMEs seemingly 
suggested in many studies (Dicken, 1992; Howells, 1992; Phelps, 1997; Chapman and 
Edmond, 2000), SMEs are not pawns in the restructuring game of TNCs; SMEs too 
have a certain amount of capacity to resist and protect themselves by developing 
various responses towards regional economic integration and TNC activities.   
In general, economic regionalism has changed the system of regulations and 
controls governing the production and distribution of products, heightened 
competition in the domestic market and increased export opportunities for SMEs 
(Smallbone et al, 1999).  SMEs face problems in adjusting to the new macro-regional 
environment due to their size-related characteristics which further affect their ability to 
identify, cope with and respond to new sources of threat and opportunity.  Even in the 
scant research into SMEs and econom
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to question the routes pursued by SMEs to reposition themselves strategically in the 
changing production networks within economic blocs.  Thus, there exists an imperative 
to make a leap from simply studying impacts of economic blocs on SMEs (Foley and 
Griffith, 1992; Smallbone et al, 1999), towards one examining the strategic and pre-
emptive responses of SMEs to these changes.   
 
2.2.2 Industrial Organization and Nature of Production 
 While firm strategies have changed the geography of production, more 
specifically these strategies have also affected the nature and industrial organization of 
economic activity.  “A set of technological and organizational changes do appear to have 
been triggered by the FTA; in other cases, one could argue the FTA has accelerated 
changes already underway” (Gertler, 1999: 177).  Through industrial restructuring, for 
example, shifts towards capital intensive operations has emerged as a key thread in 
many studies (e.g. Dicken, 1992; MacPherson and Will, 1992; Hudson, 1997; 1998; 
Yang, 1998; Britton, 2002).  To fulfill NAFTA ROO, Asian manufacturers and their 
suppliers have been investing heavily in state-of-the-art electronics plants in Mexico 
and modernization of maquiladora production methods (Yang, 1998).  In a survey of 
industrialists’ opinions of the SEM, more than 60% reported that the SEM had effects 
on the restructuring of production plants (c.f. Phelps, 1997: 48).  Therefore, increased 
competitive pressures and market access in the new regional environment has 
stimulated the need for capital investments to increase productivity and efficiency in 
servicing the larger regional markets.   
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 This shift towards capital-intensive production is often accompanied by 
changes in industrial organization.  Evidence on the growth of intra-firm and intra-
uring units and with component suppliers (e.g. Gertler, 1999; Holmes, 2000; 
air and Gereffi, 2001).  As argued by Kessler (1999: 589), “NAFTA paves the way for 
industry trade reflects the strategic thrust towards specialization and continentally 
integrated production chains on the part of TNCs in the rescaled SEM and NAFTA 
production space-economy. Hence, many studies noted the emergence of increasingly 
integrated forms of industrial organization and supply chain management techniques (e.g. Holmes, 
1991; 1992; Howells, 1992; Yang, 1998; Kessler, 1999).  The increased outsourcing of 
peripheral activities and intensified trends towards rationalizing and integrated 
sourcing, production and distribution in the post-NAFTA period have also been 
associated with the closer integration of subsidiaries with their parent firms (Gertler, 
1999; Britton, 2002; Heron, 2002).  To be precise, intra-firm relationships have been 
woven more tightly in the post-NAFTA and post-SEM period. 
 While some degree of vertical (re)integration has occurred, horizontal integration 
has been underway.  Many studies reported a changed relationship between individual 
manufact
B
a variety of production sharing arrangements that are not possible under the 
maquiladora program”.  Distinctively, pre-NAFTA short-term arms-length assembly 
contracts have evolved into post-NAFTA strategic alliances with higher levels of 
organizational integration such as joint ventures and FDI in Mexican production 
facilities (Kessler, 1999).  This inevitably means the increased usage of local suppliers 
(Mexican in this case) and the heightened importance of SMEs in the manufacturing 
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process.  Thus, inter-firm relationships across the production chain become 
increasingly complex.  
 Some scholars have also noted how inter-firm and intra-firm relationships at 
particular nodes of production have evolved (e.g. Holmes and Kumar, 1998; Gertler, 
1999; Kessler, 1999).   Both Holmes’ (1992) and Dicken’s (1992) study of NAFTA and 
the SEM noted the entry of Japanese transplants and their organizational practices into 
the North American and European automobile industry respectively, have contributed 
to the
trial organization in NAFTA have 
been th
 development of more cooperative industrial relations in the formerly 
independent parts supplier segment.  Increased local sourcing required for fulfilling 
NAFTA provisions has also led to the creation of a “cluster” industrial organizational 
structure with the lead firm and independent suppliers undertaking functions such as 
R&D and quality control collaboratively (Yang, 1998).  Thus, the emergence of a new 
supply chain management philosophy coupled with changes in industrial relations 
means the various production functions are ever more blurred and enmeshed into one 
another. 
 
 Generally, many of these changes in indus
eorized with the aid of a Global Commodity Chains (GCC) framework (e.g. 
Kessler, 1999; Bair and Gereffi, 2001; Heron, 2002).  Though the GCC framework has 
utility, I argue that it is unable to capture sufficiently the various changes in industrial 
organization.  First, a key critique of this usage of the GCC framework is the limited 
explanatory utility of a ‘chain’ concept in both NAFTA and SEM production arrangements.  The 
usage of a ‘chain’ emphasizes the “sequential and interconnected structures of 
 35
economic activities, with each link or element in the chain adding value to the process” 
(Henderson et al, 2002: 439).  Yet, production processes in the NAFTA and SEM 
environment are increasingly complex and exhibit a blurring of functions rather than 
taking the form of discrete units in the GCC perspective.   Rather, production in 
economic blocs increasingly approximates the form of a network organization, with 
multiple linkages and interconnected functions in the production and distribution of 
goods. 
of a GCC framework based on input-
utput structures is insufficient in reflecting the complexities involved.  
 
  
A second related critique is the inadequacies of the GCC framework in capturing 
macro-regional geographies of production.  The production geographies under NAFTA and 
the SEM are often spatially aggregated into generalized patterns (usually core-
periphery) under the GCC framework (Heron, 2002), hardly reflective of their complex 
network nature.  To reiterate, regional integration will inadvertently have significant 
impacts on the production strategies of firms, ranging from sourcing, manufacturing, 
testing to distribution.  Therefore, the adoption 
o
2.2.3 Implications for Economic Development 
New forms of industrial organization “joining firms in industrial clusters that 
span both country and industry boundaries reshape the larger North American 
production chain in that they alter the locations at which distinct nodes of production 
‘touch down’” (Kessler, 1999: 571).  A key concern in most studies is the implications 
of economic regionalism on issues of development and competitiveness (e.g. 
MacPherson and Will, 2001; Gereffi, 1992; MacPherson and McConnell, 1992; Heron, 
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2002; Smith, 2003).  Studies have attempted to demonstrate the relationships between 
changing firm strategies and industrial organization on regional development.  In the 
apparel industry, increased sourcing arising from NAFTA ROO has created new forms 
of cross-border production networks and allowed Mexico to develop OEM apparel 
produc
 First, the GCC conceptualization of production processes as vertical 
and lin
tion with backward linkages into the Mexican domestic economy (e.g. Kessler, 
1999; Bair and Gereffi, 2003). 
A related thread is the upgrading opportunities for firms.  NAFTA was signed 
in the belief that greater competition will induce firms to attain higher standards of 
performance.  With increased specialization and outsourcing, many firms have moved 
up the value ladder towards technologically intensive activities such as R&D (Britton, 
2002).  Turning to Europe, the SEM was implemented with aims to nurture European 
champions able to compete more effectively against American and Japanese producers 
(Howells, 1992; James 1997; Hudson, 1998), thus increasing the competitiveness of 
firms and the economies they are embedded in. 
 
While many of the studies reviewed offer valuable insights, some issues need to 
be highlighted. 
ear is inadequate in capturing developmental linkages between different localities.  In 
other words, it is unable to “penetrate effectively the national, sub-national and intra-
firm levels, which are where key development issues are still largely determined” 
(Czaban and Henderson, 2003: 193).  For instance, shifts in sourcing strategies of 
apparel manufacturers from the Caribbean towards Mexico had negative impacts on 
the textile and apparel industry of Miami, which is the hub for cutting and repair 
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operations for Caribbean-bound fabrics (Heron, 2002: 762).  The sequential focus of 
the GCC perspective is an impediment towards understanding the nature of 
production as dense networks of relationships and how these have implications 
stretching across the space-economy. 
Second, the adoption of a GCC framework to understand development 
implications faces the problem of over-privileging the power of key agents in the GCC (such as 
retailers and textilers) as driving forces in shaping production geographies.  The 
reorganization of production chains in the NAFTA environment is often perceived to 
be the work of key agents within the chain (e.g. Heron, 2002).  In Kessler’s terms 
(1999: 589), “as textilers and retailers exploit NAFTA provisions to capture and/or 
extend control over segments of the apparel production chain, Mexican manufacturers 
and textile companies are becoming important players in new transnational networks”.  
Thus it appears that developmental implications are the sum of the structure and 
distribution of power among the key economic agents in the GCC.  This not only 
negates the role of institutional agents and their associated policies in shaping the 
organization of economic activity, but also reduces the role of local agency to affect 
development.   
Third, a related critique is the central preoccupation within this body of research in 
mapping the changing geography of production (e.g. Dicken, 1992; Holmes, 1992; 2000; 
Howells, 1992; Chapman and Edmond, 2000).  I concur that an understanding of the 
trends and patterns of production is clearly important.  However, a key question as to 
what purposeful usage can we make of these patterns remains largely unanswered.  To 
be precise, with corporate activity increasingly articulated on a macro-regional scale and 
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with local fortunes more or less tightly locked into this process of economic 
integration, what are the implications of changing firm strategies in economic 
regionalism on localities? 
Many studies have arrived at the conclusion that restructuring and 
tionalization of TNC operations have produced core-periphery geographies of 
produc
ork on the multiplicity of corporate spatial geographies and 
ierarchies (1984 c.f. Amin and Malmberg, 1992) reminds us of the need to move 
spanning reach 
of TNC
f regional and local development requires us to delve into the 
terplay of factors and how relationality among actors (TNCs, SMEs, local 
ra
tion in the EU and NAFTA (e.g. Amin et al, 1992; Dicken, 1992; Howells, 1992; 
Hudson, 1997; Holmes, 2000; Britton, 2002).  Such core-periphery patterns indicate a 
dependency perspective and suggest little capacity for localities to develop their own 
strategies to attract higher-end TNC operations and to improve their fortunes.  
However, Massey’s w
h
beyond generalizing from particular locational forms.  With the global 
s, the organizational structures of TNCs are less hierarchical, and composed of 
multiple inter-firm and intra-firm networks.  By definition, “networks are relational: the 
conditions of possibilities and actions of network participants are defined by their 
relationship with other participants, rather than their own inherent characteristics” 
(Leitner and Sheppard, 2002: 496).   
 The interest in mapping the changing geography of production has not been 
accompanied by a similar interest in understanding the processes involved in these 
changing geographies.  Insights into the multiplicity of processes shaping production 




administrators, state officials etc.) ‘tug and stretch’ at these webs of networks.  In other 
words, insights into the processes underpinning firm strategies and power relationships 
within these networks can make substantial contributions in understanding firm 
strategies, production geographies and development implications.   
 
Based on the review above, it is clear firm strategies coupled with associated 
organization and geographies of production are often influenced by the formation of 
regional economic blocs.  As these production patterns become increasingly complex 
and network-like in nature, these exists a need to explore theoretical ideas to frame 
these developments. 
 
2.3 APPROACHING THE CONCEPTUALIZATION OF FTAs 
With the rise of economic blocs, scholars from various disciplines (especially 
international relations and economics) are churning out theories and concepts to 
understand this phenomenon.  In Geography, attempts have been made to study 
regionalism, particularly in the sub-discipline of political geography.  Economic 
geographers’ contributions are in the form of mapping flows of investments and firms’ 
activities, and making generalizations of corporate and production geographies within 
and between blocs.  While these studies yield empirically rich insights, this has not been 
accompanied by comparable richness in theoretical and conceptual ideas.  Hence, there 
exists an urgency to explore possible frameworks aimed at conceptualizing macro-
regional economies.   
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2.3.1 Thinking of Economic Regionalism from an Organizational Perspective: A 
 
Network Approach 
 As suggested earlier, an objective of this research is to approach the 
conceptualization of regional economic integration whereby firms are placed as a 
centre of analysis.  Using the firm as a point of entry, the relational framework argues 
that “the firm is an organizational unit bringing together diverse social relations in 
which actors in the firm are embedded” (Yeung, 2000: 14).  Firms are thus enmeshed 
in loosely coupled networks of reciprocity, interdependence, and unequal power 
relations.  From the literature reviewed in this thesis, it appears firms are passive 
respondents towards economic regionalism; responding strategically to the impacts 
posed by regional integration and more broadly, trade liberalization (e.g. Dicken and 
Hassler, 2000; Sjöberg and Sjöholm, 2004).  Instead, I assert that firms are imbricated 
in the formation of economic blocs, and albeit in a rather different manner when 
viewed from the organizational perspective.  On the one hand, PTAs are created with 
an objective of influencing production, investment and trade activities.  On the other, 
firms’ tactics such as lobbying and consultation with public agencies can determine the 
shape of trade and economic policies.  In short, firm activities and PTAs are 
interdependent.  Thus, I echo Yeung’s (2001: 316) view on the importance of going 
“beyond macro-economic analysis and to embrace an organizational perspective which 
seeks to explain the empirical patterns in the global economy through an examination 
of such major actors as TNCs and their worldwide web of activities”.  From this 
analytical angle, instead of interpreting economic regionalism as a spatial logic pitted 
against the local, national and/or global (characteristic of trade creation/diversion 
studies), e between economic regionalism should be understood in relational terms as the interdependenc
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global, nat een firms 
and territo
 As observed in studies of changing production geographies in the EU and 
NAFTA, the conceptual basis most commonly utilized is the GCC framework 
advanced by Gereffi, which runs contrary to the network nature of economic activity in 
NAFTA and EU and the fluidity of firm boundaries.  In extrapolation, the very essence 
of the USSFTA demands the creation of qualitatively new transnational production networks as firms 
search for new sourcing and production options.  Therefore, I argue a network approach has 
immense utility in the conceptualization of the organization of production. 
 According to Dicken and Thrift (1992: 285-286), “a particularly fruitful way of 
conceptualizing the organization of production chains and production systems is as a 
complex set of networks or inter-relationships between firms which have differing 
degrees of power and influence”.  This approach broadens the scope of analysis to 
include differential power relations amongst actors, and the various equity and non-
equity re re thus 
intra-firm  and a 
process ns are 
connected in a coherent manner for mutual benefits and synergies” (Yeung, 2000a: 
302).  This multidimensional nature of networks encompasses various agents without 
over-privileging any particular agent.  
Furthermore, networks are not simply social relations; networks have a spatial 
element.   
If networks are social structures and relational processes constituted 
by intentional actors and are causal mechanisms capable of effecting 
ional and local logics through the networks of relationships spun among and betw
ries.   
lationships linking actors in production networks.  Network relations a
, inter-firm and extra-firm.  Networks are “both a governance structure
of socialization through which disparate actors and organizatio
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empirical changes, they must be recognized as having distinctive 
time-space specificity in their workings such that no regular 
network formation (Yeung, 2000b: 23).   
While network linkages transcend international boundaries and geographical 
scales, th n space, 
reflecting rritorial 
embedde SSFTA 
may be i d trade 
regulatio ctures in the organizational 
and exchange, the importance of tacit knowledge and social and 
of markets, the social and discursive architecture that binds 
institutions which sediment or renew habits, conventions and 
 
 
conjunctions of events or outcomes can be fully predicted by 
 
e territorial element of networks suggests networks do ‘touch down’ i
 differences in the regulatory and institutional terrains.  This te
dness of networks indicates governance mechanisms such as the U
nternalized within the production network through specific ROO an
ns.  Within the USSFTA space-economy, disjun
and cultural environment continue to create ‘bounded’ national space-economies, 
capable of influencing the firm and network configurations.  Thus, actors and networks 
are embedded within territories, as territories are also “inserted” into networks.   
The notion of relationality endorses networks with immense analytical power in 
the study of production geographies.  Relationality recognizes the  
role of rationalities of behaviour, the social relations of production 
conversational skills, the institutionally and socially mediated nature 
economic actors together into networks of association, the 
routines (Amin, 1998: 159).   
Economic actors are always embedded in social and institutional networks on a 
multiplicity of geographical and organizational scales, and these relations impinge on 




2.3.2 Conceptualizing FTAs 
 The network approach adopted in my study of the USSFTA draws heavily 
from the Global Production Network (GPN) perspective.  The GPN 
Is a conceptual framework that is capable of grasping the global, 
involved in many forms of economic globalization.  Production 
through which goods and services are produced, distributed and 
also increasingly global in their geographic extent.  Such networks 
blur traditional organizational boundaries… but also integrate 
 
regional and local economic and social dimensions of the processes 
networks – the nexus of interconnected functions and operations 
consumed – have become both organizationally more complex and 
not only integrate firms (and parts of firms) into structures which 
national economies (Henderson et al, 2002: 445). 
This focus on an organizational perspective and the relationality of territorially 
embedded actors are particularly useful in the study of changing production 
geographies in the USSFTA.  First, the GPN perspective is able to capture the blurring 
of production functions and increasing complexities in economic activities without 
falling into a territorial trap of generalizing these spatial geographies.  Second, the 
relational logic acknowledges the mutually constitutive relationship between the 
USSFTA and firms’ activities in shaping the precise policy provisions of the USSFTA, 
and firms’ responses to the USSFTA.  Third, the attention on the hybrid networks of 
interdependence locking together social, economic and institutional agents embedded 
in different spatial scales offers insights into the processes involved in the changing 
geographies under the USSFTA and their developmental outcomes.  Accordingly, this 
draws attention to power dynamics without over privileging any agent, thus opening 
more ‘space’ for local agency. 
Though the production geographies under the USSFTA is more about Regional 
Production Networks (RPNs) than GPNs, the conceptual elements of value, networks, 
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firms and institutions remain applicable in my study of RPNs.  In addition, the precise 
configura nce of 
the instit  on the 
strategic (i.e. knowledge, 
 
tion of RPNs in the USSFTA are not solely determined by the existe
utional environment created by the USSFTA; but are also predicated
interaction between the demands of GPNs and regional assets 
skills, institutional environment) (Coe et al, 2004).  This element highlights the need to 
steer clear of according causal power to structures such as the USSFTA, hence 
avoiding tendencies of spatial fetishism.  In line with network analysis, the idea of 
scales (regional, global) is replaced with the topological idea of connections (Dicken et 
al, 2001); what is regional is thus also global.   
  
 In the analysis of RPNs in the macro-regional economy of the USSFTA, five 
principal conceptual elements are raised: firms, institutions, USSFTA provisions, 
networks and relational geometries as well as value.  With reference to Figure 2.1, 
firms, institutions and networks are territorially embedded within the abstract space 
created by the USSFTA provisions.  It must be reminded that each entity is embedded 
unevenly within this space, reflecting differences in power, capacities, priorities and 
most importantly, territoriality.  Hence, this differential embeddedness will create 







The significance of firms in capitalist economies lies in their 
combination of financial control over resources with employment.  
As ownership-based units of decision making and control, they are 
clearly central collective actors in the mobilization, allocation, and 
use of assets (Whitley, c.f. Dicken and Malmberg, 2001: 351). 
 
Firms are influential actors as their socio-spatial organization of production spin webs 
of intra-firm and inter-firm relationships weaving together firms and territories, and 
shapes specific spatial outcomes.  Presenting four6 different groups of firms from 
different economies (Figure 2.1) reflect the heterogeneity of firms, for they comprise a 
constellation of network relations fundamentally and intrinsically territorial and spatial: 
territorial in the sense they “derive some of their characteristics from and also directly 
influence the characteristics of specific territories”, and spatial in as they are 
“responsive to geographic distance and spatial variations in the availability of necessary 
resources and business opportunities” (Dicken and Malmberg, 2001: 355).  Clearly, 
territorial and spatial elements are important in shaping firms’ networks and strategies.  
“The corporation does not simply use space, nor does it control space… instead space 
is produced through the establishment of relational networks within and outside the 
corporation” (Pritchard, 2000: 793).  The choice to place firms in the centre of the 
framework in Figure 2.1 exemplifies how geographic space, such as the space created 
by the USSFTA, is manipulated and used by firms as part of their competitive 
strategies.  Hence, territoriality and spatiality influence how some firms construct 
RPNs, how other firms are “inserted” into RPNs and how localities are differentially 
rticulated into RPNs. a
                                                 
ce to separate Riau and Malaysia from the ASEAN group of firms is because Riau and 

































































Represents the Networks spun amongst different agents 
Figure 2.1
 





 I rticular 
localities tutional 
mechanisms such as tax incentives and labour relations, institutions can influence the 
nature of socio-economic development at these places.  It is imperative to point out 
that the state as an institution continues to act as significant containers of distinctive 
socio-cultural practices, regulatory institutions and constellation of other factors of 
production despite their increasing boundary permeability.   
Given the state as a key and more or less autonomous actor, it follows 
institutions are not coherent and bounded entities.  The state, business associations and 
NGOs have very different agendas arising from their socio-economic-political 
positionality.  Territorial embeddedness of these actors, either in the US or Singapore, 
affects the values, perceptions and policy practices of each actor.  Furthermore, the 
exercise  form 
coalition ions are 
lso networks of actors in differential power relationships rather than reified and 
naturally occurring (Jessop, 2001). 
 
USSFTA Provisions 
 The USSFTA provisions are an especially important conceptual element in my 
study of production geographies in the macro-regional economy of the USSFTA, 
exhibiting an influential role in shaping firm’s organization and geography of 
production.  According to Dicken and Malmberg (2001: 358),  
ions 
nstitutions are key agents influencing the architecture of RPNs at pa
 and how these RPNs ‘touch down’.  Through a variety of insti
of power by certain institutional actors in lobbying other actors to
s creates further fissures amongst various actors.  In this light, institut
a
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One of the major differentiating dimensions of geographic space, of 
course, is its demarcation into multiscalar spaces of governance, 
encompassing the “local state” through to the national, as well as 
such supranational jurisdictions as the European Union.  Such 
governed spaces are one of the major ways in which resources on 
which firms depend are packaged. 
 
Thus, the existence of these governed spaces encourages TNCs to search for the most 
suitable package.  As argued in the preceding sections, lobbying of interests by firms, 
especially TNCs are important in determining the provisions.  The USSFTA provisions 
are thus an outcome of the negotiations within and between institutional and firm 
actors.   
 Besides, provisions such as harmonization of standards and removal of tariffs 
aratively novel reordering of 
ace: to produce a spatial order of the ‘network’ and with a heightened emphasis on 
lity, as presented in Figure 2.2. 
like a server on the internet… we must have broadest band 
you will access the entire world best from Singapore (Straits Times, 9 
 
 insights into the developmental outcomes of the USSFTA. 
 
are instances of neoliberal discourses to effect a comp
sp
mobility, flexibility, connectivity and noda
Sealing these FTAs is to lock itself into the new global trade routes 
connectivity possible to the major economic centres of the world… 
December 2002). 
This reordered network space creates a qualitatively different environment, a 
disjuncture in the regulatory terrain of the global space-economy.  It is precisely how 
this new regulatory terrain ‘fits with’ the demands of GPNs that has an effect on the 
way RPNs evolves.  The USSFTA provisions are thus a catalyst in shaping the 




Figure 2.2: A pictorial representation of Singapore as a global ‘hub’.  Increased connectivity provided by 
Source: SEDB Annual Report (2001) 
the FTAs leads to the enlargement of Singapore as a central server. 
 
Networks and Relational Geometries 
 The conceptual element of networks in this framework is really RPNs formed 
by the strategic interaction amongst and between firms and institutions within the 
context of the USSFTA provisions.  Broadly, these networks are both formal (i.e. 
buyer-supplier, business associations, government-led initiatives) and informal (i.e. 
business associates).  More specifically, the networks are also intra-firm, inter-firm and 
extra-firm as discussed earlier.  These networks are in effect relational geometries 
where the “spatial configurations of heterogeneous relations among actors and 
structures through which power and identities are played out and become efficacious” 
(Yeung, 2005: 38).   
With reference to Figure 2.1, the broken lines surrounding each conceptual 
element suggest each element has fluid boundaries and are connected to the other 
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elemen
se elements.  Such an 
interpret in the 
distributi wer is 
emergent n these 
networks.  In short, these double-ended arrows are the networks of relationships spun 
                                              
ts.  The double-ended arrows further stresses this point and two interpretations 
of these arrows can be made.  On the one hand, the double-ended arrows indicate the 
interactions between these entities and relationality amongst actors in the construction 
of RPNs in the USSFTA.  On the other, these arrows pulling in opposing directions 
signal the tensions and differential power geometries between the
ation allows us to think of the influence of power and capacities 
on of economic activities within the USSFTA space-economy.  Po
 and situated in the positions of and relationality among actors i
between these elements, and how these networks are played out affects the precise 
architecture of RPNs: how the macro-regional geography of production is organized 
and how economic activity is organized at various nodes with specific spatial outcomes. 
 
Value7 and Power 
As argued earlier, the element of power is crucial for us to appreciate the 
tension between discrete categories of actors and to view power as an emergent effect 
of social action among actors.  Constellations of power are constantly shifting with the 
heterogeneity of network configurations.  Hence relational geometries, emergent power 
and socio-spatial outcomes cannot be determined a priori.  Of particular interest in this 
thesis is the manner in which changing subcontracting and partnership arrangements 
create unique configurations of power forcing us to rethink previous notions of 
domination and subordination in production arrangements.   
   
 conceptual element of value is currently not included in Figure 2.1.  In short, the whole process of 
economic flows and relationality in RPNs will engender value creation, enhancement and capture.  Thus, 
it is not possible to place value as a bounded entity in Figure 2.1. 
7 The
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Bringing ‘power’ back into the analysis of network forms of organization 
encourages us to reconsider our understanding of the relationship between 
collaboration, complementarities and development.  Dynamism in power relations 
influences the manner in which RPNs touch down, and how firms and localities are 
articulated into RPNs with differential developmental outcomes. 
 More importantly, it is the organization of the production, 
that impinge upon this process – state governa
appropriation and realization of value flows and the various forces 
nce, labour 
organization, corporate practices and so on – that are fundamental 
to the understanding of the (re)configuration of economic activity in 
increasingly integrated macro-regional economies (Smith et al, 2002: 
 
Highligh position 
of econo e flows 
(Henderson et al, 2002: 448).  In terms of value creation, interest resides in the initial 
conditions of production and the techniques used, and whether firms are able to 
generate value from their embedded position in the RPN.  In other words, how firms 
are plugged into the RPNs and the relationality between firms.  For value 
enhancement, the emphasis is on the circumstances and opportunities whereby firms 
are able to engage in value-added activities and thus undergo industrial upgrading.  
Simply, the concern here is the type of activities undertaken by firms (especially 
subcontractors) and the potential for development.  Lastly, the inter-relationships 
among social and economic actors in the RPNs condition the possibilities whereby 
value is captured for the benefit of the localities.  Here, the role of state policies in 
governing corporate activities is an extremely important factor. 
 
41). 
ting the issue of value directs attention to the differential power and 
mic actors in governing the creation, enhancement and capture of valu
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 Economic development of territories reflects the ways in which they are woven 
into the organizational spaces and production networks of firms.  Although the 
USSFTA may be a policy tool to catalyse trade liberalisation and generate economic 
development, the precise developmental outcomes are mediated by changes in firm 
rategies towards the USSFTA provisions, and the strategic interaction between firms 
is conceptual element helps to shed light on the 
for a methodological shift, as a focus on economic contingency 
and their inter-relations) (Boggs and Rantisi, 2003: 111). 
With an ontological emphasis on networks and relationality, we need epistemological 
tools of enquiry that focus on different groups of agents (Henderson et al, 2002; Phelps 
and Waley, 2004) and their different territorial underpinnings.  In analyzing how 
electronics production networks are (re)configured and the importance of relationality 
amongst agents, my research methodology involves survey-interviews with electronics 
firms in Singapore, interviews with institutional actors from Singapore and the US, as 
well as examining archival materials such as policy texts and press reports.  This 
methodology was chosen to reflect the ‘triangulation’ (Burgess, 1984; Yeung, 2003) of 
information sources, whereby “multiple lines of sights” (Berg, 1995: 5) allow for a 
more substantive picture of reality.  To reiterate, a survey without an interview 
generates raw statistical data that may be concrete and scientific, but lack life and 
impact.  Nor will an interview that is empirically rich be able to present a holistic 
st
and institutional capacities.  In short, th
changing competitive positions occupied by different localities.   
 
2.4 METHODOLOGY 
The relational turn in economic geography opens up the possibility 
implies a shift from the macro-level to the micro level (i.e. agents 
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picture of the phenomenon.  In addition, interviews with only a single group of actors 
may lead to biased perspectives as compared to interviews conducted with disparate 
groups of actors.  Hence, a combination of methods and points of entry will engender 
a more complete array of symbols, cues and linkages. 
 
2.4.1 Su
ue, subsidiary establishments and source of inputs.  
Inform
rvey-Interviews with Firms 
 As the USSFTA came into force on 1st January 2004, it was hence still a very 
new phenomenon when my research commenced.  To ensure that the research was 
headed in the right direction, pilot interviews were conducted with 2 electronics firms 
and 1 industry leader to gauge industrial perceptions on the USSFTA.  With the 
information obtained from the pilot interviews, a detailed methodological road map 
was drafted. 
 Since this thesis is interested in unpacking the webs of network relations spun 
by firms (Schoenberger, 1991), the key methodological instrument involved a survey-
interview.  This included an eleven pages long questionnaire and a cover letter detailing 
the aims of the survey (Appendix A).  In general, the questionnaire covered three broad 
groups of data.  The first group of questions sought to acquire information about the 
company including sales reven
ation from this section will provide suitable parameters such as firm size and 
origin necessary for statistical analysis8, a glimpse into the configuration of the 
electronics production networks and current firm strategies.  The second group of 
                                                 
8 Quantitative statistical analysis such as regression and chi-square tests are not conducted in my thesis as 
the sample size of 46 and total number of 190 players in the electronics industry is too small for the 
generation of reliable and meaningful results.  Besides, I am not concerned with prediction but more 
interested in explicating the processes involved in the changing production geographies. 
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questions collected data on the firm’s knowledge of the USSFTA and its impacts on 
their firm’s strategies since it was signed in 2003, for the purpose of uncovering 
changes to the configurations of the electronics production network.  The last group of 
questio
 and probable strategic reorientations in future.   
he 
survey-interview approach allowed the interviewer to explain the various terminologies 
At the same time, with the questionnaire structuring the whole session around themes, 
survey-interview, the questions were tailored according to the company’s background 
inte rs outside a structured 
format.  Hence, it introduced more fluidity and permitted me to understand the issues 
in the s
ns is directed to firms unaffected by the USSFTA, seeking to understand the 
problems and issues involved,
Rather than self-administered, the questionnaire was administered by t
interviewer as a result of the length and complexity of the questions asked.  This 
used in the questionnaire and to clarify the choice of answers provided when in doubt.  
I was able to interject with additional questions at suitable junctures.  Through a 
and operations to generate data that were empirically rich and multilayered as 
rviewees were given an opportunity to develop their answe
ubjects’ own terms (Burgess, 1984: 102).  In all, the survey-interview was less a 
question and answer session than a discussion, a “conversation with a purpose” (Elyes 
cited in Valentine, 1997: 111).   
Primary data on electronics firms located in Singapore were obtained from the 
Singapore Electronics Industry Directory 2003/2004 published by Times Business 
Information, which provides listings of electronics firms.  For this research is 
concerned with the production side of the networks, only electronics manufacturers 
were selected to participate in the research.  Based on the Singapore Yearbook of 
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Statistics (2003: 99), there are a total of 190 local and foreign electronics manufacturers 
in Singapore.  To ascertain the accuracy of the information provided in the Directory, 
web searches were conducted to ensure the firms’ profiles are up-to-date.   
The entire sampling procedure conducted between June to December 2004 
involved the following steps: 
1. Contact all 190 electronics manufacturers in groups of 50 either by email or fax. 
2. Give a follow-up telephone call one week after the first contact was made if there is 
no reply. 
3. Give another follow-up telephone call after the previous follow-up call if there is 
still no reply.   
4. Give another follow-up telephone call after the previous follow-up call if there is 
still no reply. 
5. P ceed   n uf s n in
E onics and 4
 the questionnaire of electronics manufacturers 
 Singapore.  Out of the 190 electronics manufacturers contacted, only 46 responded; 
making up a final response rate of 24.2%.  The breakdown of the completed 
questionnaires is presented in Table 2.1, and the profiles of the subjects and their firms 
are presented in Appendix B.  This response was achieved after three rounds of follow-
up telephone calls were made to non-responding firms.  Explanations from non-
responding firms revolved around “busy schedules” and “confidentiality of 
information”.  Much was done to reassure the firms that the information collected will 
ro to the next 50 electro ics man acturer listed i the S gapore 
lectr  Industry Directory, and repeat Steps 2, 3 . 
 
This section presents data from
in
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be kept anonymous and confidential.  Besides, the period when the survey was 
conducted coincided with the upswing in the electronics cycle, with many firms busy 
closing deals and meeting orders.  As a result, a tentative date for the survey-interview 
was scheduled for a couple of months later whereby the firm representatives were 
available.  This tactic was useful as it locked interested firms into an informal 
agreement while simultaneously allowing for a longer gestation period for the USSFTA 
to take effect.  Evident in the explanations provided by the firms towards the later 
stages of the research, many firms either responded enthusiastically to the survey-
interview or cited “busy schedules” as a reason for not responding.  This was in stark 
contrast to the common explanation “no impact from the USSFTA” as reported in the 
earlier stages of research.   
 
 Singapore US Others Total 
 Count Table % Count Table % Count Table % Count Table %
 SME9 11 23.9% 0 0% 1 2.2% 12 26.1% 
 TNC 19 41.3% 11 23.9% 4 8.7% 34 73.9% 




 Prior to each survey-interview, exhaustive preparations with respect to the 
background and operations of the firm concerned were made.  This is achieved by 
referring to past annual reports, information on company websites and press reports.  
In addition, experts in the electronics industry were also consulted to familiarize myself 
with “electronics lingo”, such as ‘box-build’ (meaning full product assembly) and ‘burn-
                                                
Table 2.1: Profile Breakdown of Interviewees. 
Source: Author’s Survey. 
 
9 According to the conventional definition used by Singapore's government agencies administering 
financial assistance to firms, an SME is a firm that has less that S$1mn in fixed assets (derived from 
interview with SPRING Singapore respondent, 29 March 2005). 
 57
in’ (related to printed circuit boards and semiconductors).  This is to ensure both the 
interviewer and interviewee are on the same wavelength to build trust and rapport in 
this brief relationship, which further facilitated the smooth delivery in the survey-
interview proceedings.   
 In the course of the survey-interview, power relations and in fact ‘power 
struggle’ at times between the interviewer and interviewee was a key issue of concern.  
Here, power was often in the hands of the interviewee because of their experience in 
interviewing and being interviewed.  Thus they were better at controlling the situation, 
 
evading questions or giving monosyllabic answers.  As all the interviews were 
conducted within the office premises of the firms concerned, the interviewees were 
also able to control the temporal and spatial environment to his advantage.  For 
instance, some interviewees attempted to demonstrate their power by making me sit by 
their desks while they continued reading their documents, and waited till they were 
ready for the survey-interview to commence.  In other cases the interviewees would
play the time game by saying, “I am very busy, so you only have 15 minutes”, although 
the scheduled appointment was to last for an hour. 
Given that all the interviewees were males in high-ranking managerial positions, 
gender relations were also often at play.  As a young female in a predominantly male 
environment, many interviewees engaged in some degree of maneuvers to catch me 
off-balance.  For example, phrases such as “I didn’t know that you’re so young”, 
“What you young girls know” and “Electronics are not for women” were often 
transpired in the course of the survey-interview.   
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 To circumvent the various problems encountered in this struggle for power, 
various measures were undertaken.  Exhaustive preparations were useful in 
demonstrating professionalism and knowledge of the research topic while the ability to 
communicate in “electronics lingo” came as a surprise to many interviewees.  This 
often made them “sit up” and became more interested in the survey-interview session.  
Relating questions to their current plans or to ask difficult but interesting questions 
suggesting I have done my “homework”, often won over the interviewees’ co-
TAs for electronics firms conducted by the 
Singapo
w with them.  Based on the spirit of an ontological emphasis on 
operation.  Hence, power was gradually shifted onto the side of the interviewer. 
 For some other cases, I took on the role of the educator.  Some interviewees 
started off by expressing, “I agreed to meet you because I want to learn more about the 
USSFTA”.  Thus, for this group of interviewees, much time was spent discussing the 
various tenets of the USSFTA and the possible opportunities and challenges presented 
to their firm.  Care was taken to ensure any bias in the survey-interview was reduced to 
a minimum, by negating all the information that arose out of the “education” process. 
 Possible bias in the research is the ratio of TNCs to SMEs interviewed.  The 
larger proportion of TNCs as compared to SMEs may skew results derived from the 
survey.  To overcome this problem, interviews played a critical role in generating 
insights into the situation SMEs face.  In addition, I attended an outreach workshop on 
understanding and utilizing Singapore’s F
re Business Federation.  In the course of the workshop, I conversed with many 
of the participants who were all SMEs.  Some of the participants were interviewees 
who have decided to attend the workshop after learning more about the USSFTA 
during my intervie
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networks in this research, participant observation of this nature allowed me to assume a 
 impact of the USSFTA, although 
‘relational’ position relative to the subjects.  This methodological shift generated a 
variety of subject narratives and promoted keen understanding of relational geometries 
of power.  Hence, the benefits of this workshop were twofold: I was first able to gauge 
the change in firm perceptions and strategies towards the USSFTA, as well as delved 
deeper into the issues and concerns of SMEs, which facilitated the correction of any 
gross bias that might result from the survey.   
 Given that my research commenced a year after the USSFTA was signed and 
six months after it was implemented, impact analysis of the USSTA is based on a 
relatively short time lag, thus firms may be unclear about the issue at hand.  While 
cautioning against over-analysis and over-interpretation of the survey-interview results, 
certain measures were undertaken to mitigate possible bias.  In the course of each 
survey-interview, I ensured that each interviewee had a clear understanding of what an 
FTA means and can do for their businesses.  This is reflected in Question 11 & 12 of 
the questionnaire-survey, which is designed specifically to gauge the interviewees' 
knowledge and understanding of the USSFTA.  Interviewees were also specifically 
asked to evaluate the actual rather than the potential
it is acknowledged that a time lag also exists between the issuance of directives and 
actual implementation of firm strategies. 
In sum, the survey interviews lasted for an average of 90 minutes and a tape 
recorder was used in all the interviews to ensure fluidity in the “conversation”.  The 
contents were subsequently transcribed to uncover various firm perceptions and 
understandings.   
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2.4.2 Interviews with Institutional Actors 
 To better grasp the role of institutional actors in influencing firm strategies and 
 Business Federation (SBF), the Association of Small and Medium 
nterprises (ASME) and the American Chamber of Commerce in Singapore 
 involvement in the electronics industry and the USSFTA.   
the electronics production network, interviews with state officials and non-state actors 
were conducted.  The search for suitable state officials was confined to the Ministry of 
Trade and Industry (MTI), Singapore Economic Development Board (SEDB), 
International Enterprise Singapore (IE), and SPRING Singapore (SPRING).  The 
choice of these ministries and the actual list of respondents were based upon their 
affiliations to trade, their involvement in the USSFTA negotiations and 
implementation.  Non-state actors included the Singapore Manufacturers’ Federation 
(SMa), Singapore
E
(AmCham), based on their
These subjects were firstly contacted by a direct email, made available by the services 
provided on the Singapore Government Directory Interactive and the respective 
association’s websites.  The replies were mostly positive, for the institutional actors 
were keen to learn more about my findings and opinions thus far.  In sum, of the 8 
targeted subjects, 6 were willing to be interviewed.    
 The interviews were conducted within the office premises of the interviewees.  
The concept of “conversation with a purpose” was once again adopted, whereby 
interviews were structured around themes rather than adhering to a rigid set of 
questions.  Here, power relations was less an issue of concern as the interview was 
more like a discussion, and sensitive questions related to politics and hidden agendas 
behind the USSFTA is of no concern in this research.  In short, the average duration of 
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the interviews was approximately 45 minutes.  A tape recorder was used and the 
contents were subsequently transcribed. 
Participant observation in the outreach workshop was also undertaken to 
titutional actors such as state officials presented Singapore’s FTAs to 
texts, reports and 
ress articles as secondary, I stress that the availability of these information sources is 
of primary importance in this thesis.  The key reason lies in the novelty (as both 
uniqueness and newness) of the USSFTA, which means commentators worldwide are 
keen to offer their expert opinions.  Embedded in these opinions are really debates 
about who the advocators are, who the beneficiaries are and what the USSFTA means 
for different actors.  Thus, this set of materials provides insights into the discursive 
power struggles over the USSFTA amongst different actors.  Beyond debates, many of 
these texts and reports such as the USSFTA agreement are also factual and basic 
explanations on the USSFTA.  They are important in building up a ‘database’ on the 
various provisions and impacts of the USSFTA.  These international sources of 
 
appreciate how ins
the firms concerned and how FTAs were understood by people in the industry.  I tried 
to enmesh myself into relationships with different people during the workshop, to 
learn about their perspectives on Singapore’s FTAs and to observe the interactions 
between firms and institutional actors.  This approach is useful in examining power 
relationships and how Singapore’s FTAs have been accepted and deliberated by people 
‘on the ground’. 
 
2.4.3 Texts and Reports 
 While many are quick to dismiss existing literature such as 
p
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information thus provide a good source of background material and present varying 
perspectives on the USSFTA. 
 
2.5 SUMMARY 
 This chapter discusses the contributions and theoretical pitfalls of the existing 
literature on economic regionalism.  Consequently, the key concern of this chapter and 
contribution of this thesis is to explore a possible conceptual framework that engenders 
a better understanding of the interrelations amongst economic regionalism, economic 
activities and development.  Therefore, this section casts its analytical attention on the 
concept of networks, namely the GPN framework and relationality, and unpacks its 
immense utility as an analytical lens for my study.  To complement the ontological 
concept of production networks and associated relationality, the methodological 





EXISTING ELECTRONICS PRODUCTION NETWORKS 
 
3.1 PREAMBLE 
 In Chapter 1, I mapped out a general view of Singapore’s position in the 
electronics RPN and highlighted the role of Singapore as a hub for high value-added 
electronics.  Here, I will further explore the geographical specificities of these 
electronics RPNs, and the nature of intra-firm and inter-firm relationships through the 
analysis of firm functions, firm unit establishments and production processes.  Detailed 
case studies of three interviewed firms will be discussed to offer more specific 
knowledge into their RPNs.  Besides forming the basis for the generation of insights 
into current firm strategies and power relationships, knowledge of the existing 
electronics RPN sets the backdrop towards an analysis of the changes to production 
and organizational geographies in the new USSFTA regulatory environment.  
 
3.2 FIRM FUNCTIONS: INTER-FIRM RELATIONSHIPS 
 Firms are heterogeneous entities operating at different scales with different 
scope of functions ranging from product R&D, process R&D, manufacturing, tests 
and assembly, as well as marketing and distribution.  Thus, knowledge of the types of 
activities undertaken helps to ascertain the firms’ positions and roles in the RPN.  
Product R&D as a high value-added process reflects a firm’s technological capabilities.  
93.5% of responding firms undertake product R&D operations within their firm, with 
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the type of product R&D tend to be peripherals such as casings and not the 
 
with my ers’ are 
occupying less of a branch plant position and that Singapore firms are climbing up the 
technological ladder, pro
 P isplay similar operational bias towards foreign firms as in 
product R
means to lower costs of production and increa ble 3.1).  
Interestin ly, all the non-Singapore firms that indicated the importance of process 
R&D as part of their operations in Singapore hold Overseas Headquarters or Regional 
Headquarters status, drawing resonance with similar findings in another study (Poon 
and Thompson, 2003).   Again, Singapore-OEMs are active in partnership 
arrangements with foreign firms rather than with local firms.  As SG-TNC-8 expressed, 
significant variations in the degree of product R&D across the sample (Table 3.1).  
Interviews show that Singapore-SMEs conduct product R&D on a sporadic basis and
components itself.  In reality, SMEs on the whole hardly engage in product R&D.  
According to this respondent, “I must know my capabilities; I don’t have the resources 
to do real R&D” (SG-SME-4).  Singapore-OEMs (63.6%) and semiconductor (60%) 
manufacturers tend to engage in partnership arrangements with foreign firms, while US 
(100%) and non-USSFTA (80%) firms are more inclined to engage in joint product 
R&D amongst them.  In the terms of US-TNC-710, “Singapore firms have definitely 
come a long way, but to really partner them on a long term basis for R&D and hand 
them product mandates is not something I would do… I can either do it in-house or
 established partners”.  Although Singapore’s foreign manufactur
duct R&D still remains a very foreign dominated firm activity. 
rocess R&D also d
&D.  84.8% of responding firms engage in some degree of process R&D as a 
se manufacturing standards (Ta
g
                                                 
 found in Appendix B, and this applies for all other responding firms 
throughout the analysis. 
10 The details of this firm are
 65
“It’s not we look down on local firms, but if you want a partner for R&D, you have to 
aim high.  And it will be foreign firms who have the technology”.   
Manufacturing operations are conducted by all interviewed firms and 
substantial partnership arrangements may be observed.  This insinuates the possibility 
edding some of their manufacturing capacity by 
ng production orders to Singapore firms.  Findings from Table 3.2 confirms that 
a substantial number of US-OEMs (50%) an S BMs (71.4%) e in partnerships 
all Singapore-OEMs surveyed are in manufacturing 
partnerships with US firms.  However SG-SMEs who are normally component 
suppliers (approximately 50%), continue to be left out of these partnership 
arrangements especially with foreign firms.  
worked wit a
and they deliver on time.  So I have no qualms about working with 
g as the rice is compe ve The partn  n
newed pe
experience
large orders, I don’t think they hav e resources to handle them 
 
 
ug y est is
s ill al p
long-time SME partners (SG-TNC-17).   
Overall, SG-SME and SG-TNC relationships proximate long-term production 
arrangements, while SG-TNC and US  relations term
length transactions to middle-term produc  arrangements.  Therefore  
electronics RPN configurations between non-Singapore firms and their sup er  
to hierarc al in n re, rr g ar pr uction ation an t in  
locales (Phelps, 1996). 
of US
handi
 and non-USSFTA firms sh
d U -O  ar
with Singapore firms and 90.9% of 





























































































































Ass y ri nPro uct R Process R&D Manufacturing 
T st & 
embl
Marketing & 
Dist butio  Firm Functio R
T  %   %
ns ow 
otal   Row   Row %   Row % Row    Row % 
OBM 3 3 100. % 0 0 0 %3 100. % 3 100. % 2 66.7  3 100.0% 
OEM 11 11 100. %  0 0 0 %  11 100. % 11 100. % 11 100.0  1 9.1%
CS 11 8 72. %   7 % 0 %  7 63.6  11 100. % 9 81.8  1 9.1%
Singapore 
M 0 0 0 %  SE  5 5 100. % 5 100. % 5 100. % 5 100.0  1 20.0%
OBM 7 7 100. % 0 0 %6 85.7% 7 100. % 6 85.7  7 100.0% 
US 
0 0 %OEM 4 4 100. % 3 75.0% 4 100. % 4 100.0  3 75.0% 
OBM 3 3 100. % 0 0 % 100.0% 2 66.7% 3 100. % 3 100.0  3 Others 
M 0 0 0 % 100.0% SE  2 2 100. % 2 100. % 2 100. % 2 100.0  2 
Table Total 4 93.5% % 291.3  1 45.7%   6 43 39 84.8% 46 100.0% 42 
 
Table 3.1: Firm Fun s r h m





ction  Perfo med within t e Fir s. 
on 5). 
Within Firm 
 Sing pore 
Firms 
s 
Oth r For gn 
Firms Manuf in
Row %   Row % Row % 
actur g 
      Row % 
OBM 3 3 100.0% 1 33.3% %2 66.7% 2 66.7
OEM 11 11 100.0% 9 81.8%  %10 90.9% 9 81.8
CS 11 11 100.0% 7 63.6%  5 45.5% 6 54.5%
Singapore 
1 20.0%SEM 5 5 100.0% 3 60.0% 3 60.0%
OBM 7 7 100 0% .  5 71.4% 7 100.0% 5 71.4% 
US 
 .  2 50.0% OEM 4 4 100 0% 4 100.0% 4 100.0% 
OBM 3 3 100 0% .  1 3 733. % 2 66. % 2 66.7% 
Others 
1 50.0% 100.0SEM 2 2 100.0% 2 100.0% 2 %
Table T  100.0% 27 1  71.1% 58.7% 35 76. % 33otal 46 46
 
Table 3.2: Manufacturing io o d o nd with  F
Source: Author’s Survey (Q





 Analysis into testing and assembly operations reveals the low value-added 
nature o
is or just subcontract it out” (US-TNC-3).  Therefore, 
Singapor
 M n-house 
activity w re firms 
conduct marketing and distribution operations, of which 3 are OBMs.  “As an OEM I 
don’t have my own product to speak of, so marketing is not important.  Also, I don’t 
export direct, I sell it back to the TNC subsidiaries here, so what marketing is there?” 
(SG-TNC-6).  Overall, only US firms such as OBMs (100%) have substantial marketing 
activities which they retain in-house.   
 By illuminating the activities undertaken by different categories of firms and the 
various inter-firm relationships among different types of firms, I argue that large TNCs 
especially OBMs are key agents in the electronics RPN, with immense control over the 
more profitable sections (R&D) of the RPN.  Consequently, the manner in which they 
relate to the other agents in the RPN through short-term arms-length transactions or 
long-term partnerships affects how different firms are articulated into the RPN. 
 
 
f these activities.  Albeit 91.3% of responding firms claim they conduct testing 
and assembly operations (Table 3.1), further probing reveals the minimal extent of this 
activity among large TNCs, OBMs and OEMs.  Subcontracting relations rather than 
partnership arrangements tend to dominate these aspects.  “Conducting testing and 
assembly in-house is a waste of resources.  We either partner a Singapore firm to do it 
for us on a long-term bas
e firms are important nodes in this stage of the RPN. 
arketing operations (45.7% of responding firms) remains a largely i
ith nominal partnerships (Table 3.1).  In fact, only 6 out of 30 Singapo
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3.3 FIRM UNIT ESTABLISHMENTS: INTRA-FIRM RELATIONSHIPS 
Based on firm profiles, 95.6% have establishments in various sectors 
worldwid ample d 
firms (Ta ally the 
parent, with operations including strategic decision making and R&D.  In the case of 
SG-TNC-OEMs, their services operations in the US are R&D and distribution offices.  
According to SG-OEM-9,  
The US is a huge market, so we gathered we need to establish 
We have a R&D lab in San Jose to tap on the capabilities offered by 
closely with our engineers in Singapore to develop products for our 
 
.  
Summing up, intra-firm relationships between firm units in the US and Singapore are 
marked by flows of information (proprieta  and investments. 
For the Riau Islands, 59.1% of the interviewed firms, largely SG-OEMs and 
SG-CS, have subsidiaries in in m ng nen uring
(45  (T e 3 In ie ea he ity f t isla s t ap  
m  e bl t o ser ent s unnecessary.  Therefore, it is reasonable to 
postulate that the establishment of subsidiaries on these islands fulfills the purpose of 
es in 
all sectors of the electronics industry (Table 3.3).  Activities are largely concentrated in 
e.  In the US, services (38.6%) are the dominant activities among the s
ble 3.3).  For US-originating firms, the firm units in the US are usu
distribution offices of our own rather than relying on third parties.  
companies located there… the engineers there (San Jose) work 
customers based in Singapore or US.   
By extrapolation, firms are clearly adopting a two-prong strategy drawing on localized 
knowledge and capabilities, and further integrating these knowledges across its business 
units to enhance its global competitive advantage (Amin and Cohendet, 1999)
ry knowledge), mandates
volved anufacturi and compo t manufact  
.5%) abl .3).  terv ws rev l t proxim  o hese nd o Sing ore
akes the sta ishmen f vice c re
off-shoring low value-added activities.   
Malaysia is a key centre for subsidiaries, with 70.5% establishing subsidiari
 69
manufacturing and component manufacturing sectors, and dominated by Singapore 
and US TNCs.  According to SG-TNC-18,  
The cost of manufacturing my products in Malaysia is lower than in 
components and send it to Malaysia, then we manufacture some of 
 
Singapore.  Our office in Singapore will source for some of the 
the parts needed and assemble the rest of the product there.   
As in the case of Riau, the intra-firm relationship is marked by a flow of investments, 
production directives, components and finished products.  
For the rest of Asia, patterns of concentration in the manufacturing and 
component manufacturing sectors may be detected (Table 3.3), reflecting the 
competitiveness of neighbouring economies in manufacturing activities.  Much of these 
are established by Singapore-OEMs.  Substantial services activities such as distribution 
and R&D are also scattered throughout Asia.  Thus, different parts of the firm are 
integrated by networks of investments, material and information flows with the firm 
unit in Singapore playing a regional (sometimes global) control and coordination role. 
 
  Firm Unit Establishments 
  Sector   









US  32 72.7% 0 0.0% 17 38.6% 6 13.6% 0 0.0% 9 20.5%
Riau  26 59.1% 13 29.5% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 13 29.5% 0 0.0%
Malaysia  31 70.5%  7 15.9% 1 2.3% 1 2.3% 20 45.5% 2 4.5%
Other 
ASEAN 
 37 84.1% 5 11.4% 0 0.0% 4 9.1% 7 15.9% 21 47.7%
 
Table 3.3: Firm Unit Establishments in Various Locales 
Source: Author’s Survey (Question 6). 
(Note: Total number of responding firms of 44 is based on the number of firms with firm unit 
establishments). 
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3.4 SPINNING ELECTRONICS RPN: GEOGRAPHIES AND 
 
RELATIONALITY  
 Tracing flows of materials in inter-firm and intra-firm relationships shed light 
on the diverse geographies and relationalities of the RPN.  Survey data shows that 
inputs used in the manufacturing of electronics products are derived from a variety of 
source iffer bet var  o (T .  F erm le 3.4 
illustrates that SG-SMEs tend to source more narrowly from domestic sources through 
shor rm a ength ransac  co to ide rap ources 
utilized by o espon ng fir plan  by SM hli  other 
rms are unwilling to lock themselves into long-term contractual obligations with 
ed characteristics.  Previous studies on inter-firm 
lation
ch centre, we also integrate strategic suppliers onsite to reduce 
ocurement costs. 
 
hus, TNCs’ sourcing strategies reveal a mixture of inter-firm arms-length transactions 
nd close intra-firm subsidiary relationships.  Input-geographies of TNCs point to Riau 
s and d ween ious types f firms able 3.4) urth ore, Tab
t-te rms-l  t tions in ntrast the w r geog hical s
ther r di ms.  Ex ations  some Es hig ght that
fi
SMEs due to their size-relat
re ships in Singapore also noted that the perceived inadequacy of the local 
supporting industry contributed to weak but budding linkages between SMEs and 
foreign TNCs in the electronics industry (Perry and Tan, 1998; Chew and Yeung, 2001) 
and the TNCs’ inclination to use their own subsidiaries (Aoyama, 2000).  In this case, 
the TNCs surveyed also exhibit the tendency to obtain inputs from their own 
subsidiaries and sourcing from other (larger and more reputable) suppliers for more 
specialized components.  Explained by US-TNC-7, 
We have manufacturing clusters worldwide.  Each cluster 
incorporates the manufacture of printed circuit boards (PCBs), 
components, cables, plastics and metal parts needed for final system 







(47.8%) and Malaysia (78.3%) as key sourc inputs, with 28.3% of the interviewed 
firms obtain re t  50%  in m ia (  3.4 m these 







Malaysia US Others 
es of 
ing mo han  of their puts fro  Malays Table ).  Fro
b. 
Riau 
100.0% 36.4% 72.7% SME 11 0.0% 63.6% 
Singapore 
TNC 19 100.0% 57.9% 78.9% 31.6% 89.5% 
US TNC 11 100.0% 45.5% 90.9% 81.8% 100.0% 
SME 1 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
Other
TNC 4 100.0% 25.0% 75.0% 75.0% 100.0% 
s 
Table Total 46 97.8% 47.8% 78.3% 39.1% 87.0% 
 
Table 3.4: Geographical Sources of Inputs by Origin and Firm Size 
 
 With the fragmentation of electronics production into modules, we may expect 
components to be shipped to intermediate markets for further processing before they 
are exported to their ultimate markets.  Statistics from the surveys again place Riau 
Source: Author’s Survey (Question 7). 
 
(37%) an ured in 
the ASE  locales 
serve as omestic 
market can be seen in the large number of firms (100%) retaining a proportion of their 
products here.  Information from the interviews directs attention to the role of firms 





d Malaysia (76.1%) as key intermediate markets for products manufact
AN region (Table 3.5), confirming our earlier postulation that these










Malaysia US Others 
SME 11 100.0% 27.3% 72.7% 9.1% 63.6% 
Singapore 
4 73.7% 21.1% 89.5% TNC 19 100.0% 7.4% 
US TNC 72.7% 81.8% 11 100.0% 27.3% 90.9% 
SME 1 100.0% 1 100.0% 00.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Others 
2 100.0% TNC 4 100.0% 5.0% 75.0% 0.0% 
Total 4 36 100.0% 7.0% 76.1% 34.8% 82.6% 
 
Table 3.5: Geo ediate y O d Fi
Source: A  Survey (Qu
 offshore production centres 
aysia and Riau are not the ultimate markets for finished products (Table 
3.6).  The reasoning is twofold: final products are bound for developed economies 
 of our customer, and 
graphy of Interm  Markets b rigin an rm Size 
uthor’s estion 8). 
 
 Survey data shows that developing economies and
such as Mal
and/or exported back to Singapore for final processing.  Close scrutiny of the data 
shows that the US (65.2%) and other developed economies (71.7%) are key markets 
for final products.  At the same time, statistics also point to Singapore’s position as an 
ultimate market for SG-OEM and SG-CS products as compared to other destinations.   
As a contract manufacturer, we don’t export the products directly.  
We send the goods back to the local subsidiary
then they will decide what they want to do with it.  So if you ask me 
where my products go exactly, I will say I don’t know.  I just know it 
ends up with my foreign TNC customers in Singapore (SG-TNC-
15).   
 
Studies on US manufacturing affiliates also highlight that Singapore has the highest 
percent of affiliate exports among all the host economies to US firms (Shatz, 2004). 
Collating these insights, I establish that exports are conducted largely by US and non-
USSFTA TNCs, while Singapore firms play a secondary role in this aspect.  RPNs of 










Malaysia US Others 
OBM 3 100.0% 0.0% 66.7% 100.0% 100.0% 
OEM 11 100.0% 9.1% 9.1% 36.4% 45.5% 
CS 11 100.0% 27.3% 63.6% 27.3% 36.4% 
Singapore 
SEM 5 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
OBM 7 100.0% 0.0% 85.7% 100.0% 100.0% 
US 
OEM 4 100.0% 0.0% 25.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
OBM 3 100.0% 0.0% 66.7% 66.7% 100.0% 
Others 
SEM 2 100.0% 0.0% 50.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Total 46 100.0% 8.7% 43.5% 65.2% 71.7% 
 
Table 3.6
Source: Author’s Survey (Question 9). 
: Geography of Ultimate Markets by Origin and Firm Type 
 
3.5 CASE STUDY ANALYSIS 
 In the following section, I will present the case studies of 3 firms – 1 US-OEM, 
1 Singapore-OEM and 1 US-OBM – in order to analyze the precise configurations of 
their individual RPNs.  By highlighting the differences and similarities of their RPNs, I 
argue that their inherent territoriality influences the spatiality and relationality of their 
production networks.  This is a prelude towards understanding the strategic 
orientations of each firm at the onset of the USSFTA.   
  offering a wide scope 
of contract manufacturing functions.  US-TNC-10’s strategy is to develop complete 
manufacturing centres with high degrees 
t
l
Altogether, this confirms my earlier ar
s
t
In Box 3.1, I discuss the case of US-TNC-10, a US-OEM
of vertical and horizontal integration 
hroughout its RPN.  In the Singapore-Malaysia cluster, the preference is to integrate 
arge TNC-suppliers and partners, while negligible links are established with SMEs.  
gument on the tendency of US-TNCs to use 
ubsidiaries for a large proportion of operations and middle-term arms-length 





functions in Malaysia, Bintan and Singapore.  SG-TNC-5’s RPN is marked by intense 
i  basis.  Nominal 
e ort a




d ization required for the product concerned.  
Precisely
power and influence the degree of power held
I





 U rovider 
headquar s.  The 
scope o  post-
manufac omies.  
The glob sters of 
production capabilities in low-cost regions such as Asia, Latin America and Europe.  Each 
Box 3.2 examines the strategy of SG-TNC-5, a Singapore-OEM, in establishing 
clusters of excellence”.  Its key Southeast Asian cluster has different facilities and 
nter-firm networks with both TNC and SME suppliers on a long-term
xp ctivity suggests that its RPN is highly concentrated within each particular 
tional links to final markets and other clusters. 
The case of US-TNC-11 presented in Box 3.3 demonstrates the dominance and 
arket power of OBMs in the electronics RPN.  The RPN of US-TNC-11 is highly 
d marked by various configurations of intra-firm and inter-firm networks 
epending on the degree of custom
 because of this dynamism in its RPN, US-TNC-11 is able to build market 
 by its suppliers and partners.  However, 
 argue that there is no single dominant actor.  In the next section, I will demonstrate 
hat mutually dependent networks of actors in vary
 the electronics RPN. 
: Close intra-firm relationships and big-firm bias 
udy 1: US-TNC-OEM -10 
S-TNC-10 is an Electronics Manufacturing Services (EMS) p
tered in Singapore, offering OEM and contract manufacturing operation
f functions includes R&D, manufacturing, logistics, distribution and
turing services through a network of more than 100 subsidiaries in 32 econ
al presence of US-TNC-10 is marked by strategically positioning clu
of these low cost centres functions as complete manufacturing centres which includes 
fulfillment services, the manufacturing of components such as PCBs and plastics, and final 
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assembly.   These centres also integrate established suppliers for certain products.  Key 
clusters in the region include Shenzhen, China, and Singapore-Malaysia.  At the same time, 
US-TNC-10 operates high technology sites in the US for R&D purposes.  Thus, US-TNC-
10’s RPN is marked by substantial vertical integration throughout the network, as well as 
horizontal integration of its subsidiaries and component suppliers.   
  Focusing on the Singapore-Malaysia cluster, I will discuss the intra-firm linkages 
ore are located in different locations, 
conducting fulfillment services, design and engineering, component manufacturing such as 
 a particular supplier.  
within this network.  The facilities in Singap
plastics, and assembly services.  In Malaysia, the activities include component 
manufacturing such as PCBs, testing and assembly, and some design services.  It must be 
highlighted that the facilities are more or less product-specific.  However for more 
standardized items such as PCBs, a single PCB manufacturing outfit supplies all the 
demands in Singapore and Malaysia.   
Beyond intra-firm linkages, global partnerships with a core network of customers 
(or partners) form a key part of US-TNC-10’s inter-firm networks.  These partners tend to 
be OBM manufacturers including Hewlett Packard and Nokia.  The range of products 
manufactured by US-TNC-10 includes mobile phones, gaming consoles and medical 
devices.  As aptly summed up by this respondent,  
Let’s say my partner hands us a product mandate to manufacture a 
printer.  After working out the costs and technology map, the 
Singapore-Malaysia cluster fits the requirements perfectly.  What 
happens next is our engineers in Singapore will collaborate with the 
engineers of our customer to work out a suitable design.  Then our 
engineers will further develop the production process and template for 
actual manufacturing to take place.  We usually make about half the 
components needed, like PCBs in Malaysia and plastics in Singapore.  
Other things like semiconductors, wafers, we will get it from our 
established suppliers, largely located in Singapore.  Sometimes, our 
customers will provide us with some of the more specialized 
omponents or even request we get them fromc
Then we’ll ship all the components to our factory in Malaysia for 
assembly… we usually export it direct or sometimes send it back to our 
partner. 
 
From the analogy, it is clear Singapore undertakes high-value operations of fulfillment, 
R&D and manufacturing of high-end products such as semiconductors through the 
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integration of key suppliers.  On the other hand, lower-value activities such as testing and 
assembly are offshored to Malaysia.    Information from the interview also emphasize the 
inclination of US-TNC-10 to integrate large TNCs suppliers only, while direct supply 
networks are seldom established with SMEs.   
 
 
BOX 3.2: Enduring inter-firm relationships 
Case Study 2: SG-TNC-OEM -5 
M and contract manufacturing 
services.  Its global electronics network of 30 worldwide subsidiaries is underpinned by a 
 this respondent, 
 A rengths 
of each n closer 
examination, some key differences may be observed.  First, SG-TNC-9 integrates both 
 SG-TNC-9 is also an EMS provider offering OE
strategy of “clusters of excellence” located in Southeast Asia, Northeast Asia and the US.  
In the Southeast Asian region, the key “clusters of excellence” is founded on facilities 
based in Singapore, Malaysia and the Riau Islands of Bintan.  In other words, it is based 
on the IMS-GT concept.  This cluster integrates component manufacturing in Bintan; 
manufacturing, test and assembly facilities in Malaysia; and assembly, R&D and fulfillment 
services located in Singapore and the US.  This strategy aims to complement the 
competitive advantages of each locality in a supply chain management approach to deliver 
lowest cost services to its customers.  In the terms of
Basically our strategy is to offer a one-stop shop for all our customers.  
We design, build and ship electronics products to our customers… by 
strategically locating manufacturing clusters in different parts of the 
world.  A single product does not travel the whole world in the 
manufacturing process.  What we do is to allocate the orders to the 
cluster that has the capabilities and is the closest to our customer.  So 
we design the product in Singapore, make some of the components and 
sub assemblies ourselves in Bintan and Malaysia, get most inputs from 
long-time suppliers in the cluster, both TNCs and SMEs, then we ship 
to Malaysia or Singapore for assembly depending on whether our TNC 
customer is in Malaysia or Singapore... we don’t export direct… This 
way, we cut down on time-to-market and costs. 
 
t first glance, the strategy of production clusters to tap on the relative st
locality appears similar to the strategy adopted by US-TNC-10.  Upo
external TNC and SME suppliers, while US-TNC-10 shows a preference for external 
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TNC sup rtion of 
their ope  arms-
length tr s not of 
a substa  to the 
ultimate markets but passes on the final products to the TNC customers located within 
pliers.  Next, SG-TNC-9 utilizes external suppliers for a larger propo
rations in long-term arrangements.  Arrangements may also be short-term
ansactions especially in the initial stage of collaboration, or if either party i
ntial scale and reputation.  Lastly, SG-TNC-9 does not export direct
the cluster.  The right to export is a key issue which we will discuss later.  
 
 
alley and Singapore.  Manufacturing 
sites are located in California, China, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand.  However it must 
be highlighted manufacturing is not conducted entirely in-house, only high-end 
customized products (high-mix, low volume) are manufactured in-house; to be precise, 
ts, 
ts 
are sourced from established component suppliers.  





For other low-mix, high-volume products, these are often outsourced to subcontractors or 
established OEM partners (first-tier suppliers).   
BOX 3.3: Dynamic intra-firm and inter-firm linkages 
Case Study 3:, US-TNC- OBM -11 
 US-TNC-11 is an OBM in disk drives, computers and other advanced storage 
devices.  It has R&D sites in locales such as Silicon V
much of the production process such as R&D, manufacturing of specialized componen
test and assembly are internalized within the firm while standardized component inpu
There are a few approaches for new product launches.  If say our 
product is a wholly finished product for the open market, then 
everything will be in-house.  Our engineers develop the products, we 
make the patented components ourselves and source for other stuff like 
wafers and semiconductors from our established suppliers.  Sometimes, 
we have to get the wafer plants to customize the wafers because of 
requirements of the product.  Then we will export it to the various 
markets.  For build to order products to be integrated into our 
customer’s systems, sometimes we will also do it in-house like our 
finished product at t
service centre in Singapore, our engineers get to work in the labs, they 
will check with our customers if the product template is compatib
with their systems, we commence manufacturing like our finishe
products.  In other cases, we work with the OEMs developing t
systems for our customers, we develop the product mandate and supp




Making standardized products especially our disk drives is quite a waste 
of resources… rather concentrate on R&D to build up our 
competency…  We hand them the product templates and they will do 
the rest.  Some partners
sales office
 will also export the products directly to our 





hence ensuring their continued market dominance.   
for the smaller subcontractors. 
 
From the descriptions provided, OBMs clearly have a lot of market power in terms
their ability to dictate the distribution of product mandates amongst partners and 
subcontractors through a variety of inter-firm networks.  In a sense, it may be said OEM
and component suppliers depend on OBMs for their market shares.  From another ang
OBMs too rely on OEMs and component suppliers in terms of load-shedding a
building up of core competencies in an environment of shortening product-life cycles, 
 
3.6 EMPOWERING ELECTRONICS RPNs 
 Pulling together the information presented earlier, a broad geography of 
production is established.  Two competing tendencies – globalize production seeking 
out low cost sites and cutting time-to-market costs, coupled with industrial clustering 
to facilitate production operations and supply chain management – are crucial in the 
creation of globally distributed yet regionally concentrated production geographies.  
Coupled with the rapid development of logistics and supply chain management 
techniques, production fragmentation is becoming a reality in the global economy.  As 
Yeung et al argues (2001: 179),  
To overcome the tyranny of geographical and cultural distances, 
these global corporations are increasingly pursuing a regional 
strategy to organize their regional operations.  In particular, they 
establish regional headquarters to achieve simultaneously global 




Thus, the culmination of ‘cluster manufacturing’ firm strategies and the above-
mentioned tendencies have led to RPNs ‘touching down’ at specific localities to create 
production nodes.   
In Southeast Asia, a key production node mirrors that of the IMS-GT (Figure 
3.1).  The IMS-GT concept of a technical, sectoral and regional division of labour was 
first mooted in 1989 by Singapore’s current Senior Minister Goh Chok Tong 
(Parsonage, 1992; Chia and Lee, 1993; Van Grunsven, 1995; Kumar, 1998; Peachy et al, 
1998; Perry, 1998; Yeung, 1998; Yeung, Y-M, 1998).   
 
Figure 3.1: A Map of the IMS-GT 
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The vision for the IMS-GT is modeled under the discourse of economic 
complementarity, a project of comparative advantage to attract and retain investments.  
In Batam, sixteen industrial estates have been completed (Broadfoot, 2003a), with the 
flagship project, Batamindo Industrial Park, under the aegis of Singapore investments 
and development standards boasting a range of Singapore, US, European and Japanese 
firms already operating in Singapore.  Thus far, the production geographies appear to 
approximate this model of comparative advantage.  The electronics RPN elucidates the 
migration of assembly and some manufacturing operations to relatively low-cost sites 
such as Riau and Malaysia, while Singapore increases specialization in high-value 
manufacturing and R&D.  Availability of air cargo services in Singapore is a crucial 
region-specific asset integrating and shaping the spatial configuration of the electronics 
RPN in Southeast Asia (Leinbach and Bowen, 2004).  Thus, Singapore’s position is as a 
service link to facilitate production activities in neighbouring economies (See more in 
Chia, 1997; Brown, 1998; Perry and Tan, 1998) (Refer to Figure 3.2 for a pictorial 
representation). 
More significantly, the IMS-GT should be situated in the wider context of a 
strategy promoted by global interests and regional leaders to expand “embedded 
exportism” (Sum, 2002: 54).  In other words, the IMS-GT is part of Singapore’s search 
for a ‘spatial fix’:  
A clever remedy for a city-state that grew from export-processing 
but now aims at occupying the higher rungs of the international 
division of labour without losing its regional competitive advantage.  
And reterritorializations – of capital, of land and, above all, of 
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Indeed, most literature on the IMS-GT concerns itself with issues of uneven 
development and political implications (Abdullah, 1996; Abonyi, 1996; Acharya, 1996; 
Chia, 1996; Macleod and McGee, 1996; Pospos, 1996; Ho and So, 1997; S.Smith, 1997; 
Naidu, 1998; Grundy-Warr et al, 1999).  However, crucial pitfalls in this literature exist: 
the tendency to discuss uneven economic and social impacts, and regional integration 
as distinct from extra-local happenings with little mention of the roles of both local and 
transnational corporate activity and production strategies in shaping developments in 
the IMS-GT.  Notable conceptual and application problems with regards to local 
‘clustering’ and the under emphasis on wider extra-local networks and structures 
(Martin and Sunley, 2001; Mackinnon et al, 2002) make it crucial to reconsider the 
importance of transnational linkages in the embedding and disembedding of economic 
activity.  This suggests that existing literature fall short of acknowledging critical issues 
of power and relationality in the RPNs spun within, and between the IMS-GT and 
other locales having consequential spatial outcomes.  I will adopt this relational 
e 
3.6.1 Power Geometries and Market Passivity 
 Beyond geographies of production, changing firm strategies also alter relations 
of production between firms.  As OBMs increasingly adopt a strategy of load shedding, 
build to order (BTO) strategies aimed at cost reduction are becoming more common in 
the electronics industry.  Large OBMs will only issue manufacturing orders to firms 
when demand arises, thus corporate power may be seen as asymmetrically distributed 
in favour of the OBMs (lead firm).  This trend towards BTO implies logistics and 
perspective to analyze the implications of the USSFTA and spatial restructuring on th




supply chain management techniques, and associated changes in subcontracting 
relationships are increasingly critical in the competitiveness of a firm, both in winning 
contracts and ensuring smooth production.  According to Amin and Thrift (1992: 575), 
“new developments in subcontracting have often led to preferred status being 
bestowed on fewer suppliers, linking them more tightly into corporate hierarchies and 
threatening the survival and growth of other suppliers”.  In other words, only big 
OEMs have the capacity and resources to manage the whole supply chain (turnkey 
production) and to cope with sudden surges in demand (Sturgeon, 2001; 2002).  Other 
studies also documented the unequal power relations in production networks (e.g. 
Hart-Landsberg and Burkett, 1998; Tsui-Auch, 1999; Edgington and Hayter, 2000).  
Earlier survey analysis showed that large TNCs either utilize their subsidiaries or 
partner other large TNCs in the production processes.  SMEs on the other hand, face 
high entry barriers and will have to work in conjunction with these OEMs as 
component suppliers or to absorb smaller orders parceled out by TNCs.   
 Figure 3.3 charts the inter-firm relationships among OBMs, foreign and local 
OEMS, component suppliers and SMEs.  The main issue is not simply the innate 
nature of each actor, but also the nature of these relationships determines the 
differential power shared among these actors.  This directs our attention to the 
processes of network construction, consolidation and stabilization as attempts to 
construct and maintain power relations (Murdoch, 1995: 745).  Generally, OBMs have 
substantial power in their ability to manipulate the distribution of product mandates.  
They are active agents constantly embedding and disembedding OEMs and component 
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We don’t go looking for customers on our own.  Usually, it’s the 
who fits the requirements and gives them the best value at the least 
(SG-TNC-4). 
At this juncture, I would like to broach the issue of market passivity.  This idea 
connotes the impression that non-OBM firms are passive and even powerless in 
securing orders and negotiating terms with OBMs.  A possible reason may be due to 
the large number of OEMs and component suppliers in the industry, hence accounting 
for stiff competition 
customers, OBMs, who go around looking for us, looking to see 
cost.  So we are quite passive actually.  Or powerless you can say 
 
whereby the advantage may just rest in competitive pricing.  
Besides patented products, substitutes are readily available for many electronics 
compone
ty, technology and 
pertise.  So the difference is really the relationship with our 
 
s networks, the issue of relationships throws up 
impress.  Over time, as the relationship develops, they start to trust 
relationship that is intangible and a kind of reputability.  So if we 
product, they will think of us first (SG-TNC-11).   
 
nts. So, OBMs may find it easy to source for alternative supplies. 
Generally it’s a wait-and-see game.  You wait for customers to come, 
rather than actively seeking them out.  Our closest competitors are 
quite similar to us in terms of size, reputabili
ex
customers or potential customers (US-TNC-8). 
While the above quote highlights market passivity in terms of the vulnerable position 
of non-OBMs in the electronic
possibility for capacity development.   
Drawing in on large TNCs, the ability to harness significant resources and 
establish long-term production arrangements with OBMs confer considerable power 
on large TNCs (including OEMs and component suppliers) (Dicken 2003).         
When we first get our customer, we try our best to oblige and 
us more and we take on more responsibilities.  This will build up a 
manage the relationship well, next time when they have a new 
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From the above comment, it follows that network configuration creates and gives 
power, not simply the entity itself.  In Latour’s (1986, c.f. Smith, 2003) terms, “power is 
a perform ething 
that is in nstance 
gradually morphs into a source of power and influence.  However, while networks are a 
source of power, networks are susceptible to change and hence may lose it efficacy.  In 
electronics RPN, the element of change often stems from economic considerations of 
cost and competition. 
Of course we have a fixed pool of customers where we have long-
tay on with 
us forever.  Yes, established relationships are very important, but if 
their other partners, they just need to give them an extra product to 
develops, but price is still the key (SG-TNC-14). 
In sum, networks are highly variable and conditioning factors such as costs continue to 
influence network configurations.  Thus, it is important for firms to engage in certain 
degrees of network maintenance. 
 Market passivity appears to affect SMEs to a greater extent than TNCs.  For 
one, production arrangements between TNCs and SMEs are often short-term or 
middle-te bility to 
secure orders is based largely on merit.  Consequently, the position of SMEs in the 
network etwork 
power d m the 
interview ersonal 
ative effect, a product of associating entities together, rather than som
trinsically possessed by actors”.  Thus market passivity in the first i
term contracts with.  But this doesn’t mean they would s
the price is not right, they can still go.  Our customers also have 
cover.  I might have greater bargaining power as the relationship 
  
rm arms-length transactions due to SMEs’ size-related features.  The a
is erratic.  Only in a minority of cases are SMEs able to summon their n
ue to personal relationships with certain social actors in TNCs.  Fro
s, some TNCs (both US-OEMs and SG-OEMs) revealed that p
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relationships have some bearings in their decisions when engaging subcontractors for 
some of their operations.   
I obtain a certain component from this SME-subcontractor who 
fac
used to be my former employee.  Well, cost is definitely the decisive 
tor.  Given the competitive prices offered, I think it is better to 
work with someone you know and trust (US-TNC-4).  
 
Thus network capital in the form of social relationships adds another dimension to 
electronics production geographies.  This example demonstrates the importance of 
transcending atomistic analysis of the firms/individuals per se, towards a focus on the 
ongoing relations which is able to capture the intentionality, non-economic 
considerations and emergent power relations (Dicken et al, 2001). 
 Another perspective to analyze market passivity is in the ability to export 
products directly to final markets.  Singapore firms are passive in that they are not key 
exporters of products to ultimate markets.  In this instance, market passivity is imposed 
by OBMs and foreign-OEMs (namely US) on Singapore firms.  Obvious from the 
earlier arguments, territoriality of firms plays a role in shaping the short-term to 
middle-term nature of the inter-firm networks between foreign and Singapore firms.  
This network configuration inadvertently imposes constraints on the right to export.   
If it is a small firm, chances are most of the products are sold back 
and they are usually foreign companies.  What local OEMs do is to 
it to the various markets.  OBMs and foreign OEMs are the ones 
power because you gain from market exposure, cost savings from 
obstacle I should say is the relationship is a more a customer-client 
(SG-TNC-7). 
to the local OEM or the OBM.  Only a handful of OEMs export, 
pass the products back to the OBM.  Then the OBM will distribute 
that export… the ability to export is a very huge form of market 
tariffs and earnings from exchange rates.  But the problem or 




Hence, I argue exports as the flow of products across geographical space establish 
connections between territories, creates an emergent power bestowed on certain firms.  
Here, the key power holders are large US-TNCs with these transnational export 
networks.   
 
 To sum up, the analysis aims to establish existing electronics RPN in the region 
in bid to gain insights into the geographies and relationality among actors in the 
networks.  Thus, with the implementation of the USSFTA, how will the geographies of 
these networks adjust?  How will the differential positions of actors in the existing 




Through the adoption of networks as an analytical lens, I analyzed the 
multiplicity of roles and activities undertaken by firms.  Examining intra-firm networks 
such as parent-subsidiary relationships highlighted the “cluster-based” and off-shoring 
strategies of electronics firms.  Looking into inter-firm networks, the variety of arms-
length transactions established among different types of firms sheds light on the 
positions of different firms in the electronics networks.  This combination of inter-firm 
and intra-firm networks draws our attention to the issue of market passivity: where we 
explore who exercises power, how is power exercised and how power relationships are 
manifested.  In the next chapter, I will look into the power and tactics of firm actors, 
and their associated extra-firm networks in producing the USSFTA regional space-
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economy.  This completes the electronics RPN puzzle and sets the stage for analysis of 





DUCING REGIONAL SPACES: FIRMS IN THE USSFPRO TA 
 
.  Subsequent USSFTA 
 
              
4.1 PREAMBLE 
An informal golf game between the former US President Bill Clinton and the 
former Singapore Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong during the 2000 APEC meeting in 
Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei, marked the start of the USSFTA11.  From its very first 
inception, the USSFTA was launched in an informal setting with the social 
relationships between two key actors taking centrestage
negotiations were and still are the culmination of social interactions amongst state 
officials, lawyers, firms, business associations, non-governmental organizations and 
other actors.  This chapter looks into the roles played by firms in their direct and 
indirect involvement in the USSFTA negotiations.   The organizational perspective 
brings the firm to the fore by highlighting the various tactics adopted by firms in 
reconfiguring new firm boundaries.  In this context, I argue that firms are important in 
the production of regional spaces because they can influence the USSFTA provisions 
and their firm strategies further shape the material form of the USSFTA.   
 
                                   
tory is that former US Ambassador to Singapore, Steven Green and USTR Ambassador 11 The inside s
Charlene Barshefsky discussed the possibility of a USSFTA.  Subsequently, they broached this idea to 
the former Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew, who in turn conveyed the message to PM Goh who was at 
the APEC meeting (Koh, 2003).  Soon, official negotiations commenced and the USSFTA was 




hile governments can create the framework for free trade, it is for 
While it appears the USSFTA is hitherto another state-led project, closer 
scrutiny
 a 
group of US firms joined forces with various US-based Chambers of Commerce to 
form an  of the 
USSFTA
was lobbying the Congress and other officials involved, requesting 
suggestions and submitted them to the officials for review.  Looking 
DUCING THE USSFTA SPACE-ECONOMY 
W
businessmen to seek out the opportunities, create wealth … efforts 
to provide information to businessmen, give feedback to our 
governments and build networks are very important (Yeo, 200012). 
 
 and reflection portray the USSFTA as an outcome and ongoing process 
managed by disparate groups of actors.  The logic behind this is that FTAs are aimed at 
spurring trade liberalization for economic benefits.  Without a firm grasp of economic 
activities and patterns on the ground, policy initiatives will not be able to achieve its 
objectives.  Heretofore, I will highlight the various groups of actors and their associated 
relationality critical in producing the spaces of the USSFTA. 
 Firms are one of the central actors in the production of economic space.  One 
of the most overt means of their involvement is the lobbying of interests (Paulson, 
2003).  For instance, the US-ASEAN Business Council conducted and published the 
proceedings from a number of workshops and seminars as position papers for 
consumption by state officials and other firms.  The aim is to stir interest and influence 
the business communities to adopt similar stances towards the USSFTA.  Notably,
 USSFTA Coalition (Appendix D) to lobby for the quick passage
 bill of approval.         
As part of the USSFTA Business Coalition, one of the main things 
they hasten the pace of the negotiations.  We too compiled our 
                                                 
12 Accessed online at <http://www.mti.gov.sg/public/NWS/frm_NWS_Default.asp?sid=39&cid=538> 
on 19 March 2005. 
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at the USSFTA now, I believe what we did was rather successful.  I 
 
offic
see some of our proposals taken (US-TNC-3). 
I remember how we attended a roundtable meeting with various 
ials.  We made a short speech about our operations in 
Singapore, such as the conducive environment for business and how 
It’s like a sales talk (US-TNC-8). 
Not to be outdone, Singapore-originating firms too engaged in some lobbying, 
a spectacle not witnessed in Singapore’s other FTAs.  This indicates the high degree of 
importance placed by Singapore’s firms in the US market, and the significant difference 
the USSF es such 
as basic information on Singapore and company profiles published by Singaporean 
compani cement 
strong tr benefits that will 
accrue to imes to 
lobby fo ‘acting at a distance’ 
(Foucault, 1991), as the newspaper reaches influential US policymakers.  
Simultan stablish 
linkages in the US market and open networking opportunities to Singapore’s firms.   
thought, ‘if we can get our voices heard by the people in the US, it 
with us’.  Who would have thought a Singaporean firm will do 
 
to use their economic power to influence the political process of the USSFTA 
negotiations in their favour.  Clearly, a relational conception of the firm (e.g. Yeung, 
important Singapore is for businesses looking to expand into Asia.  
 
TA will make to their operations.    In a 16-page report covering issu
es in the Washington Times,  the USSFTA is actively propounded to “
ade links between the two countries” and for the numerous 
 the US (Business Times, 9 October 2002).  Publishing in the Washington T
r the USSFTA is a calculated decision and akin to 
eously, presenting information on Singapore and firm profiles e
Lobbying for the USSFTA sounded like a crazy idea at first.  But we 
will boost our image and get the US companies interested to work 
something like that? (SG-TNC-3). 
Lobbying becomes a tactic to widen inter-firm networks amongst and between US and 
Singapore firms, as well as extra-firm networks with institutional actors.  Firms attempt 
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2000b; Dicken and Malmberg, 2001; Ettlinger, 2001) is able to capture the firm as a key 
agent of transformation, rather than the ‘black box’ characterized in neoclassical 
economi
 I duction 
of the US process 
of engaging firms for their opinions and proposals on the USSFTA.  According to a 
MTI spokesperson13, 
We speak to companies to get their inputs.  In the pre-negotiation 
EDB, IE Singapore and SPRING, you know talk to them.  ‘Look, 
they are looking at in terms of accessing the US market? What are 
feedback to us.  We also make use of the chambers of commerce 
 
getting inputs from our member companies.  We had a major role in 
 
done makes us important sources of information about how the 
across and they are taken up, we benefit too. It’s a win-win thing 
 
e a key role to play in formulating USSFTA provisions even 
                                                
cs.   
ndustrial consultation is another avenue of firm involvement in the pro
SFTA space-economy.  Extra-firm networks are widened through the 
stage, the USSFTA team, will go about working with our agencies 
the companies under your care, will they be interested to tell us what 
the barriers they face?’  So we organize sessions for them to provide 
increasingly so… to get in touch with companies and tell us. 
We worked very hard during the initial stages of negotiations… 
shaping the IPR aspect of the agreement (AmCham)14. 
We are like consultants.  Our inside knowledge about how things are 
USSFTA is to be effective in its workings…  If we can get our ideas 
(SG-TNC-9). 
Evidently, firms hav
though they are not frontline negotiators.  It is the use of firm-specific knowledge as a 
resource to shape the perceptions of policymakers and as a source of power to 
augment the interests of the firms’ desire for an enhanced business environment.  This 
firm-specific knowledge is in turn transformed into a reserve of maneuvers by the 
 
13 Interview with a MTI respondent on 16th March 2005. 
14 Interview with Nicholas de Boursac, Executive Director of AmCham Singapore, on 22nd April 2005. 
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USSFTA or their 
own firm
A e networks are crucial to foster power, which is 
ons as argued in the 
ed on these firms by Singapore’s institutional agencies.  Differential 
embedde tion of 
firms are e more 
in Chapter 5 and 6). 
 A lucid example of the important role of firms in influencing the USSFTA 
ROO is cost statement information.  Required by the Customs Office, cost statements 
documenting the various sources of inputs and place of production are valuable 
information mapping out the production patterns of firms and in determining the 
provisions.   
                                                
 negotiators at the state level in bargaining for the best concessions f
s.   
At SPRING, we do the part on MRAs and technical barriers to 
trade.  We also provide inputs gathered on the ground to the 
negotiators, so that they know what is a good and beneficial ROO 
for our firms.  In trade negotiations, the more knowledge you have, 
the better it is.  So you know what you can concede and what you 
can’t (SPRING Singapore)15. 
 
ccess to various knowledg
further exercised simultaneously throughout the relational geometries.  Intuitively, this 
illustrates the blurring of boundaries between firms and instituti
conceptual framework (Chapter 2).  Both actors are trying to enroll each other into 
their respective knowledge networks, demonstrating a high degree of relational 
complementarity (Yeung, 2005).  However, this blurring of boundaries is uneven 
because firms are heterogeneous entities.  Some firms, such as TNCs and foreign firms 
have greater access to extra-firm networks due to the size and scope of their GPN and 
the importance plac
dness in extra-firm networks implies that only the interests of a sec
 met.  Consequently, disparate implications on firm strategies result (Se
 
15 Interview with a SRING Singapore respondent on 29th March 2005. 
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In the case of Singapore, these cost statements reveal the tendency 
neigbouring countries; so it is important for the FTA to recognize 
to see how much local input is in a final product.  It gives us a sense 
how we start negotiations is we use th
to outsource labour-intensive operations to low-cost locations in 
this production pattern through the OP.  These statements allow us 
of what is workable as a rule-of-origin.  At the same time, usually 
e ASEAN-CEPT ROO as the 
baseline.  That was our first FTA and that is what our traders are 
familiar with.  Using this rate, we will adjust it according to the 
negotiation dynamics, cost statements and industry inputs.  This 
 for our traders to 
meet (MTI respondent)16.  
Previous  of one 
recognizing the role of multiple actors and interrelated processes. 
your points across to the other party, because they’re on different 
bridge the gap between business and government.           
Dichotomizing the production of spaces in the USSFTA as a state-led top-
down or firm-led bottom-up approach not only generalizes the plethora of tendencies, 
but inhibits us from acknowledging the various networks of relationships, and power 
created and exercised in the process.  As argued in the conceptual framework (Figure 
2.1), neither firms nor institutions are bounded wholes.  More accurately, firms and 
way, the USSFTA rules will be liberal and flexible
 
 conceptions of FTAs as a state-led project should be erased in place
 Another non-state actor is business associations.  From the lobbying tactics 
employed by firms and outreach programmes by state agencies, business associations 
are usually key counterparts.  Despite the ability of firms and state actors to spin 
networks of relationships with each other, their differences in agenda continue to make 
business associations a critical node in these extra-firm networks.  According to an 
SBF17 respondent, 
Government and business don’t mix.  It can be quite difficult to get 
wavelengths.  So business associations are like the middleman to 
 
                                                 
th a MTI respondent on 16th March 2005. 




institutions are consistently engaged in a process of negotiation, influence and 
sometim
‘perfume’. An FTA would strengthen further the ‘perfume’ side of 
(Gresser, 2001: n.p.).  
The USSFTA was signed by former PM Goh Chok Tong and President George W. 
Bush on 6  May 2003 in Washington DC and officially implemented on 1  January 
2004.  Besides being the first agreement between the US and an Asian country, it is also 
NAFTA Plus, WTO Plus and WTO Consistent.  In other words, the different chapters 
and clauses of the agreement is aligned with the trade liberalization policies of the 
WTO and aims to go beyond WTO policies by including new areas of economic 
activity.  The USSFTA has often been accorded the status of a “gold standard” FTA 
(Straits Times, 25 August 2002) as a competitive benchmark for other FTAs particularly 
in Asia to be modeled upon.  Areas covered in the agreement ranges from trade in 
goods, rules of origin, customs administration, technical barriers to trade, trade 
remedies, cross border trade in services, financial services, temporary entry, 
telecommunications, e-commerce, investment, competition, government procurement, 
intellectual property protection, transparency, general provisions, labour, environment 
and dispute settlement (MTI, 2003a).  Appendix E looks at the key talking points of the 
USSFTA.   
es conflict.  Thus, I assert there exists a mutually constitutive relationship 
between institutional arrangements (USSFTA provisions) and firm activities in the 
(re)production of a whole new regional space. 
 
4.3 US-SINGAPORE FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 
US’s relationship with Singapore is built on ‘battleships’ and 





4.3.1 Trad ods and Rules
ate is the abolishment of Singapore’s ten-year ban on 
chewing gum.  Now, US-made chewing gum can now be imported and consumed in 
Singapore for medicinal purposes (Straits Times, 20 November 2002).  This instance 
indicates the immense impact of the USSFTA on the area of trade in goods, the key 
area of concern in my thesis.  Tariff elimination, w n terms of tariff 
savings and concessions, help reduce the cost burdens of businesses exporting between 
e US and Singapore.  Savings from these preferential tariff concessions will make 
-
ember
e in Go -of-Origin 
One area of intense deb
hen measured i
th
exports between member countries more competitive vis-à-vis exports between non
m  countries.  To make tariff preferences effective, the margins of preferences 
(MFN rate minus preferential rates) enjoyed by Singaporean exporters must more than 
compensate for the differences in production costs between Singapore and its 
competitors.   
Currently, more than 99% of imports to Singapore are duty-free (MTI 2003c).  
With the USSFTA, remaining tariffs on US products will be eliminated.  On the US’s 
side, 92% of current tariffs on exports from Singapore will be eliminated immediately, 
with the remaining tariffs to be eliminated within 8 years (MTI, 2003d).  Table 4.1 
presents the tariff elimination stages in key sectors.  Although MFN tariff rates vary 
from 0% to 7% resulting in a small margin of preferences accorded to Singaporean 
exporters (Tongzon, 2003: 15), the US still maintains MFN applied tariff on consumer 
electronics.  Therefore, consumer electronics manufacturers will still reap immense 




Sector % of Products Staging 
Previously Dutiable 
Electronic and IT products 44.4% 
A (immediate): 39% 
B (4 Years): 4.9% 
C (8 Years): 0.5% 
Processed Food Product 85% 
A (immediate): 45.1% 
C (8 Years): 9.3% 
Tariff Rate Quota: 14% 
B (4 Years): 15 % 
D (10 Years): 1.6% 
Chemicals and  
Petrochemicals products 74% 
A (immediate): 28.9% 
B (4 Years): 30.3% 
C (8 Years): 14.6% 
D (10 Years): 0.1% 
Precision Instrument 52% 
A (immediate): 44.7% 
B (4 Years): 5.1% 
C (8 Years): 1.9% 
 
Table 4.1: Stages of Tariff Eliminations in Key Sectors 
Source: Accessed online at <http://app.fta.gov.sg/asp/faqs/ussfta_tgoods.asp> on 10th January 2005. 
 
For any real derivation of benefits from tariff concessions, non-tariff barriers 
such as clear systems with regards to trade remedies, sanitary and phyto-sanitary 
measures and technical barriers to trade need to be taken into consideration too (MTI, 
2003b). For instance, products must undergo conformity assessments certifying 
product conformity to relevant technical and safety requirements in each market.  
Duplicative testing and unfamiliarity with foreign certification procedures often results 
in time-to-market delays.  With the U
 
SSFTA, Singapore has concluded sectoral Mutual 
oducts (MTI, 2003b).  In the electrical 
and electronics industry, tests and certification by authorized agents in Singapore will 
be accep
 
Recognition Agreements (MRA) for specific pr
ted by the US.  These products do not have to undergo further tests in MRA 
markets, thereby reducing costs and shortening time-to-market.  Hence, the USSFTA 
will reduce non-tariff barriers (NTBs) significantly; ensuring tariff savings can be 
enjoyed and not negated by other measures. 
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While the removal of trade barriers will increase trade between the US and 
Singapore one of the key determinants of trade and market entry is ROO.  ROO are 
criteria determining the “nationality” of a product and consequent preferential access 
to a member country.  This ensures only goods of member countries will benefit from 
the USSFTA by preventing Trojan Horse entry by a non-member.  In other words, the 
USSFTA has transformed Singapore and the US into a single production space, despite 
their territorial boundaries.  To qualify as originating, the product must either be wholly 
obtained, or for manufactured products, have undergone "substantial transformation".  
There are three main rules for substantial transformation: Change in Tariff 
Classification, Value Added Rule and Process Rule.  Each product has at least one 
corresponding specific ROO under the USSFTA.  USSFTA ROO for electronics is 
usually quite broad as a result of the global nature of electronics manufacturing and the 
generally low tariff level. Of interest in this thesis are the Outward Processing Rule 
(OP) and Integrated Sourcing Initiative (ISI), two variations from the conventional 
ROO concept that the country of origin is the last country where a substantial 
transformation took place.   
 
4.3.2 Outward Processing and Integrated Sourcing Initiative  
The first variation is the recognition of outward processing18 production 
e electronics sector.  In reality, outward 
o Singapore.  For the Pearl River Delta, such 
atterns are termed ‘outprocessing’ or ‘projects of imported material processing’ (Sit, 
patterns for Singapore, especially in th
processing is not a phenomenon unique t
p
                                                 









hereby the Hong Kong investor supplies the material, technology and product 
design while the Chinese counterpart supplies the plant, labour and other facilities 
(Chia and Lee, 1993; Chiu and So, 1995; Wang, 1998; Y-M Yeung, 1998).  In the EU, 
outward processing was a key trade regime accounting for the development of the 
garment industry in East-Central Europe and their integration into a pan-European 
production system (Begg et al, 2003).  For Singapore, outward processing is closely 
intertwined with interstate cooperation in the IMS-GT.  It acknowledges part of the 
manufacturing process especially the lower value-added or labour-intensive activities, 
may be outsourced to neighbouring areas while retaining the high
re.  Conventional ROO does not allow the activities in Singapore prior to 
outward processing to be counted towards the local content. However under the OP 
concept, “the product can accumulate the value of all work done in Singapore as 
‘Singapore-content’, as long as the final-stage manufacturing is done in Singapore” 
(Rajah and Tann, 2004: 59).  Hence, the OP leads to the recognition of the various 
stages of the manufacturing process as a Singapore group19 (Figure 3.3).  It encourages 
firms to locate higher value activities in Singapore where Singapore has a competitive 
advantage, while leveraging on the lower costs in the region for low value-added 
assembly and other labour-intensive processes.  Thus, firms are able to fra
tion processes while enjoying lower costs of production     
   Stage 1                  Stage 2                     Stage 3
Singapore -----> Foreign Country -----> Singapore -----> Exported 
Conventional ROO --> Stage 3 = Local Content 
Outward Processing Rule --> Stage 1 + Stage 3 = Local Content 
 
Figure 4.1: Diagrammatical Presentation of Outward Processing Rule. 
Source: Accessed online at <http://app.fta.gov.sg/asp/goods/chapter01.asp> on 15 March 2005.   
                                                 
19 Accessed online at <http://www.fta.gov.sg/index1.htm> on 10 October 2003. 
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The Integrated Sourcing Initiative20 is a “creative mechanism to extend the 
benefits of the USSFTA to the region in non-sensitive sectors such as IT” (MTI, 2002). 
As an extension of rules-of-origin provisions, the core principle is the exclusion of 
certain goods such as IT components and medical devices although not made in 
Singapore, from the US and Singapore’s lists of taxable goods and regarded as 
Singapore-origin if they are imported into the US from Singapore.  Hence, the 
geographical origin of ISI products are inconsequential so long as a Singapore 
consignee is involved (while the region in question has not been geographically defined, 
many observers believe it will center on the nea
 
rby Riau Islands)21.   
ng by exporting their products through 
ingapore to the US.  The scheme encourages TNCs, particularly from the US to take 
                                              
To date, the ISI is confined to about 266 finished products (mainly IT 
equipment and some medical and instrumentation equipment) set out in Annex 3B in 
the Agreement (MTI, 2003f) (Appendix F).  Though these products already enter the 
US tariff-free, thus limiting the liberalizing effect on bilateral trade, benefits continue to 
accrue to firms procuring these products regionally or globally through Singapore.  A 
key advantage of importing these ISI items into the US from Singapore is the waiver of 
the 0.21% Merchandise Processing Fee (MTI, 2003b) imposed by the US on all 
imports.  The key beneficiaries of this agreement are firms in the electronics industry, 
particularly semiconductor-related and telecommunication equipment segments. 
While the USSFTA is an agreement signed between the US and Singapore, 
firms outside Singapore, such as firms in the Riau islands currently manufacturing these 
ISI items may take advantage of this cost savi
S
   
 The ISI is based on a similar concept in NAFTA (Wong, 2004b: 37). 
21 The US initially proposed the ISI in the aftermath of the 911 attacks as a way of showing appreciation 




advantage of each ASEAN country's relative comparative advantage22.  Over 100 
SSFTA 
will be interesting to analyze the specific nature of economic 
integrat
 
                                                
electronics parts made in Riau will be considered as Singapore-origin and enjoy duty-
free access into the US market (Dhume and Saywell, 2002).  In essence, the ISI 
transforms the USSFTA into a “win-win-win” arrangement where US companies view 
ASEAN as a more attractive place for investment because of the added flexibility for 
distributed production; Singapore and its neighbours can further develop their 
manufacturing base and attract foreign investments” (MTI, 2002a). The benefit for 
these third parties, such as Riau is an indirect one, a spillover effect of the ISI by virtue 
of their geographical proximity to Singapore.  
From this angle, the ISI and OP suggest that the boundaries of the U
are fuzzy and shifting.  Thus, conceptualizations of regions and regionalism as 
‘bounded spaces’ serve little utility in our understanding of the USSFTA.  Moving away 
from “topological presuppositions” (Thrift and Olds, 1996) of the “bounded region” 
will not lead to disregard for the geographical disjunctures in the global economy and 
an embracement of the “borderless world” (Ohmae, 1995) trope.  Instead, it refocuses 
attention on the topologies of practices embedded in the USSFTA provisions, firm 
strategies and production networks in constructing a “bounded level-playing field” yet 
simultaneously “borderless” USSFTA space-economy. Hence, in the light of these 
propositions, it 
ion in the USSFTA.  How are the electronics RPN changing with new 
variations in ROO, especially the OP and ISI? 
 
 
22 Accessed online at <http://app.fta.gov.sg/asp/goods/chapter01.asp> on 3rd March 2003. 
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4.4 PERCEPTIONS OF THE USSFTA 
 Firm strategic orientations are often contingent on a variety of influences.  
There is s firm-
centered rticular 
social context and that the nature of economic action is contingent upon cognition, 
culture, 1: 320).  
This sect tions as 
shaped by a variety of influences underlie their decision-making process and strategies.  
Given di ilable to 
each firm
 I SSFTA 
positively, while the remaining 14% remained neutral, (SMa, 2003:3).  In my interviews, 
the USSFTA is also greeted with a general sentiment of welcome.  According to SG-
TNC-6, “Of course having the USSFTA is good, I mean its guaranteed market access 
and most of my friends in the industry think the same way too”.  Survey data shows 
that firms have positive perceptions of the USSFTA particularly in terms of the export 
opportunities, reduction in tariffs, cheaper component inputs, lower cost of 
production, access to the US market, partnership opportunities and stricter IPR regime 
(Table 4.2-4.3).  
A large proportion of the respondents view the USSFTA having positive 
impacts on their export opportunities (76.1%) and increasing their access to the US 
market (63%).  A possible explanation could be related to the respondents’ perception 
 no single logic of profit maximization; instead at the heart of thi
approach is the contention “economic exchange is embedded in a pa
social structure, and political institutions” (Asheim and Taylor, 200
ion examines firms’ perceptions of the USSFTA because their percep
fferential territoriality, scope of activities undertaken and resources ava
, perceptions may vary considerably across different groups of firms.   




The removal of tariffs will lower the price of goods sold to the US.  
This will enhance Singapore’s competitiveness.  That should raise 
also boost production here (Straits Times, 20 November 2002).   
 The USSFTA will definitely have impacts, be it big or small, direct 
very important.  Now I can tell my customers, ‘I have the privilege 
might just turn out to be my source of bargaining power (SG-TNC-
Clearly, cost is a key factor guiding fi us it is 
important for the USSFTA to be effective in minimizing costs of production.  It is 
apparent the USSFTA is perceived favourably in its ability to minimize costs through 
tariff savings and tariff-free sourcing.  Table 4.3 also confirms that 89.1% of the 
respondents foresee the USSFTA contributing to cheaper component inputs and 
subsequently lowering their costs of production.  The advantage of lower costs 
highlights the importance of the USSFTA as a bargaining tool.  Whilst reduction of 
tariffs from the USSFTA has immense impacts on export opportunities and market 
access, we must acknowledge that not all firms share the same perceptions.  SMEs 
(18.2%) are inclined to view the USSFTA to have negative impacts on their export 
opportunities, sourcing and costs of production.  With reference to the earlier 
discussion about existing electronics RPN, most SMEs especially Singapore-SMEs do 
of positive impacts from tariff reduction (69.6%) on their activities.  According to 
MMS International economist, David Cohen, 
demand for made-in-Singapore products.  More foreign sales will 
 
or indirect.  Export opportunities and access to the US market is 
when exporting to the US.  I can save some money for you!’  This 
11).   
 
In business, cost is very important.  If the USSFTA allows tariff-free 
sourcing and processing, I don’t see why businesses can’t benefit 
from it.  As long as it does not mean extra administrative hassle and 
costs involved...  A small price difference is also a difference when 
the product reaches the market or when a deal is being concluded 
(US-TNC-2). 
 
rms’ production strategies.  Th
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not engage in export activities, hence accounting for their negative perceptions towards 
these aspects.   
 
New e nt portun are r the U A. lth gh the 
response from the sur
USSF at the 
USSFTA brings along heightened protection of investments in the US (37%). 
Having the USSFTA is wonderful for my company to expand in the 
  Th vels t layin eld for us. v ly, in ing in th
and each state is different from another, setting up shop there is a 
very tough. For an OEM like us, we are like many other OEMs 
y in e Stat o t will n  mak sie r u
business partnerships with US firms (SG-SME-10). 
The USSFTA creates a whole new regulatory playing field which gives 
Singapore firms an edge in the US ma a to 
i  a certificate of quality assurance to Singapore firms seeking to expand e 
.  67.4% of firms perceive this assurance to open up more opportunitie r 
par r e 
(52.2%) giv
activit such a &D. ccord  to U NC-1 he st er IP ime m s
safely leave R&D to the local firms here, even
believe that rtner p opportunit  and icter I  reg  will nslate
inv stme op ities  also c eated by SSFT  A ou
vey is relatively lukewarm, 30.4% of the firms believe the 






















































huge task....  Unless you have a very good product to sell, then it’s 
alr




























.  It increases the 
eaili f Sin an o it it  e lis
 









tnerships with US firms.  Regulatory changes in terms of a stricter IPR 
e Singapore firms an added advantage when engaging in high-value 
ies s R    A ing S-T  “T rict reg ean an 
to 
 some of the smaller ones”.  In all, 39.1% 
pa shi ies str PR ime  tra
technological upgrading.   
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   Singapore  US Others 
   SME TNC TNC SME TNC 
   Column % Column %  Column % Column % Column % Total 
Positive 8         72.7% 19 100.0% 5 45.5% 1 100.0% 2 50.0% 35 76.1% 
Neutral 1            9.1% 0 0.0% 6 54.5% 0 0.0% 2 50.0% 9 19.6%
Export 
Opportunities 
Negative 2 18.2% 0          0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 2 4.3%
Positive 7  19 10    1  63.6% 100.0% 90.9% 1 100.0% 4 00.0% 41 89.1% 
Neutral 2            18.2% 0 0.0% 1 9.1% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 3 6.5%
Cheaper 
          
Component 
Inputs Negative 2 18.2% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 2 4.3%
Positive 6         54.5% 14 73.7% 9 81.8% 1 100.0% 2 50.0% 32 69.6% 
Neutral 2           18.2% 4 21.1% 2 18.2% 0 0.0% 2 50.0% 10 21.7%
Reduced 
Tariffs 
Negative 3            27.3% 1 5.3% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 4 8.7%
Positive 7         63.6% 17 89.5% 2 18.2% 1 100.0% 2 50.0% 29 63.0% 
Neutral 0            0.0% 2 10.5% 3 27.3% 0 0.0% 2 50.0% 7 15.2%
Access US 
Market 
Negative 4           36.4% 0 0.0% 6 54.5% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 10 21.7%
Positive 3         27.3% 10 52.6% 1 9.1% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 14 30.4% 
Neutral 1           9.1% 5 26.3% 1 9.1% 0 0.0% 3 75.0% 10 21.7%
Investments 
in US 
Negative 7 63.6% 4        21.1% 9 81.8% 1 100.0% 1 25.0% 22 47.8%
Positive 7  19      63.6% 100.0% 11 100.0% 0 0.0% 4 100.0% 41 89.1% 
Neutral 2            18.2% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 1 100.0% 0 0.0% 3 6.5%Lower COP 
Negative 2 18.2% 0          0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 2 4.3%
Positive 5         45.5% 7 36.8% 9 81.8% 0 0.0% 3 75.0% 24 52.2% 
Neutral 5 45.5% 11 57.9%   1     2 18.2% 1 00.0% 1 25.0% 20 43.5%
Stringent IPR 
Regime 
Negative 1            9.1% 1 5.3% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 2 4.3%
Positive 2         18.2% 13 68.4% 2 18.2% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 17 37.0% 
Neutral 1            9.1% 2 10.5% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 1 25.0% 4 8.7%
Protection in 
US 




Table 4.2: Frequency tables on firms’ perceptions of the USSFTA 
. Source: Author’s Survey (Question 12)
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 Singapore  S t  U  O hers 
   SME TNC E TNC SM TNC 
 Column % Column % lu % umn % u l    Co mn Col Col mn % Tota
Positive 9 81.8% 18 94.7% 1 1 1 2 67.4%  2 8.2%  00.0% 1 5.0% 31
Neutra % 2 1 0 2 6 l 2 18.2  1 5.3%  8.2%  0.0% 1 5.0% 13.0% 
Partnersh
US Firm
ti % 63.6% 0 5 9 
ips 
s 
Nega ve 0 0.0  0 0.0% 7  0.0% 2 0.0% 19.6% 
Positiv % % 1 0 34.8% e 9 81.8  6 31.6  0 0.0% 1 00.0% 0 .0% 16
Neutra % % 4 0 2l 2 18.2  10 52.6  5 5.5%  0.0% 1 5.0% 18 39.1% 
Competit
Pressure
ti % % 5 0 7
ive 
s 
Nega ve 0 0.0  3 15.8  6 4.5%  0.0% 3 5.0% 12 26.1% 
Positiv % % 1 1 0e 6 54.5  3 15.8  0 0.0%  00.0% 0 .0% 10 21.7% 
Neutral 5 45.5% % 2 0 2 12 63.2  3 7.3%  0.0% 1 5.0% 21 45.7% 
Influx o
Imports
% % 7 0 7
f 
 
Negative 0 0.0  3 15.8  8 2.7%  0.0% 3 5.0% 14 30.4% 
Positive % % 1 1 07 63.6  6 31.6  0 0.0%  00.0% 0 .0% 14 30.4% 
Neutral 4 36.4% % 4 0 2 11 57.9  5 5.5%  0.0% 1 5.0% 21 45.7% 
Foreign 
Firm's
Technolo % % 5 0 7
 
gy Negative 0 0.0  2 10.5  6 4.5%  0.0% 3 5.0% 11 23.9% 
Positive % % 1 0 39.1% 9 81.8  7 36.8  1 9.1% 1 00.0% 0 .0% 18






Negative 0 0.0  1 5.3% 7 0 0.0% 3 5.0% 11 23.9% 
Positive % % 6 1 28 72.7 9 47.4  7 3.6% 1 100.0%  5.0% 26 56.5% 
Neutral 3 27.3% % 2 710 52.6  3 7.3% 0 0.0% 3 5.0% 19 41.3% 
Privilege 
US Firm
% 0 1 
to 
s 
Negative 0 0.0 0 0.0% 1 9.1% 0 0.0% 0 .0% 2.2% 
Positive % % 0 0 0  11 100.0 11 57.9  1 9.1%  0.0%  .0% 23 50.0% 
Neutral 0 0.0% % 0 0 7 7 36.8  0.0% 0 0.0% 0 .0% 15.2% 
Takeovers
US Firm
%  90.9% 
 by 
s 
Negative 0 0.0 1 5.3% 10 0 0.0% 4 100.0% 16 34.8% 
Positive %  0.0% 0 7 6 54.5 1 5.3% 0 0.0% 0 0 .0% 15.2% 
Neutral 1 9.1% % 0 0 0 4 72 10.5  0.0% 1 100.0%  .0% 8. % 
Takeovers
Domesti







Table 4.3: F nc les on firms’ perceptions of the USSFTA 




 Again, Table 4.2 shows SMEs are less keen about investment opportunities 
(63.6%) and its protection (72.7%) in the US.  With some probing, some SMEs 
achievement.  But as an SME, I’m actually more fearful about it.  
compete in terms of price and the technological demands.  I might 
 
cheaply.  I may just lose out in the competition and face a buy-out.  I 
myself more competitive.  The responsibility and decision is really 
 
explained that their small size and scale of operations is an impediment in capturing the 
benefits of the USSFTA.  “You know, everyone wants to access a big market, the 
money is there.  But if you don’t have the resources, you either can’t go or you’ll end 
up getting burnt” (SG-SME-1).  On the other hand, US-TNCs view the investment and 
protection opportunities negatively because their territoriality means the USSFTA does 
not open additional opportunities in the US.       
 Whilst the USSFTA gives Singapore’s firms an extra edge, it also opens the 
Singapore market to US firms, leading to increased competition (Table 4.3).  34.8% 
consider the USSFTA to increase competitive pressures which will impact on their 
firms’ operations.  Especially among SMEs, competitive pressure (81.8%) is manifested 
in the fear the USSFTA will lead to US firms achieving privileged status (72.7%) and 
increase the risk of takeovers (100%) by these large US firms.   
As a Singaporean, I’m happy we have the USSFTA, it’s an 
With all the big US firms coming in, I don’t know how I can 
get swallowed up in no time (SG-SME-2). 
Big firms definitely have better technology.  They can produce 
can stick on to what I’m doing, or I can make changes to make 
mine (SG-SME-9).  
Increased competitive pressures suggest firms will engage in some degree of strategic 
reorientation in the bid to survive.  As to how successful firms, especially SMEs, are in 
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altering their firm strategies, access to information and institutional support has to be 
quently minimal.  Hence, the impact analysis of the 
SMa survey is rather suspect.  Furthermore, given that the nature of SMa’s study is 
based mail surveys, it is unclear if it is explained to the firms what an FTA means for 
businesses.  In other words, the difference in results could be due to the industry-
specificity and interviewer-administered nature of my survey as well as the longer 
gestation period for the USSFTA to take effect before my survey was conducted. 
 By and large, firms perceive the USSFTA to have substantial impacts on their 
operations, inadvertently suggesting possible changes to firm strategies.  Interviews 
with firms hint at a regional rationalization of the electronics RPN in the post-USSFTA 
production geography that aims at capitalizing on the benefits of the USSFTA, and at 
cutting costs and retaining core competencies.   
taken into consideration.  I will explore this issue in Chapter 5 and 6. 
 This result presented above is in stark contrast to the report published by the 
SMa.  In the report, 71% of the participants indicated that the USSFTA will have 
minimal impact on their exports to the US (SMa, 2003: 2).  77% of the respondents 
think the reduction of tariffs through the USSFTA will have little impact on the price 
competitiveness of their products (SMa, 2003: 2).  A couple of reasons may account for 
the difference in the results.  With a sample size of 66 firms across all sectors of the 
manufacturing industry in the SMa study, the results present a generalized view rather 
than an electronics industry-specific view.  The survey by SMa was conducted in May 
2003, shortly after the signing of the USSFTA agreement but prior to the 
implementation of the USSFTA.  Information on the USSFTA was most probably 




 Investigation into extra-firm networks in this chapter shows the importance of 
firms and their relationality to institutional actors in the production of economic 
spaces.  To reiterate, my analysis recasts previous conceptions of regional trading 
arrangements as a state-led project, in favour of a more nuanced and all-encompassing 
etwork perspective.  This vivid picture of the webs of cooperative and competitive 




ed through social action and this means for very different outcomes in different 
territorial and spatial dimensions.  In all, the appreciation of firm operations, networks 
and capacities form the foundation for the analysis of firm perceptions on the 
USSFTA, and the associated strategic (re)orientations in this new macro-regional 
economic space.  I shall now turn to the changing firm strategies, networks and 





LATIO  OR IZATION 
CHANGING PRODUCTION GEOGRAPHIES 
AND RE NAL GAN
 
5.1 PREAMBLE 
With the comprehensive nature and magnitude of the USSFTA, many 
al economic impacts generated by this 
e on the economic costs and benefits of the 
USSFT
oes the USSFTA reshape firm strategies 
and their
 A TA is a 
signal to the market… It’s a powerful statement about the ease of doing business” 
economists were anxious to calculate the potenti
agreement.  It has been estimated Singapore’s exporters will experience tariff-savings of 
US$200mn and a merchandise processing fee saving of S$53mn annually from the 
USSFTA (IE Singapore, 2003).  Exports of electronics such as computers, printers, 
integrated circuits and printed circuit boards will account for the bulk of the 
US$40.3mn savings (Business Times, 9 August 2003).  Evidence of these tariff-savings 
and estimates of a possible 0.7% increase in Singapore’s GDP (Straits Times, 20 
November 2002) were and still are used as arguments in support for the benefits of the 
USSFTA.  However, statistical evidenc
A provides a cursory account at best; what is needed is to reflect upon the role 
of the USSFTA in (re)configuring Singapore’s position as a hub for electronics 
manufacturing activities.  To be precise, how d
 associated RPNs? 
ccording to the US Ambassador to Singapore, Frank Lavin, “The F
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(Business  Table 
5.1 suggests that firm strategies have changed.   
US-Singapore Economic Relationship, 2003-2004 
Times, 5 December 2003).  Increasing trade and investments shown in
In % Change Terms 2003 2004 
US-Singapore Bilateral Trade 3.3% 11.7% 
Electronics Non-Oil Domestic 
Exports -5.3% 7.7% 
    
In Absolute Terms (US$Bn) 2003 
of 2004 
1st 3 quarters 
US FDI Flows in Singapore 5699 5432* 
 
Table 5.1: US-Singapore Bilateral Economic Statistics, 2003 to 2004 
Source: IE Singapore (2005); Business Times, 29 January 2005. 
 
 
For instance, electronics manufacturer Aztech Systems secured a US$20mn contract 
for its ADSL products in the US (Business Times, 29 January 2005).  Californian 
semiconductor equipment-maker Asyst Technologies moved its manufacturing facility 
to Singapore through its Singapore outsourcing partner Shinei International, hence 
consolidating 95% of its worldwide revenue in Singapore (SEDB, 2004: 13).  While we 
must caution against establishing a causal link between the USSFTA and the increase in 
trade and investments, it will not be unreasonable to conclude that the USSFTA is one 
of the main reasons for these changes.  
From the survey-interviews, 40 firms (87%) indicated the USSFTA will have 
implications on their firm strategies.  The remaining 6 firms (13%) with no changes to 
their firm strategies are all Singapore-SMEs.   
The USSFTA is still very new, so it is a 50-50 chance our firms have 
does not affect all the electronics firms, as far as I know, it is our 




affected (SMa Respondent) .   
While the USSFTA has warranted a certain amount of reaction and changes in firm 
strategies, it is still very much in its infancy to effect a widespread transformation and 
has uneven impacts across different segments of the electronics industry.  Hence, this 
chapter will examine four aspects of firm strategies – input-sourcing, manufacturing 
locations, exports and partnerships – to unravel the implications of the USSFTA on 
firm strategies in forging new transnational production networks.  I argue that changing 
firm strategies not only reconfigures production geographies on a macro-regional scale; 
it also symbolizes the formation of a new network space.  This network space means firm 
strategies are not simply contingent on itself or on the USSFTA provisions, but also on 
the relationality among different actors.  As Asheim and Taylor (2001: 323) argued, 
“There are significant differences in the power geometries in these relationships that 
will impact on the formulation and execution of strategies within the firm – the way 
strategic co
 
5.2 COMP GIES 
 S urces of inputs are important in determining the origin of a product.  With 
changes to regulations such as ROO under the USSFTA, how will firms react with 
regards to their sourcing patterns?  Survey data shows that 97.5% of firms with 
changing strategies indicated modifications to their input-sourcing strategies.  To be 
precise, current input-sourcing patterns will highlight a geographical variation from 
previous patterns.  According to SG-TNC-4, “The local-content needed is lowered, so 
                                                
semiconductors and ICs firms and the big OEMs that are more 
23
 
mpetencies be constructed from the resources available”. 
ONENT FLOWS: SHIFTING INPUT-SOURCING STRATE
o
 
23 Interview with Dr. Roger Low, Secretary-General of the Singapore Manufacturers’ Federation on 25th 
November 2004. 
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I can afford to source more from different countries… then exporting my product to 
the US at zero tariffs”.  Referring to Table 5.2, the geographical patterns for input-
sourcing show increases in sourcing within the USSFTA and ASEAN space-economy, 
while sourcing decreases in the locales outside this area.  Further confirmation from 
state officials highlights the finding that e 
changi  strat As f ome companies 
dec .  They said it is 
a good opportunity for them to restrategize and a cost-cutting measure”24.   
 
5.2.1 Singapore: High-Va rc
 From the sample of 39 firms with changes to their input-sourcing strategies, 
97.4% are increasing their input-sourcing from Singapore (Table 5.2).  Interestingly, 5 
of SS
I may have premises in Singapore, but at the end of the day y
and the rules are not as flexible as it may seem.  Rules-of-o
SF .
ga e
as long as it do t jack up my cost  can fulfill the minim
 
Having a presence within the USSFTA economic space is insufficient for non-USSFTA 
firm rit  M ti be a 
signifi for A f   has 
significant impacts on non-USSFTA firms, as they alter their strategies in bid to 
reposition themselves more competitively vis-à-vis the US and Singapore 
                                                
the USSFTA has indeed taken root in th
ng input-sourcing egies of firms.  “ ar as we know, s
ided to change the source of their inputs after the FTA came along
lue Component Sou ing 




































































requirements a pete better (FR-T 4).   
s, because firm ter oriality (Dicken and almberg, 2001) con es 
SF
s
cant impediment these non-USSFT irms.  Thus, the
 
24 Interview with a MTI respondent on  March 2005.  16th
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  Singapore S   U
  Increase No Change Decrease Increase N a D as  o Ch nge ecre e 
SME 5 12.8% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% %1 2.6% 4 10.3% 0 0.0  
Singapor C 18 46.2% 1 2.6% 0 0.0% 7 %e 2 5.1% 1 43.6% 0 0.0  TN
US TNC 10 25.6% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 1 %4 0.3% 6 15.4% 0 0.0  
SME 1 2.6% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 2.  %0 0.0% 1 6% 0 0.0  
Others C 4 10.3% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 5.  %2 5.1% 2 1% 0 0.0  TN
Total   38 97.4% 1 2.6% 0 0.0% 2 0 %9 3.1% 3 76.9% 0 0.0  
  Malaysia R l  iau Is ands 
  Increase No Change Decrease Increase N a D as  o Ch nge ecre e 
SME 5 12.8% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 5.  %3 7.7% 2 1% 0 0.0  
Singapor C 18 46.2% 1 2.6% 0 0.0% 15 3 %e 8.5% 4 10.3% 0 0.0  TN
US TNC 10 25.6% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 1 7.  %7 7.9% 3 7% 0 0.0  
SME 1 2.6% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0.  1 2.6% 0 0% 0 0.0% 
Others C 4 10.3% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 2.  %3 7.7% 1 6% 0 0.0  TN
Total   38 97.4% 1 2.6% 0 0.0% 29 0 %74.4% 1 25.6% 0 0.0  
  Other ASEAN   Others 
  Increase No Change Decrease Increase N a D as  o Ch nge ecre e 
2 5.1% 3 7.7% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 4 10.3% 1 2.6% SME 
Singapor TNC 8 20.5% 10 25.6% 1 2.6% 5e 0 0.0% 1 38.5% 4 10.3% 
US TNC 7 17.9% 3 7.7% 0 0.0% %0 0.0% 9 23.1% 1 2.6  
SME 0 0.0% 1 2.6% 0 0.0% 0 2.  0.0% 1 6% 0 0.0% 
Others TNC 3 7.7% 1 2.6% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 4 10.3% 0 0.0% 
Total   20 51.3% 18 46.2% 1 2.6% 0 3 15.4% 0.0% 3 84.6% 6
 
Table 5.2: Geographical Changes to Sources of Inputs used in Production. 
Source: Author’s Survey (Question 14).   
(Note: Sample Size of 39 is based on the number of firms with changes to input-sourcing strategies) 
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In fact, 92.3% of the firms cited ROO as a key influence in their decision to 
increase sourcing in Singapore (Figure 5.1).  Initially, it might seem illogical for US and 
Singapore firms to source more intensely from Singapore when ROO has become 
more flexible.  Table 5.3 presents th es in component flows.  
A s r rms pone ows from Singapore to 
Riau (90%), Malaysia (97.5%) and the wider ASEAN region (60%).  Data from the 
survey illustrates that the increase in component flows from Singapore to these 
loc an pone are bound for further 
production and this will enhance the costs competitiveness of the final products 
(Figure 5.2).  Furthermore, information from the firm-interviews shows that changes to 
firm strategies are not as straightforward as they may seem.   
 
e broad geographical chang
ubstantial numbe of fi are increasing their com nt fl


















































Figure 5.1 ange t-S ore 
Source: Author’s Surv Question 14). 
(Note: Sample size is 39.  Each firm was required to provide 2 answ
 
: Reasons for c
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    Riau Malaysia 
   Increase No Change Decrease Increa No Change Decrease se 
  
Row 
al   
Row 
%   
Row 
%   
Row 
%     
Row 







Sing pore 24a  %  10 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 22 91.7  2 8.3% 0 0.0% 24 0.0%
U  %  10 0 0.0% 0 0.0% S 11 11 100.0 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 11 0.0%
Others %  80.0% 1 20.0% 0 0.0% 5 3 60.0  2 40.0% 0 0.0% 4
                      
Table Total %  9 1 2.5% 0 0.0% 36 90.0  4 10.0% 0 0.0% 39 7.5% 
                  
  Others  Other ASEAN 





   
Row 




Tot   
Ro
%   
Row 
%   
Row 
%   
Row 
% 
Sing pore 24a  %  0 16 66.7% 8 33.3%14 58.3  10 41.7% 0 0.0% 0 .0% 
U  %  81.8% 2 18.2%S 11 7 63.6  4 36.4% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 9 
Others %  100.0% 0 0.0% 5 3 60.0 2 40.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 5 
                            
Table Total %  0 30 75.0% 10 25.0%24 60.0 16 40.0% 0 0.0% 0 .0% 
 
Table 5.3 Geog phica Chan
Sou : Au or’s S rvey (Questi
(Note: Sample si  of 40 s bas
: ra l ges to nent at
rce th u on 17




 with changes to th
 Firms’ Compo
). 





Reasons for Changes in Component Flows 




















Figure 5.2: Reasons for Changes to Component Flows to Riau and Malaysia 
(Note: Sample size is 40.  Each firm was required to provide 2 answers.) 
 
 
Components we get in Singapore are 
Source: Author’s Survey (Question 17). 
very specialized high-value 
products like semiconductors, wafers etc.  Since we can get it from 
Singapore at a good quality and price, why not? Also, ROO being 




one han widely, 
rationaliz n.  On 
the other  degree 
of calculated sourcing where the types  
geographically and the necessity to export components from Singapore to intermediate 
more flexible doesn’t mean it is that easy to meet, esp
have so many operations offshore (SG-TNC-13). 
 
The ROO certainly opened a window of opportunities for us to 
source from other places… and manufacture our products outside 
Singapore.  But it also means the Singapore origin of our goods will 
decrease.  To overcome this problem, we must send Singapore-made 
components, like the expensive semiconductors, wafers needed to 
our Bintan factory (US-TNC-7). 
 
Once you get the permits and documentation done, it is relatively 
hassle-free and customs clearance is a breeze…  So yes, the USSFTA 
made customs clearance easier and beneficial for co
ours who manufacture our products with a global outloo
TNC-9). 
 
rom the above explanations, the dual nature of ROO is illustrated.  On the 
d, increased flexibility in ROO means firms may source more 
e their operations and increase the degree of production fragmentatio
, the necessity to satisfy ROO means firms have to engage in a certain
 and value of inputs are demarcated
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markets in the nearby ASEAN economies, to ensure that their products still meet the 
stipulated requirements.  Hence, increased sourcing of component inputs from 
Singapore is a combination of the availability of high-technological components and 
the binary nature of ROO; whereby high-value Singapore components are necessary to 
offset the cumulative value of components and operations offshore, such that the 
ROO remain fulfilled.  In addition, firms also think the streamlining of customs 
procedures has facilitated their just-in-time supply chain management techniques 
ermulst’s (1992) argument on 
e importance of ROO in international trade. 
 
5.2.2 Riau and Malaysia: Intensifying Component Flows 
  Beyond Singapore, many firms also indicated increased sourcing from Riau 
and Malaysia.  74.4% and 97.4% of the 39 firms with changes to input-sourcing 
strategies will increase input-sourcing from Riau and Malaysia respectively (Table 5.2), 
with TNCs largely responsible for changes to sourcing patterns.  From the data, 69.2% 
nd 92.3% of the firms specify the importance of ROO in shifting their sourcing 
.4). 
I’m not the only one intending to get more of my components from 
same thing… local-content is now lowered (SG-TNC-15). 
Some customers tell us to source from Batam… they say the 
final product are lower.  It’s easier to get the appropriate component 
are run by Singapore businessmen, easier to liaise with them… A lot 
Batam (SG-TNC-6). 
 
(Business Times, 29 January 2005).  This finding affirms V
th
a
patterns towards Riau and Malaysia respectively (Figure 5.3-5
Batam, many of my friends in the industry are thinking of doing the 
 
USSFTA has more flexible local-content rules and tariffs for the 
specifications in Batam than in China… many of the factories here 
of sourcing and procurement costs are reduced when you get from 
 
 120
































: Reasons for changes to Input-Sourcing in Riau Islands 
hor’s Survey (Question 14) 




(Note: Sam ers.) 
 
























Figure 5.4: Reasons for changes to Input Sourcing in Malaysia. 
(Note: Sample size is 39.  Each firm was required to provide 2 answers.) 
 
 
Besides ROO, the role of customer requests and personal relationships is important for 
many firms increasing sourcing from Riau in particular.  This hints at the catalytic role 
 
Source: Author’s Survey (Question 14). 
of actor-relations and power in shaping sourcing networks.  Figure 5.3 further confirms 
this tendency with 64.1% of the 39 firms specifying the importance of customer 
requests affecting their sourcing strategies.  In other words, given the existing role of 
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OBMs and large OEMs as customers to other firms, their requests have a conditioning 
influence on the decisions of other firms and the configuration of the RPN.  
export something, we have to produce a certificate-
of-origin in order to claim tariff advantages.  It’s a very tedious 
if we can stipulate that our component suppliers supply us with 
of documentation and tracking (US-TNC-3). 
Having to overcome cumbersome paperwork and to ensure a reliable supply of 
components of a specific-origin has implications on intra-firm and inter-firm 
relationships.  I argue that TNCs, especially US OBM and OEMs, will demonstrate the 
tendency to establish a formal network of component suppliers in Singapore and the 
neighbouring economies either through the setting up of new subsidiaries (intra-firm) 
or through a variety of partnership arrangements with other firms (inter-firm).  Albeit 
firms, especially SMEs continue to be passive, TNCs’ changing strategies inevitably still 
mean that relationality and power geometries between various firm actors will also be 
altered.  From the survey data, SG-SMEs too express the importance of customer 
requests in shaping their sourcing strategies.  Thus, with these new power dynamics, 
how are SMEs repositioning themselves strategically as component suppliers to TNCs? 
 In addition, geographical proximity of component sources to Singapore is crucial 
for the coordination of the production processes, clearly highlighting the spatiality of 
the firm (Pritchard, 2000).  About 33.3% and 25.6% indicate increased sourcing from 
Some of my US customers will ask me to get it from certain 
suppliers because they want to make use of the tariff benefits of the 
USSFTA.  Although we don’t benefit directly, we are ok about it as 
long as it doesn’t jack up our costs.  Well, I mean if I don’t do it, 
they can always find someone else willing (SG-SME-9). 
 
Every time we 
process if our sources of components change all the time.  It is best 




Malaysia and Riau respectively (Figure 5.3-5.4), as a result of the close proximity of 
these two locales to Singapore.   
Components from China are definitely cheaper than that in Batam 
or Bintan.  But my factories are in Malaysia and Singapore, so why 
go so far when I can get it from those suppliers in Malaysia and 
Batam and even ASEAN… can coordinate my supply chain better 
too.  With the USSFTA, tariffs on my goods and local content are 
lowered. At the end of the day, my products are still as competitive 
(SG-TNC-19). 
 
A closer examination of firm sourcing strategies also directs attention to 
) in encouraging firms to 
source more actively within ASEAN (Figure 5.5).  As input-sourcing and component 
mpared to 
e impacts 
geographical proximity (41%) and changes to ROO (46.2%
flows from Singapore to ASEAN on a whole are increasing, component trade to 
economies outside ASEAN is falling, and Singapore firms (33.3%) are the key players 
involved (Table 5.2-5.3).  The argument is twofold.  First, it indicates there is little 
incentive to increase input-sourcing from economies outside the USSFTA and ASEAN 
area.  Here, the more flexible ROO cannot compensate for the higher costs incurred 
from transporting inputs across greater geographical distances, bringing attention to the 
issue of spatiality in shaping production strategies.  In this aspect, it may be argued that 
Singapore firms have a relatively higher concentration of operations in the IMS-GT 
node.  Hence the USSFTA holds a stronger impact on Singapore firms as co
the global spanning GPNs of foreign TNCs (Dicken 2003).   
Second, 15.4% of the 39 firms (Table 5.2) decrease their input-sourcing from 
other locales, often as a result of requests from customers to change their sourcing 
patterns in order to take advantage of the USSFTA.  Therefore, while the USSFTA is 
an exclusive arrangement between the US and Singapore, it does not limit th
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Reasons for Changes to Input-Sourcing in 
Other ASEAN Locales
























: Reasons for changes to Input-Sourcing in Other ASEAN Locales 
Source: Author’s Survey (Question 14). 
(Note: Sample size is 39.  Each firm was required to provide 2 answers.) 
 
and benefits to the geographical territories of these two economies.  Instead, the notion 
of geographical proximity coupled with changes to the ROO create an incentive for 
firms to source near to and around the economic bloc for tighter coordination of the 
RPN and shortening the time-to-market.  I argue that the increasingly network nature 
of production under the USSFTA not only demonstrates the transterritorial nature of 
networks and the fuzziness of the USSFTA space boundaries, but also critical 
developmental linkages between di
Figure 5.5
fferent localities.  “The fortunes of one region are 
ked to other regions through relations of control and dependency, market 




While some may expect increased sourcing from the US given the integration 
of the US and Singapore economies, it is actually not surprising to observe little 
changes in the sourcing of component inputs from the US (Table 5.2).  This reflects 
the higher cost of inputs and the tendency for firms to specialize in high-value R&D 




ng geographies have 
o scale, it is clear that the intensity of flows in 
nt basis and 
in larger volumes, though the precise degree of change would require further 
ltogether, I 
argue that th om the 
ROO under  
through lue-added processes to nearby Riau and Malaysia.  
 
 In sum, the USSFTA presents a different input-sourcing geography from the 
one existing previously as described in Chapter 3.  While sourci
remained largely similar on the macr
inputs have been altered.  The flows of inputs now occur on a more freque
quantitative studies to be conducted.  Geographically, the increase in intensity is most 
stark in the IMS-GT.  Furthermore, the manner in which input-sourcing is conducted 
currently is based on longer-term arrangements rather than previous short-term arms-
length transactions especially with SMEs.  Coupled with the tendency to source from 
component suppliers located in ASEAN, particularly Malaysia and Riau, widespread 
backward linkages into the economies of these locales should develop.  A
is increase intra-firm and intra-industry component flow arising fr
 the USSFTA may lead to the rationalization of the electronics RPN
the off-shoring of low va
These shifting intra-firm and inter-firm relationships further weave the IMS-GT into a 
closely knit production node.    
 
5.3 LOCATIONAL STRATEGIES: SHIFTING INVESTMENT PATTERNS 
Upon the successful conclusion of the USSFTA, net investment commitments 
in Singapore’s manufacturing sector have more than doubled in the 3rd quarter of 2003 
as compared to the 2nd quarter, and the same quarter in 2002 (SingStat, 2004: 71).  
Investment decisions are indicators of firms’ locational strategies.  From the firms 
surveyed, 37 firms (92.5%) will change their locational strategies to varying degrees. 
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Here, I will analyze the geographical destination and type of firm investments to unlock 
the rationale behind the changes in firm strategies.     
 
5.3.1 US: Large Market, Big Technology 
According to IE Singapore’s deputy chief executive officer, Alphonsus Chia, 
“the stronger investment provisions in th
to our companies to invest in th S  Ti
5.4 presents a picture of the changing types of investments and activities in the US.  As 
a reflection of the US’s position on the electronics value ladder, most of the changes 
are focused on developing high-value operations in the US market.  2 new R&D 
operations by Singapore-OEMs will be established in the US.   
mpany like ours.  
But if I want my company to grow, doing R&D in the US will be the 
best, I increase my chances to make a reputation and work with the 
r es cte ow, w  I 
- E-
 
In tandem with R&D, 59.5% of the firms also indicate that plans are underway to 
increase the concentration of high-value operations (including design and engineering, 
m e f ith existing 
operations in the US, 45.2% are increasing investments to advance their current 
operations in R&D and marketing.  The key actors are largely Singapore TNCs (about 
8 ), st  d atory climate 
(63.3%) in the post-USSFTA phase as a .  
Simultaneously, 48.3% of the firms think the U A v with a good 
opportunity to build up or retain core competencies in the US. 
e USSFTA, it also provides more confidence 
rkee U  ma t” (Business mes, 29 January 2005).  Table 
























arketing, business developme  in the US.  Among th 31 
uci
ide
0%  with a couple of SMEs.  Mo of the firms cite the con ve
s t




at  S g  t US Hi al p ations   ting Operations Loc ional trate ies in he gh V ue O er Investments in Exis
  Incre C e Increas No Change   ase No hang e 
  ow Tota     
Row 
Total   Row   Row %   R l Row % Row %  % 
SM  5E  2 3 6 100. 0 0.0% 40.0%  0.0% 1 1 0% Sing pore 
TN  17
a
C  14 3 1 80. 3 20.0% 82.4%  7.6% 15 12 0% 
U C  4 3 6 0.0 1 100.0% S TN  11 6.4% 7 3.6% 11 0 % 1
SM  1E  0 0 1 0.0  100.0% .0% 1 00.0% 1 0 % 1Others 
C  2 6 3 33.  66.7% TN  3 6.7% 1 3.3% 3 1 3% 2
                    
Table Total 37 22 5 45. 7 54.8% 59.5% 1 40.5% 31 14 2% 1
                        
  ng er s ew A mbly Operations     New Manufacturi  Op ation   N sse
  Incre C e  nge   ase No hang No Cha
  Row ta      Row %   To l Row % Row % 
Row 
Total 
SM  5E  0 0 1 5 100% .0% 5 00.0% 5 Singapore 
C  1 5 6 9 17 100% TN  17 .9% 1 4.1% 17 
U C  0 0 1 1 11 100% S TN  11 .0% 1 00.0% 11 
SM  1E  0 0 1 1 100% .0% 1 00.0% 1 Oth
C  0 0 1 3 100% 
ers 
TN  3 .0% 3 00.0% 3 
                    
Ta o 1 2 6 9 37 100.0%  37 ble T tal 37 .7% 3 7.3%
 
Table : Cha  t a  Strategies in th
Source: r v ue  15). 
(Note 1 p e  i d on the numb ir it n  their s.) 
(Note 2 p e  i d on the numb ir erati re changing their firm strategies) 
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Source: Author’s Survey (Question 15). 
&D, they got the technology 
For elec een the 
demands of RPN and the characteristi
from th
ssembly in the US (Table 5.4). 
 
5.3.2 Sin
 T he form 
to be reaped from the OP rule.   
 
Figure 5.6: Reasons for Changes to Locational Strategies in the US 
(Note: Each firm was required to provide 2 answers.) 
 
 
You must match the type of activity with the capabilities of the 
place.  The US is a perfect place to do R
and expertise.  Not so much for manufacturing or assembly… with 
new market opportunities, so marketing and distribution becomes all 
the more important...  With protection from the USSFTA, setting up 
sales offices and getting permits is easier (SG-TNC-14). 
 
tronics RPN to ‘touch down’ in space, a certain congruency betw
cs of the locale must exist (Coe et al, 2004).  Data 
e survey confirms this notion, as seen from the lack of new operations and 
investments in aspects of manufacturing, test and a
gapore: A Complete Manufacturing Hub 
urning our focus to Singapore, notable strategic (re)orientations in t
of concentration of high value operations and increasing investments may be observed 
(Table 5.5).  In manufacturing, 2 firms indicated they are planning to set up wholly new 
manufacturing plants in Singapore as a result of the conducive regulations and benefits 
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 High Value Operations 











 Row %  Row %  Row %  Row % 
Singapore 22 2 11.8% 20 117.6% 6 35.3% 16 94.1% 
US 11 0 0.0% 11 100.0% 0 0.0% 11 100.0% 
Others 4 0 0.0% 4 400.0% 1 100.0% 3 300.0% 
Table Total 37 2 5.4% 35 94.6% 7 18.9% 30 81.1% 
 
Table 5.5: Changes to Locational Strategies in Singapore 
Source: Author’s Survey (Question 15). 
 
One of the firms, SG-TNC-17, plans to establish a factory to manufacture personal 
computers previously produced in China.  Besides, plans are in line to invest in R&D, 
service centres and supply chain management facilities to consolidate over 80% of its 
total manufacturing capacity at the new facility.
(Note: Sample size of 37 is based on the number of firms with changes to their locational strategies.) 
   
least expensive component in a technology product.  Costs fell by 
the expensive components are made in and around Singapore, we 
the ROO.  Plus the US is our main market; we gain on tariff benefits 
 
ur presence felt so we can benefit from the USSFTA too.   
electronic goods, Eastern Asian Technology, is looking to establish its first 
Yes, labour is definitely much cheaper in China… but labour is the 
over 30% when we moved production to Singapore.  Plus many of 
saved a lot on logistics… the USSFTA also make sure we can meet 
too (SG-TNC-17). 
FR-TNC-2 has similar plans to set up a new manufacturing and service centre 
in Singapore.  
The US is our key market.  So if everyone else is changing to 
capitalize on the USSFTA, we might just lose our market share in no 
time.  You must know the USSFTA privileges US and Singapore 
companies.  For a European company like ours, the only way is to 
make o
 
To stay competitive, non-USSFTA firms too sense the urgency to alter their locational 
strategies to varying degrees.  For instance, Taiwan headquartered ODM for consumer 
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manufacturing plant in Singapore rather than at a low-cost centre like China, to take 
advantage of benefits extended to Singapore companies under the USSFTA (Straits 
Times, 5
ingapore Manufacturer’s Federation, Lew Syn Pau, “This FTA 
will attract new foreign manufacturers to establish their production bases in 
Singapore… to circumvent any trade barriers their countries may have with the US” 
(Straits T here be 
long-term ntually 
rough the impending US-Malaysia FTA, US-Thailand FTA and other region-wide 
FTAs?  I will address this issue in Chapter 7.   
 Another area seeing an increase in new operations is R&D.  3 new R&D 
operations by US and non-USSFTA firms will be established and all 37 firms have 
intentions to increase the proportion of high value-added operations in Singapore 
(Table 5.5).  The key reasons for new R&D and other high-value operations are to 
retain core competencies (56.8%) and safeguard information sensitive R&D operations 
stringent IPR regime (48.6%) (Figure 5.7).   
e.  The USSFTA 
el more secure 
conducting R&D in Singapore and have less worries about handing 
over product mandates to other Singapore firms to do it (US-TNC-
 
 November 2003).  A production site in Singapore will help the company 
reduce tariffs on exports to the US, which is a key market for the firm.  According to 
the President of the S
imes, 20 November 2002).  At this juncture we must be question: Will t
 problems for Singapore should these trade barriers be lifted eve
th
through the 
IP is very important to retain our competitive edg
brought better IP laws… with a patent, we fe
9).     
With the changes to the regulatory environment brought by the USSFTA, Singapore 
has made IPR a key weapon in its competition with other locations (Business Times, 3 
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April 2004).  This will alter the inter-firm relationships and partnerships strategies 
between US-OBMs and Singapore firms in general. 
Besides a sound IPR regime, 16.2% reporting increased investments in their 
current operations in Singapore highlight the OP rule as a crucial factor shaping their 
locational strategies.   
Tariff advantages from outward processing are good for us.  To do 
everything in Singapore, the costs will be almost 20 times that in 
stages in 
different places, the costs will be lowered significantly.  Batam and 
of speed, better coordination of the supply chain and tariff 
products here than in China (US-TNC-7). 
China.  If we can split manufacturing into different 
Malaysia might be more expensive than China, but the combination 
advantages, local-content rules, makes it cheaper to make our 
 























Figure: 5.7: Reasons for Changes to Locational Strategies in Singapore 
Source: Author’s Survey (Question 15). 
(Note: Sample size is 37.  Each firm was required to provide 2 answers.) 
 
Given that the gains from tariff savings are relatively marginal as compared to other 
low-cost competitors in the neighbouring region, economic rationality suggests firms 
will outsource labour-intensive products and processes to its low-cost neighbours such 







US$431mn.  Hence Singapore retained its pos
driving impe ISI and 
OP as well as cheap labour costs in Batam.  A Singaporean medical device 
manufacturer established a new plant in Batam in preparation for the USSFTA (Asia 
Pulse, 28 October 2003).  Benefits from duty-free access under the ISI and lower costs 
for local and foreign firms to locate some of their production facilities in neighbouring 
ASEAN countries.  Therefore, “competent, innovative and cos
sed contract manufacturers in Asia stand to gain from the move by an 
increasing number of US technology firms to farm out their operations to cheaper 
manufacturers in Asia” (Business Times, 29 January 2005).   
 
5.3.3 Riau and Malaysia: Outsourcing and Off-shoring Haven 
The attractiveness of locating labour-intensive ICT components production to 
low-wage ASEAN economies as a result of the USSFTA is exemplified by the recent 
decisions made by some Singapore manufacturers to locate their production plants in 
Riau and Malaysia.  As of 2003, there were about 650 foreign firms from 34 countries 
operating in Batam and the nearby islands, with total investments of about US$3.7bn.  
Another 35 new foreign firms were investing approximately US$62.2mn in establishing 
production plants in Batam in late 2003.  10 existing foreign firms would invest a total 
of US$48mn to expand their manufacturing plants (Jakarta Post, 22 October 2003).  
Approximately US$11.5mn was accounted by 25 Singaporean firms venturing into 
Batam for the first time (Straits Times, 24 October 2003), bringing the number of 
ean firms operating in Batam to about 400 and investments 
ition as the largest investor.  The twin 
tuses for these new Singapore firms are tariff advantages from the 
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induced Creative Technology, a leading Singapore-OBM, to consider shifting their 
operations to Riau ( ime
e 5 documents ysia.  
88.5% of the firms
f g up 
new assembly operations in Riau.  In the case of Malaysia, new manufacturing and 
assembly operations will be created by about 6 firms, while 92.8% of the firms will 
inc  ISI 
and OP as well as geographical proximity to Singapore (Figure 5.8-5.9).  US and Singapore 
TNCs are the main actors with a preference for pumping investments into Riau rather 
than Malaysia. Perhaps, reflecting the relatively higher op nal costs in Malaysia
For ra n litat
input-sourcing processes, crucial in the operationalization of the ISI and OP rule.  Fo
SG-TNC-7, the USSFTA is a crucial factor behind its d sion to create a componen
m
subsidiary are included in the list of ISI products, th lifies for USSFTA if
advantages when exported to the US via Singapore.  According to SG-TNC-7,  
 o tunitie tra ge in the US t… decided 
to set up this new subsidiary to manufacture the components 
up aci
rations… its close gapore, plus reduction in tariffs from 
A t a w g










   






ions in Riau and Mala
 with existing operations in Riau will increase investments there.  11 
irms h
reas
ave plans to establish n  manufacturing operati s and 14 firms are settin
e investments to their rrent operations.  The  reasons are benefits from
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U ISLANDS   MALAYSIA   RIA
  Investm xisting Operations in Riau  s in Existing Operations in Malaysia    ents in E Investment
  arge Incre Increase No Change Increase No Change   L ase Large Increase 
  
w
ta ow % Row %   Row % 
Row 
Total      Row %   Row %   
Ro  
To l   R    Row %
SME 5 0 0.0%  60.0% 2 40.0% 3 3 60.0% 0 0.0%  3 0 0.0% Singa ore 
TNC 1  5 4
p
2 1.7%  50.0% 1 8.3% 13 9 69.2% 2 15.4%  6 2 15.4% 
U  TNC 7 3 4S 2.9%  57.1% 0 0.0% 9 8 72.7% 0 0.0%  4 1 9.1% 
SME 1 0 0.0%  100.0% 0 0.0% 0 0 0.0% 0 0.0%  1 0 0.0% 
Others 
0.0%  100.0% 0 0.0% 3 3 100.0% 0 0.0% TNC 1 0  1 0 0.0% 
Table Total 2 8 36 0.8% 57.7% 3 11.5% 28 3  23 82.1% 2 7.1%  15 10.7%
  ew M ring Operations in Riau  nufacturing Operations in Malaysia    N anufactu New Ma
  a ncre Increase No Change Large Increase Increase No Change   L rge I ase 
  
w
ta ow % Row %   Row % 
Row 
Total      Row %   Row %   
Ro  
To l   R    Row %
SME 5 0 0.0%  0.0% 5 100.0% 5 0 0.0% 5 100.0%  0 0 0.0% Singa ore 
TNC 1  2 1
p
7 1.8%  23.5% 11 64.7% 17 2 11.8% 14 82.4%  4 1 5.9% 
U  TNC 1  0 S 1 0.0%  45.5% 6 54.5% 11 3 27.3% 8 72.7%  5 0 0.0% 
SME 1 0 0.0%  0.0% 1 100.0% 1 0 0.0% 1 100.0%  0 0 0.0% 
Others 
0.0%  0.0% 3 100.0% 3 0 0.0% 3 100.0% TNC 3 0  0 0 0.0% 
Table Total 3 2 7 5.4% 24.3% 26 70.3% 37 1 5 13.5% 31 83.8% 9 2.7% 
  New se y Operations in Riau  mbly Operations in Malaysia     As mbl New Asse
  a ncre Increase No Change Large I ase Increase No Change   L rge I ase ncre
  
w
ta ow % Row %  Row % 
Row 
Total     Row %  Row %   
Ro  
To l   R   Row % 
SME 5 0 0.0%  20.0% 4 80.0% 5 1 20.0% 3 60.0% 1 1 20.0% Singa ore 
TNC 1  2 1
p
7 1.8%  29.4% 10 58.8% 17 1 5.9% 16 94.1% 5 0 0.0% 
U  TNC 1  0 S 1 0.0% 5 45.5% 6 54.5% 11 2 18.2% 9 81.8% 0 0.0% 
SME 1 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 1 100.0% 1 0 0.0% 1 100.0% 0 0.0% 
Others 
0.0% 1 33.3% 2 66.7% 3 1 33.3% 2 66.7% 0 0.0% TNC 3 0 




7 5.4% 12 32.4% 23 62.2% 37 1 2.7% 5 13.5% 31 83.8% 
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Reasons for Changes to Investments in 

















Figure 5.8: Reasons for s t Inve  Ex ting ns i an ala
Source: Author’s S (Qu ion 15). 
(N rm qui de 2 answers.) 
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Figu s for th tab men  Operations in Riau and ays
Source ey (Question 15). 
(Note: Sample size is 37.  Ea h firm requ ed to provide 2 answers.) 
 
 
Among many he f veyed,  a petu d thei
restructuring strategies.  Observations from ou ing s teg  an ts  
operations dis  te ency to develop offshore production patterns centred on the 
IMS-GT.  Ta  sh s t 27  37
perations will relocate these operations to Riau and Malaysia respectively.  Certain 
s exhibit a preference for 
re 5.9: Reason
: Author’s Sur
e Es lish t of New Mal ia 
v
c  was ir
 of t irms sur the OP is key im s behin r 
tsourc tra ies d shif in
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o




ng rather than assembly 
for TNC strategies in Malaysia.   
  RIAU ISLANDS   MALAYSIA 
hile US firms tend to invest more in Malaysia.  This reflects the contextual 
specificity of the investment strategies of these firms.  US firms have more subsidiaries 
in Malaysia than in Riau.  This finding also suggests the changing position of Malaysia 
in the electronics RPN as observed in the focus on manufacturi
  
Shift Manufacturing Operations 
to Riau  
Shift Manufacturing Operations 
to Malaysia 
    Increase No Change Increase No Change 
    
Row 
Total   Row %   Row % 
Row 
Total   Row %   Row % 
SME 5 0 0.0% 5 100.0% 5 2 40.0% 3 60.0% Singapore 
TNC 17 7 41.2% 10 58.8% 17 6 35.3% 11 64.7% 
US TNC 11 3 27.3% 8 72.7% 11 6 54.5% 5 45.5% 
SME 1 0 0.0% 1 100.0% 1 0 0.0% 1 100.0% Others 
TNC 3 0 0.0% 3 100.0% 3 0 0.0% 3 100.0% 
Table Total 37 10 27.0% 27 73.0% 3 14 37.8% 23 62.2% 7 
                  
Shift Assembly Operations to Sh
     Riau  
ift Assembly Operations to 
Malaysia 
    Increase No Change Increase No Change 
  Total   Row %   Row % 
Row 
Total   Row %   Row % 
Row 
  
SME 5 1 20.0% 4 80.0% 5 3 60.0% 2 40.0% Singapo
 14 82.4% 
re 
TNC 17 9 52.9% 8 47.1% 17 3 17.6%
US  4 36.4% TNC 11 5 45.5% 6 54.5% 11 7 63.6%
SME 1 1 100.0% 0 0.0% 1 0 0.0% 1 100.0% Other
 2 66.7% 
s 
TNC 3 1 33.3% 2 66.7% 3 1 33.3%
Tabl .1% 37 14 37.8% 23 62.2%  Total 37 17 45.9% 20 54e
                  
  
urce Low-Value 
ions to Malaysia    
Outsource Low-Value 
Operations to Riau  
Outso
Operat
   No Change   Increase No Change Increase
     Row %   
Row 
Total   Row %   Row % 
Row 
Total   Row %
SME 5 2 40.0% 3 60.0% 5 2 40.0% 3 60.0% Singapore 
23.5% TNC 17 14 82.4% 3 17.6% 17 13 76.5% 4 
US TNC 11 8 72.7% 3 27.3% 11 3 27.3% 8 72.7% 
SME 1 1 100.0% 0 0.0% 1 1 100.0% 0 0.0% Others 
TNC 3 2 66.7% 1 33.3% 3 2 66.7% 1 33.3% 
Table Total 37 27 73.0% 10 27.0% 37 21 56.8% 16 43.2% 
 
Table 5.7: Changes in Production Relations between Singapore, and the Riau Islands and Malaysia. 
Source: Author’s Survey (Question 15). 
(Note: Sample size is 37.  Each firm was required to provide 2 answers.) 
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Data on outsourcing strategies highlight over 73% and 56.8% of firms with 
changes to locational strategies farming out their low-value operations to firms in Riau 
and Malaysia.  The impetuses are the need to remain cost competitive (60.8%), the OP 
rule (58.1%) and geographical proximity (55.4%) (Figure 5.10). 
Reasons for Outsourcing of Low-Value 



















Figure 5.10: Reasons for Outsourcing of Low-Value operations to Riau and Malaysia 
(Note: Sample size is 37.  Each firm was required to provide 2 answers.) 
 
   
The OP allows us OEMs to rationalize the production chain… shift 
some of our lower-
Malaysia, Batam… outso
Source: Author’s Survey (Question 15). 
value operations to cheaper locations like 
urce things like packaging… and keep the 
. 
high-tech design and engineering here in Singapore… Like this, we 
still fulfill the ROO required (SG-TNC-4). 
 
Now we have a good opportunity to venture to the US.  But if we 
want to be better than others, we need to trim back on some of our 
operations… we got to outsource our assembly and packaging  to 
lower costs… and focus on our design, manufacturing and 
istribution capabilities (SG-SME-11)d
 
Data analysis shows that the off-shoring of low value-added and assembly processes is 
more inclined towards Riau than Malaysia.  Contextualizing this trend, I argue that this 
reflects Malaysia’s successful economic policies that enabled the electronics sector to 
climb up the value chain.  Specifically within the IMS-GT, Johor is emerging as a key 
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node competing with Singapore for FDI, trade and high value-added operations (Ho 
and So, 1997).  Still, with the increasing tendency to outsource parts of the production 
process, it is worth pondering over what benefits are brought to these host economies 
through the linkages established by these flows of materials and investments.   
 Besides the rising number of US and Singapore firms moving to Batam, the 
USSFTA also has implications for non-USSFTA firms.  The Batam Industrial 
Development Authority (BIDA) has received many enquiries from non-USSFTA 
TNCs, especially from Japan, which are keen to relocate to Batam in expectation of the 
SSFTA.  One of the reasons behind this locational strategy is tariff advantages to be 
y data shows the tendency for 
rationalize our production chain.  We are shifting some of our 
 in Singapore to our current premises in 
Malaysia and Bintan… farm out some of the more simple assembly 
creates a new environment; it makes it important for us to do 
 
ions of relative 
U
reaped under the ISI (Straits Times, 24 October 2003).  Surve
non-USSFTA firms to increase investments and expand their current operations in 
Riau and Malaysia, in order to reap the advantages of and facilitate the 
operationalization of the OP rule (Table 5.6-5.7).  Particularly, FR-TNC-4 is engaging 
in a far-ranging rationalization strategy including outsourcing and shifts in location to 
ensure they stay competitive.   
The more flexible ROO presents us with the perfect opportunity to 
assembly operations
work to the nearby ASEAN countries.  The USSFTA, OP, ISI 
business in a new way (FR-TNC-4).   
Herein rests the paradox of the USSFTA, and perhaps its ‘success’ in shaping firm 
strategies.  As the term ‘US-Singapore’ suggests, this is an FTA between US and 
Singapore that literally joins the territories of the US and Singapore to create a single, 
bounded and level economic space.  However, USSFTA provis
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comparative advantage in the form of the ISI and OP simultaneously ‘unbound’ this 
spac into er ss’ ap lati  an  op ndaries with notable 
geographical disjunctures.  It is precisely this tension, d y plementarity between 
a “b nded” gion ith a m re or ss “borderless  transt ritorial hinterland which 
makes the USSFTA space-econom sign in e s configuration of the 
electronics R  Simp SSFT siness l concept has significant 
s  the tra of ms
economies.   
 
.3.4 ASEAN and the Rest: In or Out of the Picture? 
region, minor changes in firm operations may be 
discerned.  27% of firms with changing locational strategies have intentions to increase 
investments and 4 US-TNCs are shifting their manufacturing and assembly operations 
from Singapore to the ASEAN region (Table 5.8).  The stimulus is again the benefits 
from OP and to some degree, ISI (Figure 5.11).  To make their products more cost 
competitive, US-TNCs are actively outsourcing low value-added operations to the 
nearby ASEAN economies.   
With increasing operations in the USSFTA space-economy and the 
neighbouring ASEAN region, questions abound with regards to the possibilities of 
vercapacity.  As investments increase in some locales, closures (10.8%) and falling 
 may be expected (Table 5.9).  In this scenario, SG-TNCs are the 
ey agents involved in a phase of investment reduction (16.7%) and production 
losures (18.2%) outside the USSFTA and ASEAN space-economy.   
e a ‘bord le one enc su ng fluid d en bou
 an et com
ou re w o le ” er
y ificant  th patial 
PN. ly, the U A as a new bu  and spatia
implication on  s tegies fir  from both USSFTA and non-USSFTA 
5
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US 11 5 45.5% 6 54.5%  0 0.0%
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able 5.8: Changes to Locational Strategies in Other ASEAN Locales 
ource: Author’s Survey (Question 15). 




Firms' Strategies in Other ASEAN 
Locales



















Figure 5.11: Reasons for Changes to Locational Strategies in other ASEAN Locales 





Other Locales Operations   Operations 
Investments in Existing Outsource Low-Value 
  No Change Decrease No Change Decrease 
  
Row 
Total   Row %   Row % 
Row 
Total   Row %   Row % 
Singapore 18 15 83.3% 3 16.7% 22 17 77.3% 5 22.7% 
US 11 10 90.9% 1 9.1% 11 11 100.0% 0 0.0% 
Others 4 4 100.0% 0 0.0% 4 4 100.0% 0 0.0% 
Table Tot 13.5% al 33 29 87.9% 4 12.1% 37 32 86.5% 5 
  ations   Closures of Operations  Shift Oper
  Increase No Change No Change Decrease 
  Total   Row %   Row % Total   Row %   Row % 
Row Row 
Singapore 22 4 18.2% 18 81.8% 22 17 77.3% 5 22.7% 
US 11 0 0.0% 11 100.0% 11 11 100.0% 0 0.0% 
Others 4 0 0.0% 4 100.0% 4 4 100.0% 0 0.0% 
Table Total 37 4 10.8% 33 89.2% 37 32 86.5% 5 13.5% 
 
Source: Author’s Survey (Question 15). 
es ensuring competitive costs, the twinning 
f geographical proximity and increased flexibility in ROO bring about the 
S-GT, and 
Table 5.9: Changes to Locational Strategies in Other Locales 
(Note: Sample size is based on the number of firms with changes to their locational strategies.) 
 
 
In the past we have our plants all over the place to minimize costs.  
But this is not the most efficient way… need to consider the cost of 
logistics, supply chain management, regulations, so sometimes it is 
quite a hassle.  With the flexibility in ROO, I can now close down 
my plant in China, and then consolidate my operations in a group 
around Singapore… to be even more competitive (SG-TNC-18). 
 
13.5% also indicated they are less likely to shift and outsource their operations to 
locations outside the ASEAN region because of the inability to reap USSFTA 
advantages (Table 5.9).    Complimenting this trend is the fall in component trade 
outside ASEAN, further confirming the tendency of firms to put Singapore and 
ASEAN on their radar screens.  Thus, besid
o
rationalization of the RPN and consolidation of operations around the IM




 Summing up, while changing locational strategies have produced some degree 
of variance in the electronics RPN, this change is not as far-ranging in its effects, as the 
USSFTA is still very much in its infancy and altering firm strategies incur significant 
costs.   
Setting up entirely new operations now is a bit too early.  I prefer to 
 
watch the market a bit more.  It’s less risky like that (SG-TNC-1). 
Contrary to arguments by hyperglobalists, TNCs are not footloose entities (e.g. 
Ohmae, 1995).  Instead, sunk costs (Clark, 1994), established relations with the host 
econom and other c ncern sure Cs bst ree of 
locational inertia.  Thus, ‘societal, network and territorial embeddedness’ (Hess, 2004) 
are circumstantial in pinning down firms and their GPNs to specific locales.  For some 
other f s, the ob is m re p duc d. h be ficiaries of the 
USSFTA are semiconductors, computer peripherals and telecoms equipment (Straits 
Times, 16 August 2004).  Nevertheless, the USSFTA has been more or less internalized 
in the electronics RPN through the ROO and other changes in the business 
environment.  This combination of altering firm strategies and geographical location of 
their activities results in strengthening connections within the IMS-GT, increase 
outsourcing, off-sho pera ns a  es me of su idia  These 
changes also mark a change in the intra-firm and inter-firm relationships that I argue in 




Singapore, changes in the intensities of component and product flows and their actors 
y o s en that TN exhibit a su antial deg
irm stacle o ro t-relate  T e key ne
ring o tio nd tablish nt  new bs ries. 
reshape ynam  th PN
5.4 EXPORTS TO THE US: CHANGING 
 Since the USSFTA is aimed at increasing bilateral trade between US
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may be expected.  Besides the 6 firms with no intentions to restrategize, the remaining 
40 firms are changing their export strategies.  72.5% of this group registered significant 
increases in their component exports such as semiconductors and computer 
peripherals to the US (Table 5.10).  Tariff advantages and increased performance of 
contract manufacturing activities are the key impetus for these changes (Figure 5.12).  
For Singapore-OEMs in particular, the exports of components are for further 
ries or their US customers.   
ents 
production activities in the US either by their own subsidia
US Market     Compon
   Total Increase No Change Decrease 
        Row %   Row %   Row % 
OBM 3 3 100.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
OEM 11 10 90.9% 1 9.1% 0 0.0% 
CS 5 5 100.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
Singapore 
SEM 5 4 80.0% 1 20.0% 0 0.0% 
OBM 7 0 0.0% 7 100.0% 0 0.0% 
US 
OEM 4 3 75.0% 1 25.0% 0 0.0% 
OBM 3 2 66.7% 1 33.3% 0 0.0% Others 
SEM 2 2 100.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
                  
Table Total   29 72.5% 11 27.5% 0 0.0% 
     Final Products 
   Total Large Increase Increase No Change 
        Row %   Row %   Row % 
OBM 3 3 100.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
OEM 11 11 100.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
CS 5 0 0.0% 3 60.0% 2 40.0% 
Singapore 
SEM 5 3 60.0% 2 40.0% 0 0.0% 
OBM 7 0 0.0% 3 42.9% 4 57.1% 
US 
OEM 4 2 50.0% 2 50.0% 0 0.0% 
OBM 3 3 100.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% Others 
SEM 2 2 100.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
                  
Table Total   24 60.0% 10 25.0% 6 15.0% 
 
Table 5.10: Firms’ Export Strategies for the US Market 
Source: Author’s Survey (Question 17). 





































Source: Author’s Survey (Question 17). 
 
 
Besides components, the US is also a key market for final products, with 75% 
of 40 firms indicating an increase in their final exports to the US (Table 5.10).  A larger 
proportion of Singapore-OEMs and Singapore-OBMs even indicated a large increase 
in their final exports in comparison to US-OEMs and US-OBMs.  The availability and 
opportunities of a large market (Figure 5.13), coupled with tariff advantages are 
extremely enticing.  Mr. Alphonsus Chia of IE Singapore says, “This agreement gives 
Singapore’s exports a competitive advantage over non-FTA trading partners of the US 
through lower or zero custom duties” (Business Times, 29 January 2005).   
Figure 5.12: Reasons for changes to Component Exports to the US 

























: Reasons for changes to Exports of Final Products to the US 
ource: Author’s Survey (Question 17). 





Previously, we don’t export much directly.  Now with changes in the 
way we make our goods, we export a lot more to the US.  The tariff 
advantages are a big plus (SG-SME-10). 
Exporting to the US is not so much of a hassle now.  With 
customers and partners are more willing to allow us to do export 
 
Ms) (Refer back to section 3.6.1).  With the 
SSFTA, the combination of tariff advantages, different regulatory environment and perhaps the 
irms with the right to export directly 
 
 
harmonized standards, time-to-market is reduced… our US 
directly to the US (SG-TNC-16).  
Evidently, it is not simply exports of final products to the US that are on the 
increase, but the actors involved have changed too.  Previously, Singapore firms do not 
export directly to the US; the practice is to “sell-back” to the local subsidiaries of their 
customers (US and non-USSFTA OB
U
increased credibility of Singapore firms have conferred Singapore f
to the US.  In essence, it is not space that gives power to firms; rather, the changes in 
geographical space affect how firms, as intrinsically territorial and spatial entities, use 
space and subsequently modify the network geographies and relations.  Critically, this 
‘increase’ in power among Singapore firms is a case of a heightened “capacity to 
exercise that is realized only through the process of exercising” (Dicken et al, 2001: 93).  
Furthermore, the flows of components and final products also suggest a heightening of 
marketing and distribution firm functions, especially among Singapore firms.  I argue 
that the relationship between Singapore and US firms has somewhat morphed into a 
different production model.  It must be mentioned OBMs too will want to hold onto 
the right to export, due to the benefits available.  Therefore, engaging in critical analysis 
of how this relationship has changed is crucial as it will reveal the power play amongst 






 Understanding the changing geographies of electronics RPN is inadequate in 
unraveling the intricacies of power relationships.  For a more comprehensive picture, 
we need to zoom into where the RPNs ‘touch down’ in space and examine the 
relational organization of economic activity.  Given that issues of territoriality and 
spatiality undergird the configurations in each node, I will focus on untangling the 
intra-firm and inter-firm networks of power, subordination and reciprocity in various 
stages of the RPN within the IMS-GT. 
 
5.5.1 Product R&D: IPR Regime and Partnerships 
 Of the 40 firms experiencing changes 
indicate significant changes in their relational strategies.  In product R&D, tendencies 
for Singapore-OEMs, especially TN
firms thr d formal partnership arrangements are evident (Table 5.11).  
ging trend, with 10 Singapore firms 
(mainly TNCs) reporting a large increase in R&D partnerships with US firms.  The 
importance of building up and retaining core competencies in R&D as well as 
opportunities for technological and expertise transfer from US firms account for the 
increasing partnerships.  Significantly, the stringent IPR regime has enhanced the 
position of Singapore firms as R&D contract manufacturers (44.7%) as well as partners 
5.5 PARTNERSHIPS AND RELATIONALITY: CHANGING POWER 
 
in their firm strategies, 38 firms (95%) 
Cs to undertake these projects on behalf of US 
ough contract an
Outsourcing of product R&D is decreasing among Singapore firms (SMEs 80%, TNCs 
52.6%), whilst increasing among US firms (30%).  Further, over 95% of all the firms 
surveyed are increasing R&D contract and partnership activities with US firms.  
Singapore firms are the key actors in this chan
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to US firms (55.3%) (Figure 5.14-5.15).  Therefore, the USSFTA has fashioned a 
different regulatory environment through the IPR regime; an economic space apposite 
for information-sensitive R&D activities.   
 another angle, the inclination among US and non-
USSF  firms to partner Singapor irms as a result of the enhanced IPR regime 
(65.8%), again demonstrates the heightened position of Singapore firms in the 
electronics RPN (Figure 5.16).  Today’s shortening product life-cycles in the global 
economy makes R&D a key competitive tool among firms.  Hence, a suitable 
environment for R&D is important to attract and retain these global-spanning TNCs in 
a particular locale.  As aptly summed up by US-TNC-1,  
market conditions are important if 
you want to develop and launch a product in a specific market.  So 
D bs in  major region of the world.  In 
th nswer is undoubtedly in Singapore.  With 
 IP laws, I would permit Singapore firms to undertake this 
activity on our behalf without fears they will flout the regulations.  
Established Singapore-O  the talent and capabilities to 
D. 
Though R&D partnerships between US firms (OBMs) with Singapore-OEMs are on 
t in th gh the selection of partners whereby these 
arrangements are restricted to the lar d more reputable Singapore-OEMs.  SMEs 
are in eft be d in the cess.
T
TA
aking the R&D issue from
e f





































      Outsourcing Contract Relations 
   Increase No Change Decrease 
Large 
Increase Increase No Change 
    
Row 
Total   Row %   Row %   Row %   Row %   Row %   Row % 
SME 5 0 0.0% 1 20.0% 4 80.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 5 100.0% 
TNC 19 1 5.3% 8 42.1% 10 52.6% 2 10.5% 16 84.2% 1 5.3% 
US TNC 10 3 30.0% 2 20.0% 5 50.0% 0 0.0% 16 160.0% 4 40.0% 
SME 1 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 1 100.0% 0 0.0% 1 100.0% 0 0.0% 
Others TNC 3 0 0.0% 2 66.7% 1 33.3% 0 0.0% 1 33.3% 2 66.7% 
                        
Table Total 38 4 10.5% 13 34.2% 21 55.3% 2 5.3% 34 89.5% 12 31.6% 
                    
    Partner US Firms Partner Singapore Firms 
   Large Increase Increase No Change Increase No Change Decrease 
   
Row 
Total   Row %   Row %  Row %   Row %   Row %  Row % 
SME 5 1 20.0% 4 80.0% 0 0.0% 2 40.0% 3 60.0% 0 0.0% 
TNC 19 9 47.4% 10 52.6% 0 0.0% 11 57.9% 7 36.8% 1 5.3% 
US TNC 10 0 0.0% 9 90.0% 1 10.0% 7 70.0% 3 30.0% 0 0.0% 
SME 1 1 100.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 1 100.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
Others TNC 3 0 0.0% 2 66.7% 1 33.3% 0 0.0% 3 100.0% 0 0.0% 
                              
Table Total 38 11 28.9% 25 65.8% 2 5.3% 21 55.3% 16 42.1% 1 2.6% 
: Changes in R&D Relationships 
rce: Author’s Survey (Question 16). 
e: Sample size of 38 is based on the number of firms with changes to their inter-firm strategies.) 
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Figure 5.14: Reasons behind Changes to Contract R&D Relationships 
Source: Author’s Survey (Question 16). 
(Note: Sample size is 38.  Each firm was required to provide 2 answers.) 
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Figure 5.15: Reasons for Changes to R&D Partn
Source: Author’s Survey (Question 16). 
(Note: Sample size is 38.  Each firm was requ
 



























Figure 5.16: Reasons for Changes to R&D Partnerships with Singapore Firms 
Source: Author’s Survey (Question 16). 
(Note: Sample size is 38.  Each firm was required to provide 2 answers.) 
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5.5.2 Manufacturing and Assembly: Networks of Reciprocity 
 Marked changes in the organization of manufacturing and assembly activities 
have also occurred under the USSFTA, with disparate motivations amongst different 
groups of actors.  55.3% and 71% of firms experiencing changes in their relational 
strategies, namely US and Singapore TNCs, reported an increase in the outsourcing of 
manufacturing and assembly operations respectively to other firms (Table 5.12).  
Performance of contract manufacturing (91.7%) and assembly (87.5%) for US firms by 
Singapore firms has also increased significantly.  It may seem contradictory for 
outsourcing and contract activities by Singapore firms to be increasing simultaneously, 
but further insights may be gleaned from SG-TNC-8’s explanation. 
The USSFTA raised our profile a lot… As a contract manufacturer, 
our job is to deliver a whole range of services, take in and meet as 
many orders as possible, but there are definitely limits to our 
capabilities.  Outsourcing is a must, so we can focus on our core 
competencies in R&D, manufacturing… partnering companies long-
term to do assembly and some manufacturing for helps to rationalize 
our production chain, minimize costs.  SMEs are an important 
component in this, because all our competitors will be doing to same 
thing. 
 
The argument here is twofold.  On the one hand, the role of Singapore-TNC-OEMs is 
to offer complete package of services (from product R&D, manufacturing, assembly to 
distribution).  OBMs (US firms) seeking outsourcing options are more likely to engage 
OEMs with these range of capabilities, thereby accounting for the increased contract 
manufacturing and assembly activities undertaken by Singapore firms.  
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    Outsourcing Manufacturing Outsourcing Assembly 
  Increase No Change Decrease Large Increase Increase No Change 
  
Row 
Total   Row %   Row %  Row %   Row %   Row %   Row % 
Singapore 24 9 37.5% 14 58.3% 1 4.2% 2 8.3% 14 58.3% 8 33.3% 
US 10 9 90.0% 1 10.0% 0 0.0% 5 50.0% 4 40.0% 1 10.0% 
Others 4 3 75.0% 1 25.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 2 50.0% 2 50.0% 
                       
Table Total 21 55.3% 16 42.1% 1 2.6% 7 18.4% 20 52.6% 11 28.9% 
                  
    Contract Manufacturing for US Firms Contract Assembly for US Firms 
  Increase No Change Decrease Increase No Change Decrease 
  
Row 
Total  Row %  Row %  Row %  Row %  Row %  Row % 
Singapore 24 22 91.7% 1 4.2% 1 4.2% 21 87.5% 2 8.3% 1 4.2% 
US 10 7 70.0% 3 30.0% 0 0.0% 1 10.0% 5 50.0% 4 40.0% 
Others 4 3 75.0% 1 25.0% 0 0.0% 2 50.0% 1 25.0% 1 25.0% 
                      
Table Total 32 84.2% 5 13.2% 1 2.6% 24 63.2% 8 21.1% 6 15.8% 
 
Table 5.12: Changes in Manufacturing and Assembly Relationships 
Source: Author’s Survey (Question 16). 






On the other hand Singapore-TNC-OEMs especially, parcel out these contracts 
into smaller nuggets to Singapore-SMEs, to avoid over-taxing their operations and to 
focus on their core competencies in high value-added activities.  Hence, justifying 
increased outsourcing by Singapore-TNCs and increased contract activities by 
Singapore-SMEs.  In other words, fresh interlocking and dense network of relations 
with varying strengths of connections are in effect under the USSFTA.  Therein, 
Singapore-TNC-OEMs increasingly function as intermediaries between US firms and 
Singapore-SMEs.  With more outsourcing, it is worth pondering over the renewed 
importance of SMEs in this course of action.  To be precise, as SMEs increasingly 
undertake outsourcing roles, they are also assuming the responsibilities to absorb the 
cost pressures through these production relationships.  I argue that as SMEs reposition 
themselves as good outsourcing partners to these local and foreign TNCs, the 
repertoires of power available to SMEs in the USSFTA space-economy and the idea of 
market passivity are thus reconfigured. 
Results also show rising partnerships with US firms, by other US, Singapore 
and non-USSFTA firms in manufacturing (86.8%) and assembly (76.4%) (Table 5.13).   
Singapore firms in general perceive increased manufacturing and assembly partnerships 
with US firms as a means to facilitate access to the US market (61.8%) (Figure 5.17). 
The USSFTA definitely opened the US market to Singapore firms.  
But it’s not so easy to venture to such a large market.  Partnering US 
firms to manufacture our products will help us to better penetrate 
the US market.  US firms have the know-how, technological or the 
cultures of the US; this will facilitate our operations and in 











     Manufacturing Partnerships with US Firms Assembly Partnerships with US Firms 
   Large Increase Increase No Change Large Increase Increase No Change 
    
Row 
Total   Row %   Row %   Row %   Row %   Row %  Row % 
SME 5 0 0.0% 3 60.0% 2 40.0% 0 0.0% 4 80.0% 1 20.0% 
TNC 19 9 47.4% 9 47.4% 1 5.3% 2 10.5% 16 84.2% 1 5.3% 
US TNC 10 0 90.0% 9 90.0% 1 10.0% 0 0.0% 6 60.0% 4 40.0% 
SME 1 0 0.0% 1 100.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 1 100.0% 
Others TNC 3 0 0.0% 2 66.7% 1 33.3% 0 0.0% 1 33.3% 2 66.7% 
                        
Table Total 38 9 23.6% 24 63.2% 5 13.2% 2 5.3% 27 71.1% 9 23.6% 
                    
    Manufacturing Partnerships with Singapore Firms Assembly Partnerships with Singapore Firms 
   Large Increase Increase No Change Increase No Change Decrease 
   
Row 
Total   Row %   Row %  Row %   Row %   Row %  Row % 
SME 5 0 0.0% 5 100.0% 0 0.0% 4 80.0% 1 20.0% 0 0.0% 
TNC 19 0 0.0% 19 100.0% 0 0.0% 15 78.9% 4 21.1% 0 0.0% 
US TNC 10 3 30.0% 7 70.0% 0 0.0% 9 90.0% 0 0.0% 1 10.0% 
SME 1 0 0.0% 1 100.0% 0 0.0% 1 100.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
Others TNC 3 0 0.0% 2 66.7% 1 33.3% 3 100.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
                             
Table Total 38 3 7.9% 34 89.5% 1 2.6% 32 84.2% 5 13.2% 1 2.6% 
: Changes in Manufacturing and Assembly Partnerships 
rce: Author’s Survey (Question 16). 
e: Sample size of 38 is based on the number of firms with changes to their inter-firm strategies.) 
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Figure 5.17: Reasons for Changes in Manufacturing and Assembly Partnerships with US Firms 
Source: Author’s Survey (Question 16). 
(Note: Sample size is 38.  Each firm was required to provide 2 answers.) 
 
 
Viewing from the opposite angle, 97.4% of responding firms with changes to 
relational strategies informed of increased manufacturing and assembly partnerships with 
Singapore firms (Table 5.13).  From the Singapore firms’ perspective, rising partnerships 
amongst themselves allows them to compete more effectively against foreign (especially 
US) firms (47.4%) as well as facilitating manufacturing operations for the US market 
(Figure 5.18).  This reflects the mentality among Singapore firms to band together and 
pool resources for greater effect when venturing overseas.  As SG-TNC-3 expresses, 
“We may have quite a big foothold in the US market.  But partnering a Singapore 
company is a security measure, diversify our risks.  Being Singaporean, it is still easier to 
partner a Singaporean”.  State discourse also encourages Singapore firms to work as a 
collective rather than on an individual basis, “Be like ducks, not chickens… Ducks 
follow the mother duck, chickens run all over the place” (Business Times, 29 November 
2003).  Hence, both the US and Singapore cases elucidates the role of ‘societal 
embeddedness’ (Hess, 2004) in shaping firm strategies, and  embeddedness is often in 
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conflict and tension with costs concerns, access to strategic competencies in other firms  
and opening new markets in a firm’s desire to stay competitive.    


































Figure 5.18: Reasons for Changes in Manufacturing and Assembly Partnerships with Singapore Firms 
Source: Author’s Survey (Question 16). 
(Note: Sample size is 38.  Each firm was required to provide 2 answers.) 
 
 
 For US firms, the USSFTA has impacted on their perceptions of Singapore firms 
positively.   
The USSFTA definitely increases the profile of Singapore companies.  
The opportunities to work together will increase too.  The USSFTA is 
like a awarding an ISO certificate to Singapore manufacturers… 
establishing longer-term arrangements are options we are definitely 
more willing to consider now (US-TNC-3). 
 
Documentation is a big problem if we change our suppliers, contract 
manufacturers all the time.  To solve this, we sign longer-term 
contracts or establish formal partnerships to facilitate documentation 
and the fulfillment of ROO requirements.  The contract will insist that 
all our partners ensure that the ROO of the supplies and products 
they manufacture, assemble on our behalf, fall within a certain local-
content range (US-TNC-4). 
 
The USSFTA not only confers more power on Singapore firms by augmenting their 
profile, but the need to fulfill USSFTA ROO makes it important for mechanisms in the 
form of long-term partnership arrangements to be in place to facilitate the 
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operationalization of USSFTA advantages.  I argue therefore, the key essence of the 
USSFTA is to create new networks of outsourcing and partnership for all firms (including 
SMEs) embedded in the electronics RPN.  This in turn implies different networks of 
dominance and subordination. 
 Partnerships between US and Singapore firms illustrate the emergence of networks of 
reciprocity, reflecting intentional and purposeful collaboration for mutual benefits.  While Singapore 
firms partner US firms to increase access to US markets, US firms (particularly OBMs) 
partner Singapore firms to retain core competencies, lower production costs and increase 
access to the Singapore and Asian markets.  Increasing tie-ups between US and 
Singapore firms, from 37 in 2002 to 100 in 2003 (Straits Times, 9 October 2003), is a clear 
indicator of this reciprocity.  A substantial number of these US firms are SMEs 
venturing into Asia for the first time.  Lacking the technical capabilities and resources, 
these US-SMEs partner Singapore firms either as distributors for their products or 
representatives in sourcing and production.   Clearly, the new USSFTA institutional and 
regulatory environment has created new opportunities and markets for US-SMEs.  
Common language, business culture and legal framework between Singapore and the US 
make Singapore an easier launch pad for US-SMEs wishing to expand into the region 
(Business Times, 27 March 2004), thereby shifting their largely national and NAFTA 
orientation to include an Asian one, via Singapore.  Singapore electronics firms, C&W 
and TTI Holdings, are also taking the initiative by adding resources to tap US-SMEs 
(Business Times, 29 January 2005).   
Some US-SMEs contacted our office in the US.  They’re interested to 
launch their products through us in Asia… we’re formalizing a 
partnership where they provide us with the product template and we 
do the manufacturing and distribution (SG-TNC-9). 
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Institutional action such as the proactive stance adopted by the US Embassy in 
Singapore in matchmaking these US and Singapore firms accounts for much of the 
increase in partnerships.  The intermediating influences of extra-firm networks on the 
electronics RPN will be further explored in Chapter 6. 
My research also exemplifies the implications of the USSFTA on relational 
geometries with non-USSFTA firms.  Singapore firms are performing more contract 
manufacturing activities and increasing partnerships with non-USSFTA firms though to 
a lesser extent as with US firms.  Nevertheless, my interviewees reported the usage of 
Singapore as a node and Singaporean firms as affiliates by these non-USSFTA firms in 
sourcing for components from neighbouring economies and exporting their products to 
the US.  This finding parallels the Japanese experience in the EU and NAFTA (see 
Holmes 1992; Sadler and Swain 1994).  Over 81.6% of the firms highlighted the 
importance of this consignee role in Singapore-non-USSFTA firm partnerships (Figure 
5.19).   






























Figure 5.19: Reasons for Changes in Manufacturing Partnerships with non-USSFTA Firms 
Source: Author’s Survey (Question 16). 




Our operations may be in Singapore, and we can also benefit from the 
USSFTA.  But in the world of business, things are not so fair and 
square.  So partnering Singapore or US firms to assemble or 
manufacture our products… or as a consignee will definitely help to 
ease entry into the US markets (FR-SME-1).   
 
While non-USSFTA firms are partnering Singapore firms so as to gain greater access to 
the US market, advantages in the form of lower production costs through scale 
economies and lowering risk accrue to Singapore firms.  Thus, I argue that previous 
conceptions of contract activities and partnerships as the subordination of the 
‘subcontractor’ (OEMs) and dominance of the ‘client’ (OBMs) should instead be seen as 
networks of reciprocity.  Power relations in the pre-USSFTA electronics RPN was skewed 
towards the OBM (refer to Chapter 3).  With new regulatory terrains under the USSFTA, 
the culmination of changing firm strategies, new networks of sourcing and production 
have resulted in unique configurations of power and relational geometries.  It is the 
‘production of space’ (Lefebvre, 1991) through shifting network configurations which 
further creates new ‘spatial assemblages of power’ (Allen, 1999) for the actors embedded 
in these very networks.  The case of Singapore firms, especially SMEs in test services 
provision presents a fetching picture of the intertwining between spatiality and power.   
 
5.5.3 Test Services: New Spatialities, New Opportunities for SMEs 
 In test services, actors are motivated by the need to focus on core competencies 
and the harmonization of standards under the USSFTA.  Test services are perceived as a 
low value-added activity by firms.  Yet, test services are important for products to meet 
certain conformity requirements in a foreign market.  With the harmonization of 
standards and MRAs under the USSFTA, tests conducted in Singapore are recognized by 
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the US authorities.  In this sense, this heightens the importance of test services in the 
USSFTA RPN.  Recognizing this reality, many Singapore firms are offering test services 
to US and non-USSFTA firms.   
Survey data shows 73.7% of firms with changes to relational strategies, namely 
TNCs (over 70% of US and Singapore-TNCs), have increased outsourcing of test 
services (Table 5.14).  The outsourced test services are increasingly undertaken by 
Singapore firms, through a variety of arrangements.  Over 10 Singapore firms are 
increasing the performance of contract test services for both US and non-USSFTA 
firms, while US firms registered either no change or a reduction in this aspect.  In 
particular, Singapore-SMEs increase the performance of test services for US firms 
through contract (80%) and partnership (60%) relations.   
Many companies don’t like to do testing in-house… not cost-
effective… they prefer to outsource… this is a good opportunity for 
us to sell ourselves as test service providers to the MNCs, one round 
of testing in Singapore is all we need.  We try to partner these TNCs 
for testing (SG-SME-8). 
 
Because of double-testing, foreign MNCs prefer to export the goods 
on their own, to facilitate testing procedures and customs when it 
reaches the US market.  So now, only one round, these MNCs are 
more willing to allow us to do the exports instead (SG-TNC-14). 
 
Harmonization of standards under the USSFTA has created new spatialities imbued with 
new forms of power for Singapore firms to find their niche in test services (Figure 5.20).  
Specifically, Singapore-SMEs have tapped into this opportunity by actively marketing 
themselves as test service partners to TNCs.  SMEs’ pre-emptive responses attempt to 
correct the big-firm bias and the relative neglect of SMEs’ strategic reorientations in 
existing literature on the EU and NAFTA (e.g. Amin et al, 1992; Hudson, 1997; 




      Outsourcing Contract Relations with US Firms 
   Large Increase Increase No Change Increase No Change Decrease 
    
Row 
Total   Row %   Row %   Row %   Row %   Row %  
SME 5 0 0.0% 2 40.0% 3 60.0% 4 80.0% 0 0.0% 1Singapore 
TNC 19 5 26.3% 12 63.2% 2 10.5% 7 36.8% 10 52.6% 2
US TNC 10 5 50.0% 2 20.0% 3 30.0% 0 0.0% 5 50.0% 5
SME 1 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 1 100.0% 0 0.0% 1 100.0% 0Others 
TNC 3 0 0.0% 2 66.7% 1 33.3% 0 0.0% 2 66.7% 1
Table Total 38 10 26.3% 18 47.4% 10 26.3% 11 28.9% 18 47.4% 9
    Contract Relations with non-USSFTA Firms Partnerships with US Firms
   Increase No Change Decrease Increase No Change Decrease 
    
Row 
Total   Row %   Row %   Row %   Row %   Row %  
SME 5 3 60.0% 2 40.0% 0 0.0% 3 60.0% 2 40.0% 0Singapore 
TNC 19 7 36.8% 12 63.2% 0 0.0% 8 42.1% 10 52.6% 1
US TNC 10 0 0.0% 9 90.0% 1 10.0% 2 20.0% 8 80.0% 0
SME 1 0 0.0% 1 100.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 1 100.0% 0Others 
TNC 3 0 0.0% 2 66.7% 1 33.3% 0 0.0% 3 100.0% 0
Table Total 38 10 26.3% 26 68.4% 2 5.3% 13 34.2% 24 63.2% 1
    Partnerships with non-USSFTA Firms Partnerships with Singapore Firms 
   Increase No Change Decrease Increase No Change Decrease 
   
Row 
Total   Row %   Row %  Row %   Row %   Row %  
SME 5 3 60.0% 2 40.0% 0 0.0% 2 40.0% 3 60.0% 0Singapore 
TNC 19 5 26.3% 13 68.4% 1 5.3% 11 57.9% 8 42.1% 0
US TNC 10 0 0.0% 7 70.0% 3 30.0% 8 80.0% 1 10.0% 1
SME 1 0 0.0% 1 100.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 1 100.0% 0 0.0% Others 
TNC 3 1 33.3% 2 66.7% 0 0.0% 3 100.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
Table Total 38 9 23.7% 25 65.8% 4 10.5% 24 63.2% 13 34.2% 1 2.6% 
 
Table 5.14: Changes to Test Services Relationships 
Source: Author’s Survey (Question 16). 
(Note: Sample size of 38 is based on the number of firms with changes to their inter-firm strategies.) 
 




















Figure 5.20: Reasons for Changes in Test Services Partnerships with Singapore Firms 
Source: Author’s Survey (Question 16). 





















5.5.4 Marketing and Distribution: New Spatialities, New Actors 
  New spatialities in the form of guaranteed market access to the US for firms 
based in Singapore also insinuate changes in the role of firms and power geometries in 
the electronics RPN.  55.3% of firms with changes to relational strategies recorded a 
marked increase in their marketing and distribution activities for US firms through 
contract arrangements (Table 5.15).  Actors include Singapore-OEMs (90.0%) and US-
OEMs (100%).  13 Singapore firms also increased their partnerships with US firms.  
Partnerships aid Singapore firms in enrolling themselves into the US firms’ strategic 
competencies in established marketing and distribution networks (73.7%) (Figure 5.21). 
With increased partnerships in other aspects of production, partnerships in marketing 
and distribution are part and parcel of changes in the RPN.  Critically, this demonstrates 
Singapore firms are increasingly involved in direct exports to the US rather than the 
previous practice of “selling-back” to customers locally, highlighting the transformation 
in OBM-OEM relationships.   
If you want a chance to export, the relationship will have to be more 
like a partnership, something like a joint venture.  Everything, the 
whole process will be joint… You will have greater bargaining power, 
and a greater chance to secure the right to market and distribute 
products.  Of course, not all companies can do that. Only the bigger 
OEMs have a chance to do it (SG-TNC-12).  
 
Figures also show the inclination of increased partnerships among Singapore 
firms (SME 20%, TNC 78.9%) to compete more effectively (34.2%) and lower risks in 
their ventures in a foreign market (23.7%) (Table 5.16).  50% of US firms too have 
increased their partnerships with Singapore firms to access the Singapore and Asian 
markets (36.8%) (Figure 5.22).  For non-USSFTA firms, their marketing and distribution 










Distribution Contract Relations with US Firms Partnerships with US Firms 
   Large Increase Increase No Change Increase No Change 
    
Row 
Total Row %  Row %  Row %  Row %  Row %
OBM 3 1 33.3% 1 33.3% 1 33.3% 3 100.0% 0 0.0% 
OEM 11 3 27.3% 7 63.6% 1 9.1% 7 63.6% 4 36.4% 
CS 5 0 0.0% 1 20.0% 4 80.0% 0 0.0% 5 100.0%
SEM 5 0 0.0% 2 40.0% 3 60.0% 3 60.0% 2 40.0% 
OBM 6 0 0.0% 2 33.3% 4 66.7% 0 0.0% 6 100.0%
US 
OEM 4 4 100.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 4 100.0%
OBM 2 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 2 100.0% 0 0.0% 2 100.0%Others 
SEM 2 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 2 100.0% 0 0.0% 2 100.0%
Table Total 38 8 21.1% 13 34.2% 17 44.7% 13 34.2% 25 65.8% 
: Changes to Marketing and Distribution Relationships with US Firms 
rce: Author’s Survey (Question 16). 
e: Sample size of 38 is based on the number of firms with changes to their inter-firm strategies.) 
























Figure 5.21: Reasons for Changes in Marketing and Distribution Partnerships with US Firms 
Source: Author’s Survey (Question 16). 
(Note: Sample size is 38.  Each firm was required to provide 2 answers.)
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Marketing and Distribution Partnerships with Singapore Firms 
   Increase No Change Decrease 
    
Row 
Total   Row %   Row %   Row % 
SME 5 1 20.0% 3 60.0% 1 20.0% Singapore 
TNC 19 15 78.9% 3 15.8% 1 5.3% 
US TNC 10 5 50.0% 5 50.0% 0 0.0% 
SME 1 0 0.0% 1 100.0% 0 0.0% Others 
TNC 3 0 0.0% 3 100.0% 0 0.0% 
Table Total 38 21 55.3% 15 39.5% 2 5.3% 
    Contract Relations with Non-USSFTA Firms 
   Large Increase Increase No Change 
    
Row 
Total   Row %   Row %   Row % 
SME 5 0 0.0% 1 20.0% 4 80.0% Singapore 
TNC 19 1 5.3% 13 68.4% 5 26.3% 
US TNC 10 3 30.0% 1 10.0% 6 60.0% 
SME 1 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 1 100.0% Others 
TNC 3 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 3 100.0% 
Table Total 38 4 10.5% 15 39.5% 19 50.0% 
    Partnerships with Non-USSFTA Firms 
   Increase No Change Decrease 
   
Row 
Total   Row %   Row %  Row % 
SME 5 1 20.0% 4 80.0% 0 0.0% Singapore 
TNC 19 11 57.9% 7 36.8% 1 5.3% 
US TNC 10 1 10.0% 9 90.0% 0 0.0% 
SME 1 0 0.0% 1 100.0% 0 0.0% Others 
TNC 3 0 0.0% 3 100.0% 0 0.0% 
Table Total 38 13 34.2% 24 63.2% 1 2.6% 
 
Table 5.16: Changes to Marketing and Distribution Relations with Singapore and non-USSFTA Firms. 
Source: Author’s Survey (Question 16). 
(Note: Sample size of 38 is based on the number of firms with changes to their inter-firm strategies.) 
 



























Figure 5.22: Reasons for Changes in Marketing and Distribution Partnerships with Singapore Firms 
Source: Author’s Survey (Question 16). 
(Note: Sample size is 38.  Each firm was required to provide 2 answers.) 
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through contract (50%) and partnership (34.2%) arrangements.  Here, Singapore and 
US firms play the role of the consignee (57.9%) on the behalf of non-USSFTA firms, 
while gaining the right to market and distribute the products and enhancing visibility in 
the US market (Figure 5.23), demonstrating relationships of reciprocity.   
Marketing and Distribution Partnerships with 



















Figure 5.23: Reasons for Changes in Marketing and Distribution Partnerships with non-USSFTA Firms 
Source: Author’s Survey (Question 16). 
(Note: Sample size is 38.  Each firm was required to provide 2 answers.) 
 
In sum, the nature of relational organization in the IMS-GT has evolved with 
the USSFTA.  Much of the literature on network forms of organization celebrates the 
potential for greater flexibility, innovation and development in networks (e.g. Cooke 
and Morgan, 1993; Malmberg, 1996; Cho, 1997; Nicolini, 2003; Bathelt et al, 2004).  
However, the failure to engage with power geometries in these networks presents an 
idealistic picture of the positive correlation between networks and development.  In 
this scenario, fresh power dynamics in the form of new opportunities and threats are 
created in the electronics RPNs through a variety of USSFTA provisions on the one 
hand.  On the other, relationality among different actors has been revolutionized as 
actors reposition themselves through a variety of outsourcing, contracting and 
partnership arrangements in the electronics RPN.  Expectedly, power geometries are 
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further altered in the process.  In short, power relationships are a dynamic and cyclic 
process reflecting the mutually constitutive relationship between firms and the 
USSFTA.  As illustrated above, beyond networks of power and subordination, 
networks of reciprocity are increasingly found in the RPN.  I argue that these networks 
of reciprocity transform the market passive nature of OEMs and component suppliers, 
opening fresh prospects for firms (namely SMEs and Singapore-OEMs) to enhance 
their status in the electronics RPN.  This in turn, has significant implications on issues 
of development which I will address in Chapter 6.   
 
5.6 CASE STUDY ANALYSIS 
 In chapter 3, the production patterns of three firms were examined to guide 
understanding on the influence of territoriality and spatiality on the configurations of 
each firm’s RPN.  Here, I will revisit these three cases to analyze the variations in their 
strategic reorientations under the USSFTA.   
Presented in Box 5.1, the RPN of US-TNC-10 demonstrates increased 
production fragmentation within the USSFTA economic space.  To capitalize on the 
OP rule, US-TNC-10 established new operations in Riau and shifted certain activities 
to its subsidiaries in Malaysia and other ASEAN economies.  The more stringent IPR 
regime in Singapore also alters relationality among actors in US-TNC-10’s RPN by 
boosting R&D partnerships with Singapore firms.   
 Critically, the onset of the USSFTA transformed SG-TNC-5’s inter-firm 
relationships with its customers, partners and component suppliers (Box 5.2).  
Partnerships with various actors, especially SMEs, become an increasing source of 
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competitive advantage.  The relational geometries in SG-TNC-5’s RPN also morph 
into a unique configuration of reciprocity. 
In general, both US-TNC-10 and SG-TNC-5 undertake certain rationalization 
strategies that strengthen their focus on the IMS-GT.  The key difference in their 
strategies lies in the reach of their respective GPNs.  For US-TNC-10, its global 
spanning GPN suggests that impacts from the USSFTA have a wider reach (ASEAN), 
but it also means the implications are less acute.  The extensive geographical reach of 
non-Singapore firms’ GPNs implies the wide variety of strategic options available 
(Dicken, 2003).  On the other hand, the more major strategic changes in SG-TNC-5’s 
GPN may be accounted for by it intense regional concentration.  While both GPNs 
under the USSFTA have created new spaces for SMEs to play a greater role, I argue 
that the relatively higher degree of self-sufficiency in US-TNC-10’s GPN continues to 
limit the engagement of SMEs.  In other words, the practice of engaging SMEs in SG-
TNC-5’s GPN prior to the USSFTA allows SMEs even more space to maneuver. 
 Box 5.3 looks at the increased outsourcing of certain manufacturing, assembly 
and test operations to the partners and subcontractors of US-TNC-11.  Notably, an 
OBM like US-TNC-11 continues to exhibit a preference for TNCs and US firms.  The 
persistence in the hierarchical nature of the pre-USSFTA RPN has serious implications 
on the power relationships in the electronics RPN for it implies certain developmental 
limits placed on SMEs and Singapore firms in general.  Also, the USSFTA prompted 
US-TNC-11 to enter the retail dimension in Singapore and Asia.  Given the high level 
of importance US-TNC-11 accords to marketing and distribution operations, how will 
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OEMs (assisted by the USSFTA) clamoring for a piece of the US market counter the 
strategies of OBMs in general?  How will this struggle over the right to export ensue? 
 
BOX 5.1: Increased production fragmentation within the USSFTA economic 
space 
 
Case Study 1: US-TNC-OEM-10 
The USSFTA is not the sole factor, other considerations must 
come into play; still the USSFTA has opened a whole window of 
opportunities for us to capitalize on. 
 
US-TNC-10 is no newcomer to the changes in economic space brought about by 
PTAs and other economic arrangements.  Their electronics GPN is organized with 
NAFTA, EU and EPZs in mind.  In this case, the USSFTA sparked off a series of 
changes in their locational, export and partnerships strategies.  Input-sourcing is not 
affected because US-TNC-10 obtains much of the components needed either from 
their subsidiaries or independent suppliers located in the IMS-GT.   
To capitalize on the advantages from OP and ISI, US-TNC-10 ventured to 
Riau to set up a new manufacturing and assembly subsidiary for the first time.  Some 
manufacturing and assembly operations are either shifted to subsidiaries in or 
outsourced to other firms in Riau, Malaysia and ASEAN.  To meet the higher 
production capacity with these shifts, investments in current operations in Malaysia 
and ASEAN are increased.  The rising flow of components to Riau, Malaysia and 
ASEAN further presents a vivid picture of the increasing intensity of the IMS-GT 
production node.  Tariff benefits and OP rule facilitating production fragmentation 
and increased contract manufacturing activity, are the twin driving forces for increased 
component exports to these locales.  According to US-TNC-10,  
Why we chose to focus on the IMS-GT is really the 
complementarities in the capabilities of each country.  As for the 
wider ASEAN region, the proximity to Singapore and low cost 
ensures it still fits into our whole equation… for all these changes, 
the greatest impact comes from the OP rule which facilitates the 
management of our supply chain. 
 
 High value operations such as R&D will increase in Singapore with the more 
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stringent IPR regime.  In addition, safeguards from the stringent IPR regime also 
boost US-TNC-10’s R&D partnerships with Singapore firms.  Manufacturing 
continues to remain important in Singapore due to the need to meet certain ROO 
requirements and the higher skill levels needed for some products.  To reap scale 
economies, manufacturing and assembly activities through contract and partnerships 
with US and Singapore firms will also increase.  It must be pointed out that 
manufacturing partnerships with Singapore firms has an additional dimension; these 
partnerships facilitate further subcontracting and outsourcing of manufacturing and 
assembly operations to Singapore OEMs.  As for test services, the low value-added 
nature and harmonization of standards prompted US-TNC-10 to outsource this 
operation through a variety of contract and partnership arrangements with Singapore 
firms.  In terms of partnership and contract activities with non-USSFTA firms, the 
tendency is to increase R&D, manufacturing and assembly aspects to assist in its role 
as a consignee.  Marketing and distribution functions take on prime importance in 
US-TNC-10’s operations as the harmonization of standards facilitates its final exports 
to the US market.  To further build up its core competencies in this domain, US-
TNC-10 partners other US, Singapore and non-USSFTA firms to play the role of the 
consignee, hence allowing it to expand its marketing networks.  In sum,  
We not only have to change the where, we also have to change the 
how.  After much discussions and calculations with the operations 
team, we decided we have to change our contractual relationships 
with other companies.  That’s why we decided to outsource our test 
operations and quite a substantial bit of our assembly to other 
Singapore OEMs.  I admit our preference is still the larger 
OEMs… but I am willing to partner smaller OEMs especially those 
I have worked with before… I formalized a partnership with this 





BOX 5.2: Shifting power relations and increased SME partnerships 
Case Study 2: SG-TNC-OEM-5 
 With the advent of the USSFTA, SG-TNC-5 has embarked on a series of 
alterations to its existing firm strategies.  As a first-timer in such issues, SG-TNC-5 
has enlisted consultants from a law firm to assist in their strategic reorientations.  The 
more flexible USSFTA ROO has motivated SG-TNC-5 to change their input-
sourcing strategies.  The role of customer requests has also shaped their increased 
sourcing from Singapore, Riau, Malaysia and ASEAN, whilst decreased sourcing from 
other locales.  Investments in current operations in Singapore, Riau and Malaysia have 
also risen.  To complement their current manufacturing operations in Riau, SG-TNC-
5 has decided to establish a new assembly outfit in the same location.  This has 
facilitated the shifts of some manufacturing and assembly operations to Riau.  
Furthermore, low value-added operations will be outsourced to other firms located in 
Riau and Malaysia.  To facilitate access to the US market, SG-TNC-5 will establish 
more business development, marketing and distribution offices in the US.  As part of 
the rationalization strategy, SG-TNC-5 has also closed 1 group of manufacturing and 
assembly facilities in China.  As explained by the management of SG-TNC-5, 
I know many people think it is silly to close down our factory in 
China when everyone else is setting up shop there.  But there are 
many problems manufacturing in China, you need to get permits 
every time you change the components.  This results in delays, 
which don’t happen in Singapore.  You can say the USSFTA 
offered us a solution.  The ROO, OP, ISI allows us to rework our 
production chain… focus on upping our capabilities in the IMS-
GT.  After we factored in all the tariff benefits, with economies of 
scale our products are in fact more cost competitive.   
 
 The changed geography of SG-TNC-5’s electronics RPN is evident in the 
increased exports of components to the US, Riau and Malaysia for further production 
as facilitated by the OP rule.  The increased performance of contract manufacturing is 
also a driving force for the intensified flows of components in the network.  In their 
relationships with US firms, SG-TNC-5 is increasing R&D, manufacturing, assembly, 
marketing and distribution aspects through contract and partnership arrangements.  
Simultaneously, SG-TNC-5 will outsource its test and some assembly operations to 
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other firms.  A series of partnerships with other Singapore TNCs and SMEs are 
formalized to facilitate the outsourcing process.  On the other hand, its relationship 
with non-USSFTA firms will witness an increase in manufacturing and marketing 
partnerships as SG-TNC-5 plays the role of the consignee on behalf of these non-
USSFTA firms.   
The US market might be open for us, but getting a US partner is 
still very important to help pave our way there.  We have 
operations in the US for quite a while, I know for sure having a US 
partner will help us access the US market more easily.  Also, with 
the harmonized standards, it’s even more important for us to get a 
slice of the US market by exporting directly… We also have 
something US firms want; a platform to the Asian market.  So it’s a 
win-win situation.  To be able to compete well in the US, we need 
to focus on our core competencies… we need a network of 
Singapore firms to support us as component suppliers and 
subcontractors, so partnerships with all the big and small firms are 
a must. 
 
Clearly, manufacturing and R&D activities remain important in SG-TNC-5’s 
portfolio.  Especially in the case of R&D, the more stringent IPR regime has 
encouraged more foreign firms to partner them in this aspect.  The presence of a large 
US market and harmonized standards has made marketing and distribution rise up in 
importance in SG-TNC-5’s operations.  As for test and assembly, the importance of 
these activities has somewhat fallen in Singapore, as SG-TNC-5 outsource these 
operations to focus on their core competencies.   
 
 
BOX 5.3: Outsourcing and entry into retail dimension 
Case Study 3: US-TNC-OBM-11 
 Tariff benefits and more flexible ROO accruing from the USSFTA are vital in 
understanding the transformation in US-TNC-11’s strategies.  The lower local content 
required and established relationships with suppliers have led to increase input-
sourcing from Riau, Malaysia and ASEAN.  Increased flexibility arising from the OP 
rule and ISI, has allowed US-TNC-11 to relocate assembly and outsource low value-
added operations to the geographically proximate economies of Riau and Malaysia.  
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Growing intensity of component flows to these locales confirms this trend.  Current 
operations in Singapore, Riau and Malaysia on the other hand, witness an influx of 
investments to increase the production capacity of these facilities.  However, the 
highlight of US-TNC-11’s new strategy is the creation of a new R&D facility in 
Singapore to develop a range of consumer electronics.  According to the management 
of US-TNC-11, 
Singapore is the perfect platform for high end activities like R&D.  
With the better IPR regime, our interests are safeguarded and we 
can build our core competencies here… We plan to develop and 
manufacture a new line of consumer electronics like portable 
storage devices here, to help us enter the retail dimension in 
Singapore, then expand our retail to Asia… Frankly, I think the OP 
is the best part of the USSFTA.  I can splinter my operations yet 
integrate it to gain USSFTA benefits, and stay competitive. 
 
 Beyond geographical changes, relationality with other firms will also be 
affected.  As a means to build and retain core competencies in R&D, manufacturing, 
marketing and distribution, US-TNC-11 has outsourced much of its test and assembly 
activities through contract and partnership arrangements with US and Singapore 
firms.  In their contract and partnership with US firms, the focus is on R&D and 
manufacturing.  Conversely, in their contract and partnerships with Singapore firms, 
the attention is more on manufacturing, test and assembly.  Although R&D 
conducted with their Singapore partners has increased with the better IPR regime 
under the USSFTA, the intensity is minimal as compared to that shared with their US 
partners.     
The USSFTA made Singapore a better environment for R&D, and 
we’re also partnering Singapore firms more now.  But if given the 
choice, I would still choose a US firm, because it has better 
technology and engineers, and it is from US… for other operations 
like manufacturing, I will partner your Singapore companies… yes, 
the larger OEMs… SMEs not so, I prefer to go to the TNCs. 
 
From this, it is evident R&D and manufacturing in Singapore remain crucial in US-






Clearly, the ROO regimes (ISI and OP), harmonization of standards, IPR 
regime and other provisions of the USSFTA have transformed the ASEAN-US 
economic space into network space.  Figure 5.24 is an attempt to capture some of the 
changing geographies of the electronics RPN.  Riau, Malaysia and nearby ASEAN 
economies are developing into an increasingly competitive investment destination for 
local and foreign firms in aspects of low-cost manufacturing of electronics and 
precision components.  With the flexibility provided by the USSFTA ROO, the 
strategy adopted is to outsource and shift low value-added activities to these locales. 
Similarly, Singapore’s position in the RPN has been altered by changing firm 
strategies in the USSFTA.  In addition to high value-added manufacturing, the 
enhanced IPR regime encourages firms to conduct R&D in Singapore.  Figure 5.24 
shows that Singapore takes on the role as a hub for finance, marketing and distribution 
as US and non-USSFTA firms utlize use Singapore as a platform to Asia.  According to 
Ron Meyers, President of America II Asia, “Singapore provides a valuable gateway to 
OEM and EMS providers throughout Asia because of it’s highly developed IT and 
logistics infrastructure, social and political stability” (Business Times, 11 September 2004).  
The USSFTA has encouraged America II Asia to locate its Asian headquarters in 
Singapore to manage its Asia-Pacific operations.  It will set up a dedicated logistics and 
distribution centre based in Singapore and develop new value-added supply chain 
management services customized for the Asian market.  Thus, the red arrows in Figure 
5.24 show that flows of capital, components and end-products between US and the 






Figure 5.24: Map of USSFTA Electronics RPN 
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Increasing sales and distribution offices in Singapore (and the US) serve as key nodes in 
the RPN, as points of connectivity with other agents (institutions, suppliers, customers) 
in the network transcending territorial space. 
Analyzing the manner in which different actors relate to each other in the 
USSFTA RPN, presents the picture shown in Figure 5.25.  Research links between 
Singapore-TNC-OEMs and OBMs have been strengthened with the improved IPR 
regime in Singapore.  Although SMEs continue to lag behind in this aspect, 
outsourcing strategies under the USSFTA have opened new opportunities for SMEs in 
manufacturing, test and assembly.  However, the links among US firms, non-USSFTA 
firms, OBMs, Singapore TNCs and SMEs are not as straightforward.   
In the USSFTA space-economy, Singapore-TNC-OEMs take on the role of 
intermediaries amongst the other firms in the RPN.  Whilst Singapore-TNC-OEMs 
increase partnerships with US firms and OBMs to develop and manufacture products, 
they are also increasing their partnerships to outsource portions of these very same 
orders to Singapore-SMEs simultaneously.  Partnerships forged among Singapore firms 
are to band together for greater effect overseas and to counter the aggressive tactics of 
US firms.  Increasing partnerships among Singapore and non-USSFTA firms illustrates 
the role of Singapore firms as a geographical intermediary, whereby the territoriality of 
Singapore firms confers them the capabilities to exercise their power in shaping the 
USSFTA RPN.  A significant example is that Singapore firms, especially TNC-OEMs, 
are increasingly holding the right to export directly.  While many are quick to dismiss 
SMEs as subservient, their firm tactics show they have strategically repositioned 
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 With the entwining of USSFTA provisions and firm strategies, the USSFTA 
regional space is becoming increasingly network-like with high degrees of complexity in 
terms of the product flows and the enmeshing of intra-firm, inter-firm and extra-firm 
networks.  Most conspicuously, the USSFTA has augmented the role of Singapore firms in the 
electronics RPN and created new inter-firm networks of subordination, power and reciprocity.  From 
the GPN perspective, these new developments in relations of reciprocity suggest 
emergent power is extended and shared among actors beyond the corporate boundaries 
of each individual firm (Henderson et al, 2002).  I caution against adopting standpoints 
acknowledging this emergent power as a spread of authority and control to other 
smaller actors in the RPN.  For it must be reminded that power is constituted through 
social action and certain actors such as TNCs and OBMs will continue to engage in 
maneuvers to exert a degree of domination and subordination in the RPNs.  I thus 
argue that the blend of spatial restructuring in firm strategies, changing production 
geographies and actor relations will have striking implications for issues of value 
appropriation and development.  The way in which the “power struggle” ensues 
further forces us to recast commonsensical understandings of power, territoriality and 






(DIS)EMPOWERING FIRMS IN THE  
REGIONAL PRODUCTION NETWORKS OF DEVELOPMENT 
 
6.1 PREAMBLE 
 Beyond spatial restructuring and transformed actor relationships in the 
electronics RPN, a key question concerning developmental implications remains to be 
answered.  In this chapter, I will analyze the interrelated issues of value creation, 
enhancement and retention in the USSFTA electronics RPN.  At the heart of the issue, 
is to understand the geographically uneven generation of value between localities and 
between firms within the IMS-GT.  While I have argued earlier the USSFTA has given 
rise to changing positionalities of firms in the RPN, certain mechanisms in the 
USSFTA, extra-firm networks as well as existing firm cultures and relationships 
continue to shape the RPN and associated spatial outcomes.  Notably, the precise 
electronics RPN configuration under the USSFTA presents a set of differential power 
relationships among various actors that continue to favour TNCs of particular origins, 
while continuing to entrap other firms.  Albeit spatial restructuring has created new 
networks of opportunities and development, I argue that the innate territoriality and 
spatiality of firm networks continue to be an impediment to power formation, value 





6.2 INSTITUTIONALIZING THE USSFTA AND INTER-FIRM 
NETWORKS 
 
 A fundamental principle of all FTAs is to “abolish trade barriers in goods and 
services between partner countries” (MTI, 2000a: 1).  However, a host of factors 
ranging from market power and scope affect how businesses take advantage of FTAs, 
and FTA liberalization may mean different things for these heterogeneous firms.  In 
other words, we need to problematize such economistic and commonsensical 
understandings of the USSFTA as the ‘free unhindered passage of goods between 
Singapore and the US’, for it throws a veil on the inherent biasness within the 
provisions and workings of the USSFTA. 
 
6.2.1 Territorial and Big-Firm Bias 
Initially, there was a second part to the ISI provision recognizing ISI products 
as originating materials when used in the production of another product in Singapore.  
Stated in a MTI media brief (2002a: 1): 
Under the ISI, certain components where both the US and 
Singapore do not impose tariffs are regarded as if they originate in 
Singapore.  This will boost the Singapore content of the final 
products manufactured in Singapore.  It will make it easier for the 
final products to qualify as “Singaporean” and claim preferential 
tariff treatment under the USSFTA.  Foreign investors and 
Singapore companies can thus plan their manufacturing flow to 
make use of the comparative advantages offered by the region.  
They can manufacture the components in the region and produce 
the final product in Singapore. 
 
However, this clause sparked off much controversy and raised concerns in the 
Congress over labour and environmental issues.  There was a fear the ISI will provide a 
loophole around the USSFTA labour and environmental provisions as third party 
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economies cannot be held accountable for flouting these protections (USITC, 2003: 
116).  With much lobbying by some Congressional members and the International 
Labour Organization, this clause was subsequently removed.   
With this final watered down version of the ISI, the official USSFTA website 
highlights that the ISI is aimed at encouraging “US MNCs to take advantage of each 
ASEAN countries’ comparative advantage”25.  According to Wong (2004b: 38), “The 
ISI will only benefit firms, particularly TNCs that procure these products regionally 
through Singapore”.  Other promotional documents of the USSFTA have explicitly 
acclaimed the USSFTA’s flexible ROO to accord immense benefits and opportunities 
to TNCs seeking expansion in Asia.  Findings in Chapter 5 also underscore the ROO 
as driving impetuses behind TNCs’ decision to rationalize their RPNs and US-TNCs as 
the key beneficiaries of the ISI.  In essence, the OP rule and ISI are aimed at TNCs 
with a wide geographical spread of activities and who are direct exporters of the 
products.   
Whether it is the USSFTA or other FTAs, it will only benefit 
exporters.  FTAs are about the elimination of tariffs, so only if you 
export, then you can reap tariff-free benefits.  So before you think 
that the USSFTA is not working for you, you have to first ask 
yourself, do you export?  This is the very basic premise for the FTA 
(MTI respondent)26. 
 
Our local firms face a lot of problems in the case of the FTA… 
because FTAs are for large companies who trade.  FTA means 
international trade.  For SMEs and other companies that don’t 
export, the opportunities are definitely minimal (SMa respondent)27.  
 
                                                 
25 Accessed online at <http://app.fta.gov.sg/asp/goods/chapter01.asp> on 15 April 2005. 
26 Interview with a MTI respondent on 16th March 2005 




Historical specificity and path-dependency continue to affect the (im)balance of 
power in the electronics RPN.  Since direct exporters tend to be TNCs while SMEs 
play a supporting role in the electronics RPN, it follows that the USSFTA is geared 
towards the interests of these large firms.   Due to their size-related characteristics and 
geographical reach of their production networks, TNCs are able to command the 
resources to restrategize and take advantage of the more flexible ROO.  In addition, 
export rights tend to reside with OBMs and large OEMs who are mainly US-
originating.  In the context of the Singapore economy, this big-firm and territorial bias 
is exacerbated by the historical preference for large and foreign TNCs as witnessed in 
Singapore's outward-oriented economic development strategies since independence.  In 
short, I argue that the USSFTA provisions exhibits an intrinsic territorial bias which is 
further exacerbated by the institutional context of Singapore's economy.  Hence, the 
USSFTA presents US firms with more power and opportunities over Singapore firms, 
which will have subsequent implications on the manner in which different firms react 
to the USSFTA strategically. 
 
 While institutional agencies argue that exporters are key beneficiaries of the 
USSFTA, deeper understandings of the USSFTA suggest otherwise.  Based on the 
USSFTA, claims for preferential treatment lie with the importer.  Stated in Article 3.13 
(MTI, 2003b: 24): 
1. Each Party shall provide that an importer make a claim for 
preferential treatment under this Agreement based on the importer’s 
knowledge or on information in the importer’s possession that the 
good qualifies as an originating good. 
2. Each Party may require that an importer be prepared to submit, 
upon request, a statement setting forth the reasons that the good 
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qualifies as an originating good, including pertinent cost and 
manufacturing information. 
 
Consequently, tariff savings from tariff elimination accrue to the US-importer and not 
the Singapore-exporter.  The role of Singapore-exporters is to assist in documentation 
procedures to facilitate US-importers in their declarations to claim tariff preferences.  
Though the onus for documentation is in the hands of the importer, the US-importer 
may call upon the Singapore-exporter to provide documentary evidence to substantiate 
its claims.  One may argue that this lowers the costs of Singapore-made products and 
makes it more attractive to US-purchasers, hence translating to increase business 
opportunities for Singapore firms.  However, the territorial biasness in the USSFTA is 
still very real to these Singapore firms.  Particularly when claims for tariff preferences 
and tariff-savings lie with exporters in Singapore’s other bilateral FTAs (MTI, 2000b; 
2002b; 2002c; 2003g; 2004).   
In another sense, the elimination of tariffs also translates into lower product 
costs in TNCs’ intra-firm trade.  From SMEs’ perspective in particular, the territorial 
bias is compounded by a big-firm bias.   
I think that the USSFTA is not useful at all… it’s the importer that 
pays tariffs.  So the importer saves… and I still have to help them 
with all the documentation.  Small companies like ours are already 
short-handed.  … So what do I get in return?  The USSFTA helps 
the big guys, the big US companies… and not the local companies, 
the small companies that need help the most (Seminar-Participant-
1)28. 
 
This effectively captures the double-bind arising from territorial and network 
embeddedness that Singapore firms are trapped in various degrees.  Many Singapore 
firms reap disproportionately less benefits from the USSFTA as compared to their US 
                                                 
28 Participant observation during USSFTA seminar on 17th March 2005. 
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counterparts, resulting from their territorial embeddedness in the RPN and the 
territorial biasness in the agreement.  Particularly, network embeddedness of Singapore-
SMEs as component suppliers to TNCs in the RPN contributes to Singapore-SMEs 
experiencing a sense of ‘injustice’ and they are inclined to view the USSFTA 
unfavourably and believe that the USSFTA will further entrench power in the hands of 
foreign TNCs. 
 
6.2.2 New Networks, Renewed Actors, New Market Passivities 
 While it appears that the ‘old order’ of OBMs and US-TNCs dominating the 
electronics RPN persists in the ‘new order’ under the USSFTA, notable 
transformations have occurred.  With changing network configurations, it must be 
stressed that changing geographies and actor-relations in the USSFTA electronics RPN 
are not all a zero-sum game.  Previous ideas of “market passivity” as associated to 
powerlessness of certain agents in the RPN, now take on new and different meanings 
in relation to the position of different actors in the networks.   
 On a broader scale, I argue that the manner in which networks and power 
relations have been altered offer immense opportunities in the production of more 
power and development potential for Singapore firms.   
I believe that there are many indirect benefits to our local firms.  
Increased sourcing from Singapore and closer partnerships between 
MNCs and local firms means that there will be more technology and 
expertise transfer.  These are more valuable than cost-savings when 
used wisely.  It’s for the long term (SMa respondent)29. 
 
                                                 




Some firms also acknowledge the importance of partnerships in building credibility and 
standing in the industry.  The benefits of association with large and renowned foreign 
firms boost SMEs’ profile in particular, as well as accessing linkages in foreign markets.  
Thus, the shift from competitive and dominative relations towards more collaborative 
ones has immense intangible benefits (Ahern, 1993).  Plainly, changing network 
configurations under the USSFTA creates and bestows power upon different actors, 
especially Singapore firms.  Power in this case is not static, but its dynamics are 
constituted and reconstituted by shifting actor-relations.  Most importantly, the crux of 
the issue here is that the USSFTA networks are able to grow in intensity and hence 
present the likelihood for firm development and upgrading.   
 For Singapore-SMEs, while their ability to export is still curtailed by the market 
power of TNCs, they acknowledge that the combination of off-shoring production to 
neighbouring economies and the necessity to satisfy ROO have heightened their 
importance in the USSFTA RPN.  Emphasis is to ensure that a minimum proportion 
of the components are of USSFTA-origin, in order to qualify for tariff preferences.  
Thus, OEMs and OBMs tend to source more actively from Singapore component 
suppliers.  Since many of the component suppliers are SMEs, this inadvertently means 
that the position of SMEs is amplified. 
I would say that the benefits (from the USSFTA) are more indirect.  
I see my orders increasing… my components are largely made in 
Singapore, so it helps my customers to meet the ROO required… 
But a lot of networking with the customers and marketing skills are 
needed to convince them that we are able to deliver the goods (SG-
SME-9). 
 
In short, SME component suppliers have not only increased in their market 
importance.  More importantly, they are able to harness the power derived from the 
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changed regulatory environment and altered position, and transform it into some form 
of network power to sway TNCs’ decisions. 
 In another aspect, 5 of the 11 Singapore SMEs surveyed believe that their niche 
lies in the increasing outsourcing tendencies of TNCs (OBMs and OEMs).   
When I was talking to some of my US customers, I realized that they 
have intentions to outsource more of their operations to other 
companies… I also realized that they’re looking for companies who 
know what the USSFTA is about, how to use it… I jumped at the 
opportunity (SG-SME-11). 
 
The preference is to work with companies who know how to 
operationalize the USSFTA… ease the process of documentation 
and tariff claims (US-TNC-18). 
 
Knowledge of and the ability to operationalize the USSFTA becomes a source of 
competitive advantage for Singapore TNCs and SMEs alike.  This advantage lies in the 
innate knowledge and capabilities of the firm coupled with the ability to make the 
network linkage to TNCs’ outsourcing strategies; it is a confluence of demands 
established in the inter-firm connection that is the key. 
 A variety of marketing strategies have been adopted by Singapore-SMEs to 
enhance their visibility as preferred outsourcing partners to TNCs (OBMs and OEMs).  
One of the key mediums is the internet.  On the websites of a few Singapore-SMEs, 
marketing techniques always revolve around their geographical location in Singapore 
and their firm-specific knowledge and capabilities.  Albeit the strategies seem to lack 
novelty, it is the utilization of the FTA theme in the marketing strategies which is of 
interest.   
Strategically located in Singapore, the premier business hub in 
Southeast Asia and a dominant free-trade country, Acropolis 
benefits from numerous Free Trade Agreements.  At Acropolis, we 
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are able to offer our customers maximum value from our ability to 
utilize the benefits of the Free Trade Agreements30. 
 
The USSFTA is exploited as a marketing tool to promote the firms’ prime location in 
Singapore as well as the numerous advantages accruing to potential customers arising 
from the firm’s knowledge and ability to utilize the USSFTA.  This line of approach is 
also evident in other areas such as face-to-face business networking in both formal and 
informal settings.  Altogether, the assortment of tactics adopted by Singapore-SMEs to 
reposition themselves in the electronics RPN show that SMEs are not simply passive 
and powerless; instead, changing network relations open new spaces for action 
(Murdoch, 1998), further suggesting previous ideas of market passivity has changed.    
 At this juncture, it must be mentioned that SMEs have not morphed into all-
powerful entities.  Certain network relations structurally created by the USSFTA 
continue to impose conditions of market passivity on them.  OBMs and other large 
OEMs persist in exhibiting a big-firm bias in their outsourcing strategies.  In short, the 
ability of TNC-OEMs to secure large and long-term contracts and further outsource 
parts of these contracts to SME-OEMs suggest that they have a conditioning influence 
on the strategies of the smaller firms.   
The only few who have re-strategized are because their customers 
requested that they do it, if not the customers will give the contract 
to someone else (SPRING Singapore respondent)31. 
 
SMEs thus face limits in their ability to establish more direct relationships with OBMs 
due to OBMs’ preference for large firms, and competitive measures undertaken by 
OEMs to secure privileged network connections to OBMs.  From this perspective, 
causal power may be ascribed to networks per se (Dicken et al, 2001). 
                                                 
30 Accessed online at <http://www.acropolis-electronics.com/facilities.html> on 18 April 2005. 
31 Interview with a SPRING Singapore respondent on 29th March 2005 
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Formerly, OEMs find themselves in a position of market passivity created by 
the dominance of OBMs.  With the push towards increased production fragmentation 
and outsourcing32 by OBMs, power relations in the RPN have somewhat shifted 
towards OEMs.  Over and above similar experiences and strategies undertaken by 
Singapore-SMEs, the exercise of network power is more visible and variable in the case 
of TNC-OEMs.   
 One of the most significant changes is how OEMs have moved from a passive 
to an active stance in seeking new customers, partners and markets.  Besides the 
increasing partnership arrangements detailed in Chapter 5, the focus on business 
development functions takes precedence in OEMs’ strategies.   
I feel that the flexible ROO increased the interest of US companies 
in Singapore companies like ours.  The ground work is done (by the 
USSFTA), so our role now is to find the customers and hopefully 
strike formal alliances with them (SG-TNC-6). 
 
The FTA definitely increased our reputation… easier to form 
partnerships now more than before.  It’s like a bargaining chip… we 
tell our customers we have this FTA and we have the resources to 
help them benefit from it (SG-TNC-9). 
 
OEMs have gradually moved away from a condition of market passivity by capitalizing 
on the USSFTA as a bargaining tool when negotiating contracts and establishing 
partnerships.  Hence, the effect of the USSFTA on OEMs is twofold: it reconfigures 
the repertoires of power available to OEMs, and consequent network linkages created 
by partnership arrangements further shift the power dynamics towards OEMs.  Market 
passivity is no longer about the powerless nature of OEMs in securing contracts and 
negotiating terms with OBMs.  Now, it implies market power held by OEMs, and their 
                                                 
32 Both production fragmentation and outsourcing existed prior to the USSFTA.  The impact of the 
USSFTA is to further propel and facilitate this trend.   
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ability to influence the decisions and strategies of lead firms accruing from the OEMs’ 
heightened positionality in the production network. 
 Superficially, OBMs appear to have moved into a market passive position 
because of the increasingly aggressive tactics of OEMs in seeking new customers and 
partners.  However, it must be reminded that this is not a zero-sum game.  Albeit 
OBMs may now take a backseat in engaging new partners or subcontractors in light of 
the aggressive tactics of OEMs, OBMs still hold the right of choice in choosing their 
preferred outsourcing and contracting partners.   With so many OEMs competing for 
the limited number of contracts issued by OBMs, OBMs can afford to screen out and 
choose their preferred partners based on a host of factors such as personal 
relationships and costs.  I argue that this type of power held by OBMs is of a different 
variation and this transforms our previous understanding of the powerless connotation 
behind market passivity.  Principally, OBMs’ passive stance in seeking partners does 
not mean the lack of market power; rather being market passive connotes enhanced 
market power held by OBMs because they continue to hold the right of selection.  
From this dimension, this is a product of the innate characteristics of OBMs and the 
network-relations they share with OEMs.  In all, changing power geometries between 
OBMs and OEMs underline that power has many variations and that power is 
everywhere.  
Another aspect in analyzing market passivity is the right to export directly.  
Illustrations in Chapter 5 pinpoint that OEMs are exporting more directly and taking 
on more marketing and distribution functions as compared to previously.  Playing 
consignees to non-USSFTA firms and engaging in exports allow OEMs (especially 
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Singapore-originating) to gain valuable market exposure and cost savings.  With 
benefits to be reaped from exports, OBMs will not be willing to relinquish their right 
so readily.  To overcome this obstacle, OEMs attempt to change the dynamics of their 
previous relationship with OBMs.  By establishing formal and wide-ranging 
partnerships throughout the whole production process, OEMs will have greater say 
over the production and distribution of the goods.  Increasing OEMs’ marketing and 
distribution capabilities in the destination market and taking responsibility of filing for 
tariff preferences, enhances OBMs’ confidence in OEMs’ abilities which further 
ensures that the right to export directly is secured.   
The administrative procedures, all the forms to fill and claims to 
make are so much trouble to document and keep track of…  I rather 
partner someone reliable to handle these for me (US-TNC-7). 
 
In this light, I argue that the territoriality of Singapore firms has been enhanced by the 
USSFTA and Singapore-OEMs utilize this territorial power to their advantage in 
transforming the inter-firm relationships they share with OBMs.  Consequently, the 
formation of transterritorial flows of products confer more power on Singapore-OEMs 
and advances their position on the electronics RPN. 
The analysis thus far presents a nuanced understanding of how certain 
institutional mechanisms of the USSFTA limit the developmental capacities of 
Singapore firms especially.  However, with changing actor-relations and production 
geographies in the USSFTA electronics RPN, some niches are created and gaps left 
open for Singapore firms to fill and reposition.  A plethora of approaches have been 
adopted by firms to create new capacities and power to shape the precise 




reconstituted underscore the multi-dimensional nature of market passivity.  Market 
passivity is not static but moves from one spectrum of passiveness to another of 
activeness (Figure 6.1).  Firms also exhibit tendencies to occupy positions of passivity 
and activity simultaneously, depending on territoriality of the firm and temporality of 
the relationships.  Chiefly, the analysis recasts market passivity to acknowledge passivity 
as a source of market power.   
 
 
Figure 6.1: Dimensions of Market Passivity 
 
6.3 EXTRA-FIRM NETWORKS 
 In this section, I will examine the role of extra-firm networks crucial in the 
production of the USSFTA space-economy.  These extra-firm networks include 
personal relationships, flows of information and institutional support.  My central tenet 
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ability to restrategize and realize benefits from the USSFTA.  This influence works 
through a variety of factors such as access to knowledge, politics among institutions 
and firm cultures. 
 
6.3.1 Knowledge: Getting Pass the Gate-Keepers. 
 Firms’ knowledge and access to information about the USSFTA will have 
certain implications on their strategic reorientations and development opportunities.  
Based on the results gathered in the survey, the USSFTA is a more or less familiar issue 
among the sample.  Knowledge about the USSFTA is derived from a variety of 
avenues, with reports from newspapers and magazines emerging as a key source of 



















Yes 46 100.0% 42 91.3% 30 65.2% 35 76.1% 11 23.9% 9 19.6%
No 0 0.0% 4 8.7% 16 34.8% 11 23.9% 35 76.1% 37 80.4%
 
Table 6.1: Sources of Information on the USSFTA 
Source: Author’s Survey 
 
 
The roles of institutions in providing information and support for firms 
through print media and the organization of forums are also obvious from Table 6.1.  
Among Singapore-based institutions, the roles of state actor MTI and non-state actors 
especially SMa and SBF are extremely importantly for Singapore firms (Table 6.2).  For 
US-based institutions, the role of AmCham is significant.  In the implementation of the 
USSFTA, outreach programmes range from information packages like pamphlets, to 
seminars, group and individual consultations.  In general, 78% of responding firms 
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with changes to firm strategies acknowledge that the role of institutions is crucial in 
shaping their firm strategies (Table 6.3).  Approximately 65% indicate that institutions 
are consequential in aspects related to the provision of detailed information, organizing 
seminars and workshops, and offering professional advice (Table 6.4).   
 To better prepare for outreach programmes, agencies such as SBF will mail 
questionnaires to companies listed in their register to collect feedback. 
Usually, we send questionnaires to companies to ask them what they 
want to know about FTAs, and what is their response to the 
opportunities presented.  But the take up rate of the survey is very 
low… usually it is the MNCs that reply (SBF respondent)33. 
 
In other words, the seminar content is a product of inputs from institutions and TNCs.  
This biasness is further accentuated in SBF’s case, whereby their member companies 
are the top 20% firms in Singapore.  As I will demonstrate later, this will have key 
implications on the abilities of SMEs to take advantage of the USSFTA benefits.  
A typical USSFTA seminar may be conducted by any of the above-mentioned 
agencies individually or collaboratively.  The seminar content includes definitions of 
key terms used in the USSFTA text, changes to ROO, utilization of the tariff calculator 
and customs procedures.  Seminars like these attract firms with varying motivations.  
For a couple, the seminar is an opportunity to seek clarification on specific issues such 
as tariff and customs procedures. 
I’ve attended a few seminars before this.  This time, I’ve done my 
homework… we’re exporting a huge consignment soon.  So I 
thought it’ll be good to clarify everything today (Seminar-
Participant-2). 
 
Clearly, this shows that outreach seminars to connect firms into the USSFTA 
knowledge networks are useful in shaping firm strategies.   
                                                 












   Singapore US Others 
    SME TNC Total TNC SME TNC Total 
Table 
Total 
Yes 2 4.3% 5 10.9% 7 15.2% 1 2.2% 0 0.0% 1 2.2% 1 2.2% 9 19.6% EDB 
No 7 15.2% 17 37.0% 24 52.2% 9 19.6% 1 2.2% 3 6.5% 4 8.7% 37 80.4%
Yes 2 4.3% 17 37.0% 19 41.3% 4 8.7% 0 0.0% 2 4.3% 2 4.3% 25 54.3%IE Singapore 
No 7 15.2% 5 10.9% 12 26.1% 6 13.0% 1 2.2% 2 4.3% 3 6.5% 21 45.7%
Yes 2 4.3% 10 21.7% 12 26.1% 1 2.2% 0 0.0% 2 4.3% 2 4.3% 15 32.6%Ministry of 
Trade & 
Industry No 7 15.2% 12 26.1% 19 41.3% 9 19.6% 1 2.2% 2 4.3% 3 6.5% 31 67.4%
Yes 4 8.7% 16 34.8% 20 43.5% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 20 43.5%
Singapore 
Federation No 5 10.9% 6 13.0% 11 23.9% 10 21.7% 1 2.2% 4 8.7% 5 10.9% 26 56.5%
Yes 4 8.7% 16 34.8% 20 43.5% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 20 43.5%Singapore 
Business 
Federation No 5 10.9% 6 13.0% 11 23.9% 10 21.7% 1 2.2% 4 8.7% 5 10.9% 26 56.5%
Yes 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 9 19.6% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 9 19.6% 
AmCham 
No 9 19.6% 22 47.8% 31 67.4% 1 2.2% 1 2.2% 4 8.7% 5 10.9% 37 80.4%
Yes 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 6 13.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 6 13.0% 
US Embassy 
No 9 19.6% 22 47.8% 31 67.4% 4 8.7% 1 2.2% 4 8.7% 5 10.9% 40 87.0%
: Role of Institutions in Dissemination of Information on USSFTA 











   Role of Government 
    Yes  No   
  Row Total   Row %   Row %
23 95.8% 1 4.2% 
US 11 11 100.0% 0 0.0% 
Others 5 2 40.0% 3 60.0% 
            
Table 
Total 40 36 90.0% 4 10.0% 
: Importance of Role of Government in Firms’ Strategic Reorientations. 
rce: Author’s Survey. 





Information Seminar & Workshops 
Professional Advice & 
Aid 
Middleman Role in 
Matchmaking 















%  Row %  Row %
Singapore 24 23 95.8% 1 4.2% 18 75.0% 6 25.0% 16 66.7% 8 33.3% 0 0.0% 24 100.0%
US 11 11 100.0% 0 0.0% 7 63.6% 4 36.4% 11 100.0% 0 0.0% 3 27.3% 8 72.7% 
Others 5 2 40.0% 3 60.0% 1 20.0% 4 80.0% 1 20.0% 4 80.0% 0 0.0% 5 100.0%
Table 
Total 40 36 90.0% 4 10.0% 26 65.0% 14 35.0% 28 70.0% 12 30.0% 3 7.5% 37 92.5% 
 
: Roles of Government in Assisting Firms in the USSFTA 
rce: Author’s Survey 
e: Sample size of 40 is based on the firms with changes to their firm strategies). 
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For some others, outreach seminars are perceived as ineffective and a waste of 
time resulting from the style they are socialized into these knowledge networks.   
These people may be FTA negotiators… but the way they talk is like 
so high and mighty… they know very well what the FTA is about, 
so they just rush through everything as though it is very simple and 
easy to understand… but for first timers like us learning about 
FTAs, it is important to explain slowly and clearly (Seminar-
Participant-3)34.   
 
These people from the government don’t know what we companies 
do on the ground.  They say they provide me with market 
opportunities through the USSFTA, but it’s also difficult to translate 
into action.  The USSFTA is so difficult to understand, what I need 
is for them to guide me step-by-step in how I can operationalize it… 
not push it in my face and keep telling me that it is good for my 
company! How can it be good when I don’t know how to use it? 
(Seminar-Participant-4)35. 
 
These dissenting voices depict the manner in which the content is presented to the 
seminar participants.  The presenters’ intense knowledge and familiarity with the 
USSFTA inhibits them from understanding the issues from the firms’ perspective.  
Hence, information links established between institutional and firm actors are often 
scattered and weak.    
 
6.3.2 Territoriality, Politics and Power Play  
Outreach programmes are conducted by different institutions to target specific 
groups of firms.  For instance, MTI as the parent-agency oversees the affairs of all 
firms in general, SEDB is in-charge of TNCs (both Singapore and foreign) while 
SPRING Singapore takes care of SMEs.  IE Singapore provides assistance to firms 
with intentions to expand into the US through a variety of Market Strategy Services and 
                                                 
34 Participant observation during USSFTA seminar on 17th March 2005. 




Business Support Offices.  AmCham and the US Embassy are in-charge of US firms 
only.  I argue that it is precisely the organization of these institutional arrangements and 
relational power among institutional actors (Amin, 2001), which further creates a 
tendency to confer more power on certain firms over others.   
Most notably, the US Embassy offers match-making services to US firms 
seeking partners in Singapore.  However, this service is restricted to US firms only, thus 
US firms have greater access to knowledge, support, resources and hence power when 
venturing into Singapore.  Evidence from the sharp increase in the number of tie-ups 
between US and Singapore firms attests to the immense utility of this matchmaking 
strategy in boosting US firms’ abilities to take advantage of the USSFTA (discussed in 
Chapter 5).  In addition, only Singapore firms listed in the US Embassy’s database are 
considered ‘worthy partners’.  Given that a large proportion of these Singapore firms 
found in the database are TNCs, the big-firm bias in institutional networks effectively 
places a ceiling on the network capacities of SMEs.    
Either to counter the US Embassy’s strategies or to substantiate the efforts 
thus far, SMa and the National Association of Manufacturers (US-based institution) 
concluded a Memorandum of Understanding to matchmake Singapore and US firms 
(Straits Times, 9 October 2004).  However, this effort is still in its infancy.  Furthermore, 
the non-state nature of both SMa and NAM limits the power and resources at their 
disposal to craft an initiative, which is as all-encompassing as the US Embassy’s 
initiative.  Besides, the “role of NAM is to enhance the visibility of Singapore as a 
gateway to Asia” (Straits Times, 9 October 2004).  Therefore, the focus is still largely 
“Asian-centric” and renders little assistance to Singapore firms venturing to the US.   
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When Singapore-based state institutions were questioned whether they will 
consider such matchmaking initiatives, their responses were largely negative.  
According to one MTI respondent, “We try not to run into each other; you do yours, 
and I do mine.  We don’t copy and overlap each other’s initiative”.  I argue that this 
lack of collaborative networking amongst US and Singapore institutions is to the 
detriment of the welfare of all firms because like firms, institutions are territorial and 
thus will only be concerned with firms of similar territoriality.  The irony is while the 
USSFTA has fashioned a new US-Singapore space-economy with a high potential for 
greater relational complementarity and specificity (Yeung, 2005), territoriality in physical 
and organizational spaces remains a definitive issue in the configuration of extra-firm 
networks and the forms of institutional support available to firms.  As the example of 
matchmaking services exemplifies, institutional arrangements tend to fragment along 
territorial lines and have consequences on power dynamics.  Following this line of 
argument, spatiality and power are necessarily intertwined (Allen, 2003). 
 Even among institutions from Singapore, the clear division of labour among 
institutions has major implications on the success of outreach programs and the 
configuration of extra-firm networks.  Illustrated earlier, different agencies have 
different groups of companies under their care.  With a focus on SMEs, I will attempt 
to unravel the limitations placed on their ability to reap benefits from the USSFTA, to 
debunk existing conceptions expounded in much of the literature reviewed in Chapter 
2 that size-related characteristics are the sole cause behind the vulnerability of SMEs.   
At SPRING, we’re the SME champions.  We help SMEs identify 
market opportunities.  It’s not a one size fits all strategy.  We’ll tailor 
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it according to the different industry; sometimes even conduct one-
to-one clinics (SPRING respondent)36. 
 
While SPRING offers a whole package of services to SMEs, it is the relationships with 
other agencies that often result in the failure of its outreach programmes.  SPRING is 
under the jurisdiction of the parent-agency, MTI.  As an SME-focused agency, less 
priority is given to SPRING, as compared to other sub-agencies such as TNC-focused 
SEDB and IE Singapore.  According to the respondent from SPRING, many outreach 
initiatives catered specifically to SMEs have been rejected by higher authorities.  One 
such initiative is to conduct seminars in Mandarin rather than English, a language more 
familiar to SMEs. 
The agreement, the outreach programmes… everything is in 
English.  We small companies are Chinese educated.  English is just 
so not our type (SG-SME-1). 
 
Language is an issue.  Many of our SMEs are Chinese Towkays37.  
Their dominant language is Mandarin, and so outreach programmes 
conducted in English is a big problem.  We want to do it in 
Mandarin, but we lack greater support up there (SPRING Singapore 
respondent)38. 
 
From this example, the lack of understanding by agencies such as MTI exhibits the 
weak networks it shares with SPRING and the SMEs.  It demonstrates in a network, 
“the sum is more than its parts”, whereby politics and power play among agencies has 
intense ramifications on developmental outcomes.  As Jessop (2001: 1230) argues, 
“precisely because institutions are never fully constituted, space exists for competing 
institutional projects and designs”. 
 
                                                 
36 Interview with a SPRING Singapore respondent on 29th March 2005 
37 Towkay is a colloquial term, meaning boss or owner. 
38 Interview with a SPRING Singapore respondent on 29th March 2005 
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6.3.3 Business Cultures 
 Probing deeper into the issue of language, insights gathered from interviews 
explain the low outreach take-up by SMEs. 
The business culture of our Chinese Towkays is that they meet in 
Kopitiams39 to talk business, not coffee houses.  They converse in 
Mandarin, not the official language in business and that used by 
government bodies.  So it makes it very difficult for them to provide 
feedback in English to our government agencies.  The practice 
adopted by governments is to get the companies to write down their 
feedback.  Chinese Towkays will never write down their comments 
and opinions for feedback.  It’s like the Chinese concept of ‘face’; a 
very strong sense of pride and fear of failure.  They’re afraid that 
people will laugh at their poor (English) language abilities… snub 
their opinions and deem it as nonsensical.  They rather talk about it 
among themselves both in formal and informal settings, and leave it 
as it is (SMa respondent)40.  
 
SMEs appear to fall through the gaps of outreach efforts by institutions as a result of 
language and cultural issues. This is a product of the incongruence between informal 
social networks amongst SMEs and formal business networks created by institutions.  
Subsequently, this mismatch results in low network intensities between SMEs and 
institutions.  Table 6.5 showing that SMEs unaffected by the USSFTA face obstacles in 
understanding of the technicalities of the USSFTA as well as receiving appropriate 
institutional support further reasserts this argument (Table 6.5). 
Beyond linguistic issues, the passive business culture of SMEs also accounts for 




                                                 
39 Kopitiam is a colloquial term, meaning coffee shops or hawker centres. 




 Obstacles Yes No 
Lack Knowledge 4 66.7% 2 33.3% 
Unsure of Operationalization 5 83.3% 1 16.7% 
Products Do Not Qualify for USSFTA Advantages 0 0.0% 6 100.0% 
Insufficient Tariff Savings 3 50.0% 3 50.0% 
Lack Support from State Agencies 6 100.0% 0 0.0% 
Lack Support from Business Associations 6 100.0% 0 0.0% 
US not a Key Market 5 83.3% 1 16.7% 
No Change to Price Competitiveness 0 0.0% 6 100.0% 
ISI not Beneficial 1 16.7% 5 83.3% 
OP not Beneficial 1 16.7% 5 83.3% 
 
Table 6.5: Obstacles Faced by Firms Unaffected by the USSFTA 
Source: Author’s Survey. 
(Note: Sample size of 6 is based on the number of firms unaffected by the USSFTA.) 
 
   
We have no problems with the big guys, the MNCs.  They have the 
knowledge and resources to engage consultants to help them 
operationalize the FTA rules.  It’s the SMEs that are the ones who 
have problems taking advantage of the FTA.  First, they don’t have 
the resources.  But the government is here to help by giving free 
consultations.  Second and most importantly, it’s the mindset… 
SMEs have a very passive business culture.  They tend wait-and-see.  
They don’t actually look out for and search for business 
opportunities on their own… they fear taking risks and failure.  This 
mindset have to change if not they’ll never be able to benefit from it.  
Every time SMEs have a problem, they look to the government for 
help and advice without trying to help themselves first.  So with the 
FTA, they’re also looking to the government to help them 
operationalize (SBF respondent)41. 
 
They’re (SMEs) just unwilling to find out more.  They’ve been in 
their comfort zone for too long, its time to change.  The FTA is 
aimed at changing this mindset.  The government has taken the lead 
by having FTAs to open markets… companies now have to take 
over by venturing out.  This is not high risk, but calculated risk 
because the government has offered you some protection with the 
FTA.  Ultimately, they have to do it on their own.  We don’t want to 
cultivate a culture of dependence (MTI respondent)42. 
 
                                                 
41 Interview with a SBF respondent on 17th March 2005. 
42 Interview with a MTI respondent on 16th March 2005. 
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Impediments behind SMEs’ ability to advance up the value ladder lies not just in their 
size-related characteristics, but also their passive business culture.  Market passivity in 
this scenario refers to the unwillingness to change and adapt to new realities.  This 
market passivity of SMEs thus inhibits them from accessing available knowledge 
networks.  Seen in this light, I argue that the USSFTA and other FTAs are attempts by 
institutions to socialize SMEs into new business networks symbolizing new practices and conditions 
for greater market activity. 
 Overall, this section illustrates the importance of “institutional thickness” 
(Amin and Thrift, 1994) in creating suitable conditions for economic activity.  As 
argued, this “institutional thickness” approximates the form of extra-firm networks 
with varying degrees of intensity with different actors rather than a complete static 
whole.  I reiterate that it is the configuration, dynamism, politics and territoriality of 
these extra-firm networks that account for the differential implications for different 
types of firms. 
 
6.4 TRANSNATIONAL LINKAGES AND GEOGRAPHIES OF UNEVEN 
DEVELOPMENT 
 
Singapore has helped to clear the minefields for other countries in 
Southeast Asia. This intention to bring along the rest of ASEAN, we 
stated publicly from the beginning (Yeo, 2002)43. 
 
The Singapore state’s economic and political relations with its ASEAN neighbours 
have been consistently undergird by a strategy of “giving the neighbours a stake in its 
prosperity and independence” (Singh, 1999: 285).  Hence, this ‘pathfinder’ role of the 
                                                 




USSFTA, as a means to bring economic development to ASEAN, has been actively 
propounded in the Singapore state’s rhetoric.   
 
6.4.1 Discourse of Economic Complementarity 
At first glance, the close interlocking flows of components, finished products, 
investments and technology within the IMS-GT and the rest of ASEAN do appear to 
bring economic development to the region.  To bring forth the manner in which 
ASEAN economies may benefit from the USSFTA and the importance of 
collaboration, Singapore’s Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong presented Indonesian 
President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono with a gift of a DVD recorder.  The DVD 
recorder is made in Singapore but with components from Batam and is exported to the 
US.  As expressed by PM Lee, 
Batam and Indonesia benefits, Singapore benefits.  If you don’t do 
that, the MNCs go to the Pearl River Delta or they go to Chennai, to 
Bangalore, you lose, we lose…  MNCs opinion is that if the 
conditions are right in the Riau Islands, Singapore plus the Riaus can 
outperform the Pearl River Delta... Under Singapore’s free trade 
agreement with the US, we can have components made in Batam 
which get tax-free access. If you’d exported your components to 
America, you would have attracted 4-5% tariff (Straits Times, 13 
November 2004). 
 
While this clearly shows the synergistic relationships and developmental links among 
economies, it presents the construction and realization of the discourse of economic 
and relational complementarity by Singapore.  However, I remain circumspect of the 
coherence of this discourse of complementarity as well as the acceptance of such a 
simplistic comprehension of the developments brought to the IMS-GT and the rest of 
ASEAN by the changing USSFTA RPNs.  Importantly, even if the components are 
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manufactured in Batam, the factories involved in production may well be foreign-
owned rather than indigenous enterprises.  Table 6.6 presents the tenant profile of 
firms in the Batamindo Industrial Park (BIP).  The firms in BIP are foreign-owned, 
with Singapore and Japanese firms as the key tenants in the electronics and precision 
components sectors (Yeoh et al, 2003).  Generally, Singapore is the key foreign investor 
in all sectors of the Batam economy as of 2002, with 218 wholly-owned firms (Figure 
6.2-6.3) and involvement in over 50% of joint ventures (BIDA, 2002: 27).  Beyond 
broad macro-economic statistics, further analysis into the type of activities and 
backward linkages into these economies present a markedly different picture. 
 While firms’ spatial restructuring under the USSFTA brought increased 
investments, components and other economic flows into Riau, Malaysia and other 
ASEAN economies, the potential for development remains limited.  One key reason is 
the concentration of low value-added activities in these off-shore locations arising in 
part from the path-dependency of the RPNs.  I argue that there exists a certain 
historical specificity in Singapore’s FTA strategy, which has to be situated in the wider 
context of Singapore’s search for a ‘spatial fix’ marketed in the image of economic 
complementarity.  Since the drive to encourage Singapore firms to “go regional”, the 
Singapore state has been involved in a range of geo-economic strategies to overcome 
limits to expansion in Singapore and to enhance the innate capabilities of Singapore 
firms in their cross-border operations.  In the earlier phases of regionalization, the state 
undertook initiatives such as financial schemes and infrastructural projects (i.e. BIP).  
One of the spatial implications of this strategy is that Riau and Malaysia manifested in 
the form of the IMS-GT have become the key destinations of Singapore-originating 
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investments.  The strategy of these firms going regional is to offshore low value-added 
operations while retaining high-value processes in Singapore (refer to Chapter 3).  With 
most firms operating from Singapore to manage their production networks, a large 
proportion of high value-added activities such as R&D, marketing and high value 
manufacturing are sited in Singapore.  Hence, Riau and Malaysia are little more than 




Developer  US$ 470 million  
Committed Tenants  88 
Area Taken Up  560,000 m2  
Investment by 
Tenants  > US$1 billion  
Export Value  > US$2 billion  
No. of Employees  66,000 
Tenants by Country of Origin 
Japan 42 Finland 1 
Singapore 25 Sweden 1 
USA 7 Denmark 1 
Germany 3 Holland 1 
France 2 Australia 2 
Switzerland 2 Malaysia 1 
 
Table 6.6: Tenant Profile of Batamindo Industrial Park.   
Source: Yeoh et al, 2003 
 
In this present phase of a ‘spatial fix’, the state has persisted in its geo-
economic strategy to reconfigure whole economic spaces outside its territorial 
boundaries and script the competitive position of these spaces in the global economy.  
Via the USSFTA provisions, the (contradictory) combination of a “bounded” USSFTA 
space offering a plethora of advantages and a “borderless” USSFTA space-economy 





Figure 6.2: Value of Foreign Direct Investment by Country in Batam 






Figure 6.3: Number of Foreign Companies by Country in Batam 
Source: BIDA (2002: 28).
 
 204
model of comparative advantage and economic complementarity.  To reiterate, the 
enhanced IPR regime in Singapore offers more protection to R&D activities and the more 
flexible ROO recognizes the outward processing of certain activities in the geographies of 
electronics RPN.  Given the relatively unskilled labour force in these locales, the activities 
due for outward processing are low value-added types such as assembly (refer to Chapter 
4).  Statistics also show that average monthly wages for workers on Batam is approximately 
425000 rupiah (S$75) (Choudry, 2004).  The employment structure reveals that females 
comprise 70% of employment in the manufacturing industries (BIDA, 2002: 8), somewhat 
concurring with the New International Division of Labour discourse that low-value 
assembly processes are off-shored to developing economies because of the large supply of 
unskilled but low-cost, nimble-fingered female labour.   
The implication is magnified by perceptions that firms have of these locales. 
Places like Batam can only do simple manufacturing and assembly.  No 
one in the right mind will set up premises for R&D.  They don’t have 
the technology and skills to handle it… If you tell your customers that 
you do R&D in Batam, they’ll think twice about working with you.  
There are no patents to protect! (SG-TNC-9). 
 
There are many considerations if you want to do more complex 
manufacturing tasks in place in Riau and some parts of Malaysia.  You 
have to first train workers, then you have to make allowances for 
mistakes.  This leads to higher costs and time delays that are very costly 
for competitiveness (US-TNC-9). 
 
Singapore is just so near.  When you can do R&D in an environment 
with good IP laws, why bother to do it in some other nearby country 
with no protection? Costs aren’t the concern for R&D (US-TNC-3). 
 
From the explanations, firms’ spatial restructuring under the USSFTA has not significantly 
altered the production relations between Singapore, Malaysia and Riau.  While economic 
complementarity accounts for much of this set of production relations in the IMS-GT, 
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value appropriation is skewed in favour of Singapore and further perpetuated by changes 
to the IPR regime and ROO.  Value creation, enhancement and capture mediated by the 
notion of geographical proximity is a double-edged sword for Singapore’s neighbours.  
Geographical proximity has made these neighbouring economies the preferred location for 
off-shore production activities.   However, geographical proximity to Singapore reduces 
the possibilities for technology to trickle down through the performance of higher value 
processes in these locales.  Transterritorial networks established by component and 
investment flows in the IMS-GT thus shift the power dynamics towards Singapore and 
limit the scope for economic development in Riau in particular.  Although the USSFTA is 
reported to create at least 500 new jobs (Today, 30 January 2003), beyond employment 
opportunities and (low) wages, opportunities for technological upgrading of these 
economies remain a possibility, albeit a very dim one.   
 
6.4.2 Limited Backward Linkages 
 In addition to the broad geographies of the electronics RPN, the precise 
organization of production activities in these locales has further ramifications.  Although 
data from Chapter 5 points at increasing investments and new establishments in Malaysia 
and Riau with the USSFTA, backward linkages into these economies remain sporadic. 
The USSFTA won’t change my preference for my own off-shore 
subsidiaries in supplying components or carrying out manufacturing.  
It’s just a more reliable source.  Independent component suppliers set 
up by the locals cannot give me the certainty that I need… technology 
and expertise is also lacking.  Even if I won’t use my own subsidiary, I 
will choose an outfit belonging to an established company (US-TNC-
10). 
   
I still stick to factories set up by Singaporean businessmen.  Maybe it’s 
the culture, the understanding we share that makes its easier to liaise 
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with each other.  Also the reliability… The negotiation is also done in 
Singapore and they’ll relay the information to their factories in Batam, in 
Malaysia… we don’t have to deal with the Batam factory personally… 
the whole process is just much smoother (SG-TNC-6) 
 
We only have one small component made by some local companies… 
its cheaper to get it from them.  It’s not a long-term thing, more like 
once-off.  There are so many of them making the same stuff… if I show 
interest, they’ll give it to me cheap, if not they know that I can get it 
from someone else (SG-TNC-15). 
 
The USSFTA has not altered the preference of firms to establish long-term production 
arrangements either with the firms’ affiliates or Singapore-originating factories, hence 
restricting the formation of beneficial backward linkages into the local economies, 
especially Riau and some parts of Malaysia.  The irony of the situation is that technology 
and expertise transfer from these non-local subsidiaries to the indigenous establishments 
will be deficient and opportunities for industrial upgrading will be found wanting even in a 
scenario of rising investments created by the USSFTA.  Furthermore, with most of the 
9,886 indigenous firms in Batam (Table 6.7) lacking technological specialization in their 
products and roped into ‘price reduction’ competitions with each other, developmental 
possibilities are thus curtailed.  Off-shore locales such as Riau will not be able to develop 
its local electronics industry to grow and compete effectively against the factories set up by 
foreign subsidiaries, and will remain somewhat an archetypical branch plant economy.   
Beyond Singapore's political discourse that the USSFTA is meant to be a "win-win-
win" arrangement for the US, Singapore and the rest of ASEAN, the USSFTA continues 
to privilege the centrality of Singapore and Singapore-originating actors in the electronics 
RPN at the expense of its ASEAN neighbours.  Here, societal and network embeddedness 
of disparate actors that existed in the pre-USSFTA RPN is crucial.  Simultaneously, as 
spaces have become more fluid in the USSFTA, the impacts still exhibit spatial constraints 
 
 207
and are mediated through the regulatory framework of the USSFTA.  Hence the USSFTA 
still imposes boundaries which the more flexible regional production networks cannot 
completely over come.  Argued by Felker (2003: 271),  
Even as international production networks become more horizontal at 
the global level, with MNCs transferring design, procurement, and R&D 
responsibilities to their East and Southeast Asian subsidiaries, they 
simultaneously become more hierarchical and vertically specialized 
within the region, as these more complex and lucrative functions are re-
centralized in regional headquarters. 
 
Batam Economic Indicators 
  Remarks 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Investment US$Bn 6.75 6.98 8.01 8.8 9.46 
Government Investment US$Bn 1.58 1.63 1.9 2.1 2.14 
Foreign Investment US$Bn 2.25 2.33 2.82 3.4 3.62 
Domestic Investment US$Bn 2.92 3.02 3.29 3.3 3.7 
Gross Domestic Regional 
Product 
Trillion 
Rupiah 5.26 5.9 6.6 8.09 8.53 
Economic Growth Percent 3.08 6.38 7.67 7.9 8.35 
Foreign Companies Companies 338 396 470 531 611 
Small & Medium Enterprises Companies 7809 8179 9577 9700 9886 
Population People 266000 358000 462000 520000 553521
Indonesian Workforce People 141000 150000 155000 165000 172709
Foreign Workforce People 1300 1600 1700 2116 2517 
 
Table 6.7: Batam Economic Indicators 
Source: BIDA, 2002: 29. 
 
Thus, uneven regional development of the IMS-GT is the “dynamic outcome of the 
complex interaction between territorialized relational networks and global production 
networks within the context of changing regional governance structures” (Coe et al, 2004: 
469; see also Amin 1998; 1999).  The notions of personal relationships, trustworthiness and 
spatiality in the electronics RPNs not only shape the geographies and precise organization 
of economic activities in the IMS-GT; but also affects economic development by shifting 
power geometries towards certain firms and specific locales. An uneven map of 
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development is thus reconstituted by the USSFTA, and this continues to entrap 
Singapore’s neighbouring economies and inhibit their developmental abilities.   
 
6.5 SUMMARY 
 Altogether, the aim of this chapter is to analyze the USSFTA to unravel the 
inherent workings in this agreement to enhance our understanding of developmental 
implications.  I have demonstrated the ways in which various inter-firm and extra-firm 
networks exhibit various degrees of intrinsic territorial and big-firm biasness.  
Simultaneously, spatial and organizational restructuring of the electronics RPN has also 
created new networks of power for certain firms previously subordinated by the immense 
market power of OBMs.  The analysis sets the tone for us to recast our previous 
understandings of market passivity to include multiple perspectives enriching our 
understandings of the position of different firms in the electronics RPN.  This firm-centred 
perspective of the USSFTA has also highlighted how the organization of production has 
created an uneven map of economic development, whereby the USSFTA continues to 
perpetuate certain production relationships privileging Singapore over its neighbouring 








Neoliberal discourses tell a deceptively simple story about the logical, 
historical and philosophical superiority of markets, and of individualized 
and privatized economic relations more generally, coupling this with a 
concerted political programme to defend and extend the spaces of 
market rule.  But this simplicity is really deceptive in that it is very often 
necessary for neoliberals to deploy state power and public authority in 
pursuit of these goals (Peck and Tickell, 2003: 167). 
 
Trade liberalization via multilateral agreements or FTAs constitutes a key element of the 
neoliberal project by institutionalizing the primacy of markets and the private sphere to 
create a “borderless” world.  This suggests that discourses of neoliberalism embedded in 
the tenets of the USSFTA such as the more flexible ROO are at work to effect a reordering 
of geographical-economic space.  Regulations and norms institutionalized in the USSFTA 
(and other FTAs) following economic logics are reimposed on the world and in the 
process, shaping the world to be more and more like these economic models (Sidaway, 
2002: 7).  
While it is important to acknowledge the discursive power of neoliberalism, we 
must be attentive towards the manner in which these neoliberal discourses are negotiated 
by firms and institutional actors in producing spatial outcomes that differ significantly from 
the image envisage in the neoliberal project.  Specifically, I have played down the structural 
power of neoliberalism to analyze the enmeshing of power dynamics, relational geometries, 
territoriality and spatiality through a network lens in the creation of a USSFTA space-
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economy.  In this penultimate chapter, I will revisit some of the key findings of this thesis 
and situate them within wider policy and academic debates. 
  
7.2 KEY FINDINGS 
 Through the analytical lens of the GPN framework, the complexities of economic 
integration with its associated power dynamics and actor relations are presented.  The 
production of the USSFTA space-economy highlights the interactive process between 
social actors as well as the mutually constitutive relationship between firm operations and 
institutional arrangements.  Rather than conceiving economic regionalism as a state-led 
process common in many studies, I have argued that firms are key social actors in the 
production of macro-regional spaces.  From covert cost statements to overt lobbying 
tactics and alliances with institutional actors, firms put forward their agendas aggressively.  
Hence, the network approach demonstrates that there is little utility in differentiating 
between regionalism (state-led) and regionalization (firm-led) and/or de jure or de facto 
(Higgot, 1999).  It is the precise relational geometries between firm and institutional actors 
that shape the specific socio-spatial outcome, not either or. 
 The creation of the USSFTA space-economy has brought a wave of spatial 
restructuring in the electronics RPN, with the more flexible ROO (ISI and OP) and a more 
stringent IPR regime as the main driving forces behind changes to firm strategies.  Inputs 
are increasingly sourced from geographically proximate economies and low value-added 
activities such as assembly are increasingly off-shored to neighbouring Malaysia and Riau 
with the relaxation of ROO.  Rising investments to existing and new operations in 
Singapore, Malaysia and Riau are accompanied by falling investments in operations outside 
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the ASEAN region.  Firms are thus highly spatial entities in that changes to geographical 
space influence the manner in which firms use space.  Furthermore, firm territoriality 
affects the strategies adopted.  US firms are more inclined to rely on their intra-firm 
network of affiliates, while Singapore firms depend on their inter-firm network of external 
component suppliers as they negotiate the changes in the USSFTA environment.  In short, 
post-USSFTA production geographies highlight the rationalization of the electronics RPN 
with rising intensities of investment, information and material flows centred on the IMS-
GT. 
 Beyond broad geographies of production discussed in Chapters 3 and 5, the 
USSFTA created new networks of outsourcing, contractual and partnership relations for all 
firms embedded in the electronics RPN.  This in turn produces new relational geometries 
of domination, subordination and reciprocity.  With a more stringent IPR regime, US firms 
are conducting more R&D processes with Singapore-OEMs either through contractual or 
partnership arrangements, thereby enhancing the position of Singapore-OEMs in the RPN.  
The more flexible ROO is accompanied by increased outsourcing of manufacturing and 
assembly by US-OBMs and some large OEMs to Singapore firms, and reinforces the 
importance of Singapore component suppliers in the RPN.  Harmonization of standards 
under the USSFTA has also contributed to an outsourcing trend among TNCs and created 
new opportunities for SMEs to discover their niche in test services.  Pre-emptive and 
ingenuous responses on the part of Singapore firms in exploiting the USSFTA as a 
marketing tool and bargaining chip demonstrate further that new power relations are 
indeed emerging.   
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 Although changing actor relations have created new networks and new spaces for 
firms (especially Singapore firms) to reposition themselves competitively, the continued 
territorial biasness of the USSFTA, politics between institutional actors and firm cultures 
continue to shape the precise RPN configuration and restrain the development of new 
capacities among Singapore firms.  Thus, firms are heterogeneous entities with differential 
degrees of societal, network and territorial embeddedness that condition the manner in 
which they react to the USSFTA.  This simultaneously warns us to remain mindful of the 
historical specificity and path dependency of firms and their networks, while 
acknowledging the ingenuity and resourcefulness of firms.  It is precisely how this dialectic 
evolves which affects the reconstitution of inter-firm relationships and uncovers the multi-
dimensional nature of market passivity.   
 Beyond the mapping of production and organizational geographies, I have 
examined the implications of the USSFTA and changing firm strategies on issues of 
development in the IMS-GT in Chapter 6.  While investments to Riau in particular are 
increasing, the scope for economic development remains limited.  The concentration of 
low value-added activities in these offshore locations suggests that few opportunities exist 
for technological and industrial upgrading.  Moreover, the preference of firms to either 
establish short-term relationships with these offshore factories or production arrangements 
with the firm’s affiliates or Singapore-originating factories restricts the creation of 
beneficial backward linkages into the local economies.  Thus, value appropriation continues 
to be skewed towards Singapore.   
I argue that approaching the analysis of the USSFTA (and other FTAs or regional 
economic blocs) from an organizational perspective does not make regionalism fold back 
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on itself and naturalizing it, rather this approach problematizes ‘commonsense’ notions of 
FTAs as trade liberalization instruments engendering ‘free trade’ between partner states.  
This perspective depicts the mutually constitutive relationship between firms and 
institutional arrangements as well as the salience of networks, spatiality, power and 
relational geometries in economic development.  Having presented the key findings of this 
thesis and highlighted some of the key issues that firms face, I will now situate these within 
the wider context of policy implications. 
 
7.3 POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
While it is true that policymakers (at all spatial scales) are increasingly 
recognizing the importance of sociocultural and institutional factors in 
socioeconomic development (again at all spatial scales), the reality is that 
they still turn overwhelming to economists and social policy exports, 
and rarely to geographers, for guidance or inspiration (Martin and 
Sunley, 2001: 156). 
 
Policymakers have consistently relied on macroeconomic indicators such as GDP, FDI and 
employment rates to measure the performance of an economy as well as the efficacy of 
policies.  I argue that macroeconomic indicators present a simplistic and myopic picture of 
the USSFTA’s impacts, and thus are unable to generate directives on desired policy 
changes.  My thesis on the other hand, hopes to contribute to this very process of policy 
making through a focus on the firm and their GPNs.     
 Based on the findings presented in this thesis, I propose some key policy 
implications.  First, pre-FTA industrial consultations need to strike a balance between 
different categories of firms (TNCs versus SMEs), to ensure that the opinions of all actors 
are taken into account.  As demonstrated earlier, industrial consultations tend to exhibit a 
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big-firm bias; hence the interests of SMEs are often neglected.  More efforts must be made 
to integrate different types of firms into these consultative networks. 
 Second, institutional actors have to move away from their conceptions of firms as 
homogenous entities.  Industrial outreach programmes have to be more “audience-
focused” rather than “one size fits all”.  Presented earlier, TNCs and SMEs react 
differently to opportunities and threats created by the USSFTA.  Territoriality of firms too, 
generates different outcomes.  Thus, industrial outreach programmes should be tailored to 
meet the needs of different firm categories, such as conducting outreach seminars in 
Mandarin for SMEs. 
 Third, issues of relationality, power and social practices have significant 
implications for firm development.  Industrial outreach has to move simply from an 
informative role to initiatives targeting relations between actors.  Besides educating SMEs 
(and other types of firms) on the benefits and utility of the USSFTA, more can be done to 
help SMEs to develop marketing and imaging capabilities such as the knowledge and ability 
to utilize the USSFTA.  This approach is aimed at presenting SMEs as the preferred 
outsourcing partners to TNC through a focus on building up the knowledge competencies 
and networking capacities of SMEs.  For instance, with the harmonization of standards 
under the USSFTA, test services are now increasingly outsourced by TNCs.  With some 
institutional support and guidance, SMEs will be better equipped in transforming 
themselves into test service partners of TNCs.    
 Fourth, the USSFTA may have created a single economic space, but territoriality 
continues to be an obstacle towards institutional collaboration.  From the example on 
matchmaking services present in Chapter 6, it is clear that both the US and Singapore 
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institutional actors hold varying, and yet complementary resources.  With such a high 
potential of relational complementarity, collaboration between these two territorial actors 
will generate positive spin-offs beneficial to both US and Singapore firms.   
 The purpose of the USSFTA (and Singapore’s other bilateral FTAs) is to attract 
TNCs to establish their operations in Singapore in order to circumvent trade barriers they 
encounter when operating elsewhere.  Fears of falling outside the boundaries of FTAs have 
prompted excluded parties, especially Singapore’s ASEAN neighbors, into seeking their 
own FTAs.  For instance, Singapore’s pursuit of FTAs was met with criticism from 
Malaysia in the initial stages (Straits Times, 23 June 2002).  However, the benefits of 
exclusive FTAs and their proliferation impelled Malaysia to pursue FTAs with US and 
Japan.  Similarly, the struggle over the ASEAN ‘pie’ contributed to proposals by US, China 
and Japan to create the Enterprise for ASEAN Initiative (Straits Times, 28 October 2002), 
ASEAN-China FTA (Straits Times, 14 November 2002) and Japan-ASEAN Closer 
Economic Partnership (Straits Times, 6 November 2002) respectively.  While such region-
wide FTAs are a long term scenario and that Singapore has the first-mover advantage, 
questions remain as to whether Singapore’s competitive advantage in FTAs and in the 
ASEAN region will be eroded.  Thus Singapore cannot continue with its sole pursuit of 
bilateral FTAs.  Instead, Singapore needs to focus on synergies between its various policies, 
such as Overseas Headquarters Scheme, Regional Headquarters Scheme, SME21 and 
FTAs, to develop the technological competencies of local electronics firms as well as to 
attract and retain global spanning TNCs in Singapore.  In this manner, Singapore will be 




7.4 WIDER DEBATES ON REGIONALISM AND GLOBALIZATION 
 The proliferation of bilateralism and other PTAs cannot be divorced from wider 
phenomena in the global economy.  Most notably, the rise of regional economies has 
sparked concerns of triadization and the collapse of the multilateral order.  Au contraire, I 
suggest that Singapore’s bilateral strategy generates new insights into issues of power and 
spatialities of regionalism, multilateralism and globalization. 
In the international circle, many commentators suggested that FTAs are stumbling 
blocks to multilateral trade liberalization.  One of its strongest proponents is Bhagwati 
(1995), who argued that differing ROO for different arrangements lead to a “spaghetti 
bowl” of rules that tie up multilateral trade policies.  Yet, Singapore’s pursuit of bilateral 
FTAs has created the impetus for its neighbours to pursue multilateral ASEAN-wide 
FTAs.  I think that the contradiction between Bhagwati’s argument and the current 
phenomenon of ASEAN-wide FTAs resides in differing conceptions of space.  Based on 
Bhagwait’s argument, it is clear that his concern is with the contradictions arising from the 
overlapping spaces created by regional arrangements.  Bhagwati’s conception tends to view space 
from a scalar and territorial logic, as somewhat absolute and container-like.  However, 
these overlapping spaces also signify the multiple abstractions of spatiality such that space is fluid rather 
than bounded.  The concurrent coexistence of multilateralism and bilateralism too suggests 
the mutability and pluralities of space.   
This implies the need for conceptions of economic space that move 
beyond the absolute spatial ‘containers’ of geographical and continental 
units.  Instead, global economic space is being relativized and organized 
in patterns far more complex than which simple triadization would 
suggest (Poon et al, 2000: 440). 
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 Approaching this from an organizational perspective does not pit bilateralism 
against multilateralism; rather spaces are folded into the GPNs of firm in varying 
topologies and configurations.  As Murdoch (1997: 331) argues, 
actors and networks become one and the same: it is now ‘all for one and 
one for all’ in the construction of joint actions.  And as the actor-
network grows so it will extend its influence and reach beyond a single 
locale into other locales, typing these together in sets of complex 
association.  There is, therefore, no difference in kind between ‘macro’ 
and ‘micro’ or ‘global’ and ‘local’ actors; longer networks can simply 
reach further than shorter networks.   
 
From this network perspective, bilateral FTAs and their associated changing RPNs are not 
ontologically separable from wider GPNs, multilateralism and globalization.  Complexities 
in the organization and geographies of production suggest that both globalization and 
regionalization reflects the increasing functional integration of internationally dispersed 
activities (Dicken, 2003: 12).  Comprehending this network ontology of economic 
organization as well as the associated mutually constitutive relationship between 
institutional and firm actors highlights two interrelated insights regarding Singapore’s FTA 
strategy and understandings of globalization. 
 First, Singapore’s FTAs embody multiple roles for the governmentalization of 
networks of spaces.  ASEAN-wide FTAs show that changing RPNs create new spatialities 
and power dynamics capable of influencing multilateral developments.  Also, Singapore’s 
FTAs should further be contextualized within the economic rationality of the state, where 
the FTAs are inseparable from other apparatus of the state in the ongoing reinvention of 
Singapore.  Participation in FTAs requires many changes to the domestic economy and 
policy practices.  “Regionalism constructs the reforming process – liberalization of flows 
and the removal of barriers – as the political and ethical choice of nation-states” (Larner 
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and Walters, 2002: 418).  As Singapore transforms itself into a global ‘hub’ for knowledge 
driven industries with a strong emphasis on enterprise, technology and innovation, I argue 
that this economic transformation is closely tied up with a state project to create a ‘New 
Breed of Singaporeans’ (Straits Times, 17 March 2002) that are entrepreneurial and creative.  
From this perspective, FTAs engender new ‘appropriate’ spaces concerned with the 
production of ‘fast subjects’ (Thrift: 2000a).  Singapore’s FTA strategy thus demonstrates 
the internationalization of state capacities, a process in which the state apparatus becomes 
“increasingly oriented towards facilitating capital accumulation for the most 
internationalized investors” (Glassman, 1999: 673) and the reorganization of the nation-
state into a transnational state for global regulation.   
  Second, the interrelated insight is that the theoretical disjuncture between states 
and markets is more imaginary than real.  The old paradigm counter-posing states and 
markets as separate, self-contained entities does not present a realistic picture of 
globalization and regionalization as an inherently spatial process of economic organization 
contingent on certain socio-economic, political and geographical conditions.  This 
perspective ‘grounds’ globalization and binds its existence closely with nation-state actors 
(See also Amin, 2004; Dicken, 2004; Yeung, 2002).  Notably, the discursive construction of 
globalization as an inevitable and beneficial force is used to legitimize Singapore’s FTA 
strategy by Singapore’s political elites.  Altogether, this perspective means that regionalism 
as advanced by Singapore should be viewed as a practical rationality in thinking about 
space and strategy in the global economy:  Regionalism is an invented way of governing 
and crafting globalization by nation-states, whereby spatial networks and various 
“topologies of practice” (Amin, 2002) have the ability to harness the micro-domains of 
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power in the spatialities of Singapore’s FTAs and link their objectives and implications to 
events distant in time and space.   
 
7.5 FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 
With the scope for more survey-interviews as the FTAs develop, future research on 
Singapore’s FTAs may follow some of the directions set out in this thesis.  The GPN 
framework may be applied to the analysis of Singapore’s other bilateral FTAs and other 
economic blocs such as the EU and NAFTA.  In my critique of the empirically rich 
literatures on the EU and NAFTA, theoretical frameworks are often found wanting.  
Hence, the GPN framework is particularly useful as the ‘missing piece’ in the puzzle, to 
provide some degree of coherence to the empirical findings. 
 Besides the electronics industry, the USSFTA has immense implications for the 
organization of production in other industries such as textiles and plastics.  Particularly in 
textiles, the USSFTA eliminated quotas on Singapore textile exports and created a new 
‘yarn forward rule’ (MTI, 2003b).  Singapore textile manufacturers such as Ban Joo and 
Ghim Li have made strategic changes by using American-sourced yarn (Business Times, 29 
December 2003; Channel News Asia, 15 January 2004), in order to maximize the benefits of 
the USSFTA.  Hence, mapping the changing production and organizational geographies of 
the textile and garment industry present insights into how this ‘buyer-driven commodity chain’ 
refashions itself into a global production network. 
Deeper exposition into the processes shaping the precise firm strategy undertaken 
is particularly useful in unraveling the workings of the firm.  In other words, the concern 
here is with the intra-firm relationships between parent, regional headquarters and 
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subsidiaries.  This angle looks into negotiations between social actors within the same firm.  
Interest is in ‘how’ the FTA is understood, ‘how’ firm strategies are formulated, ‘who’ give 
the directives, ‘how’ the directives are understood’, ‘what’ form of the directives are 
implemented and ‘what’ are the outcomes.  Simply, future research may look into the intra-
firm relationships and the negotiation of different discourses and narratives, such as 
financial narratives (O’Neill, 2001), to elucidate the intentionality of actors and their firm 
strategies.  Situating the relation between discourse and practice on a wider context, 
research could also explore how discourses and geographical imaginations of the FTAs 
spatialize trade, investments and financial capital flows within and between the various 
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A SURVEY ON THE IMPACTS OF THE US-SINGAPORE FREE 









- All information collected in this questionnaire will be treated in strict confidence and only 
presented in aggregate form. 
 
 
Aims of Questionnaire: 








THANK YOU FOR YOUR KIND ASSISTANCE! 
.
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SECTION A: YOUR FIRM’S OPERATIONS 
 
1. Year of establishment: ______________________ 
 
2. What is your firm’s annual sales revenue (in S$ million)? 
(Please Tick)  < 1  25 – 49.9  
  1 – 9.9    ≥ 50 
  10 – 24.9   
 
3. What is the value of your firm’s fixed assets (in S$ million)? 
(Please Tick)  < 1  25 – 49.9  
  1 – 9.9    ≥ 50 
  10 – 24.9   
 
4. What is the current number of employees in your firm?  (Please Tick) 
(Please Tick)  10 – 49  200 – 499  
  50 – 99   ≥ 500 
  100 – 199   
 
5. What are some of the activities performed by your firm?  Please place a tick (√ ) 
in the corresponding boxes to indicate the activities performed by you firm 
either on your own or in partnership with other firms. 


















Product Research & 
Development (R&D) 
    
Process Research & 
Development (R&D) 
    
Manufacturing     
Testing of Products 
(Quality Control) 
    
Marketing     
Others: Please state 
___________________ 









6. Does your firm have subsidiary establishments outside Singapore? 
 Yes – Please complete the table below and proceed to question 4. 
 No – Please proceed to question 4. 
 
Location Number of Subsidiaries 
Sector:  
Please circle the 
appropriate sector that 
the subsidiaries are in. 
Component Manufacturing: 
Please circle the appropriate 
choice to indicate if component 
manufacturing is carried out in 
the subsidiaries. 
US  Manufacturing/Services Yes / No 
Batam  Manufacturing/Services Yes / No 
Bintan  Manufacturing/Services Yes / No 
Malaysia  Manufacturing/Services Yes / No 
Others  Manufacturing/Services Yes / No 
 
7. Where does your firm obtain the inputs required in the manufacturing of your 
components and products? 
Source of Inputs Used in 
Products 
Please tick (√ ) the corresponding 
box below if your firm use inputs 
from these sources 
Approximate Percentage: 
Please circle the appropriate 
percentage 
Domestic (Singapore)  Less than 50% / More than 50%
Batam  Less than 50% / More than 50%
Bintan  Less than 50% / More than 50%
Malaysia  Less than 50% / More than 50%
US  Less than 50% / More than 50%
Others: Please State 
____________________  Less than 50% / More than 50%
 
8. Which are the intermediate markets for your firm’s products? 
Markets for Products 
Please tick (√ ) the corresponding 
box below if your products are 
bound for these markets 
Approximate Percentage: 
Please circle the appropriate 
percentage 
Domestic (Singapore)  Less than 50% / More than 50%
Batam  Less than 50% / More than 50%
Bintan  Less than 50% / More than 50%
Malaysia  Less than 50% / More than 50%
US  Less than 50% / More than 50%
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Others: Please State 
____________________  Less than 50% / More than 50%
 
 
9. Which are the ultimate markets for your firm’s products? 
Markets for Products 
Please tick (√ ) the corresponding 
box below if your products are 
bound for these markets 
Approximate Percentage: 
Please circle the appropriate 
percentage 
Domestic (Singapore)  Less than 50% / More than 50%
Batam  Less than 50% / More than 50%
Bintan  Less than 50% / More than 50%
Malaysia  Less than 50% / More than 50%
US  Less than 50% / More than 50%
Others: Please State 
____________________  Less than 50% / More than 50%
 
 
SECTION B: KNOWLEDGE AND IMPACTS OF THE US-SINGAPORE FTA 
 
10. From which of the sources listed below, did you learn about the USSFTA? 
 Newspapers & Magazines 
 Internet sources  
 Brochures and print media disseminated by Singapore’s government agencies. 
 Forums organized by Singapore’s government agencies (such as the Ministry of 
Trade and Industry) and business associations. 
 American Chamber of Commerce (AMCHAM) 
 Association of Small and Medium Enterprises (ASME) 
 Economic Development Board (EDB) 
 International Enterprise Singapore (IE S’pore) 
 Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI) 
 Singapore International Chamber of Commerce  
 Singapore Manufacturer’s Federation (SMa) 
 Others: Please state  ________________________ 
 
11. Based on your knowledge of the USSFTA, what are some of the key policies and 
changes created by the USSFTA? (Please Tick) 
 Reduction of tariffs 
 Components sourced from Singapore and US qualify for tariff-free advantages 
 Integrated Sourcing Initiative: Tariff-free advantages for certain non-Singapore 
components/products, when exported to the US. 
 Outward Processing Rule: all stages of production in Singapore (whether before 
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or after outsourcing to locations outside Singapore) can be counted towards 
Singapore’s local content. 
 Savings from the removal of the 0.21% Merchandise Processing Fee under the 
USSFTA. 
 More flexible Rules-Of-Origin when exporting to the US. 
 
 
12. On a scale of 1 to 5, indicate the extent to which the USSFTA has impacts on 
your firm’s operations.   
1 2 3 4 5 
Positive  Neutral  Negative
 
Impacts Scale  
Export opportunities    1         2          3          4           5 
Source for cheaper tariff-free component inputs from 
other countries 
   1         2          3          4           5 
Reduced tariffs    1         2          3          4           5 
Access to the US market    1         2          3          4           5 
Investment opportunities in the US    1         2          3          4           5 
Lower costs of production or cost reduction.    1         2          3          4           5 
More stringent intellectual property rights.    1         2          3          4           5 
Protection of investments and business in the US    1         2          3          4           5 
Opportunities for partnerships with US firms    1         2          3          4           5 
Competitive pressures from a more open market    1         2          3          4           5 
Influx of cost-competitive foreign products    1         2          3          4           5 
Use of advance technology by foreign firms    1         2          3          4           5 
Opportunities for technological upgrading in production    1         2          3          4           5 
Privilege given to US firms    1         2          3          4           5 
Risk of takeovers by larger foreign (US) firms    1         2          3          4           5 
Risk of takeovers by larger domestic firms    1         2          3          4           5 
 
13. Does the USSFTA have any immediate implications on your firm’s strategies 
and/or production activities? 
 Yes – please proceed to Question 14. 
 No – please proceed to Section C. 
 
14. a) With respect to these implications, are there any changes to your input 
sourcing strategies and/or activities under the USSFTA? 
 Yes – Please continue below. 
 No – Please proceed to Question 15. 
b) On a scale of 1 to 5, indicate the extent to which the USSFTA affects your 
input sourcing strategies and/or activities.   
Also, what are the factors responsible for these changes?  
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1) Lower cost of inputs. 
2) Component inputs qualify for tariff-free advantages  
3) Component inputs from these locations are of an acceptable quality for the 
demands of your products. 
4) Sources of component inputs are in close proximity to your manufacturing 
operations. 
5) Sources of component inputs are in close proximity to Singapore. 
6) Request from customers. 
7) Established relationships with suppliers. 
8) Others: Please state _________________________________ 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Increase  No Change  Decrease
 
Strategies Scale (Please Circle) 
Factors (Please 
write the 
number in the 
boxes) 
Source for component inputs from countries not 
included under the USSFTA 1       2       3       4       5        
Source for component inputs from Singapore. 1       2       3       4       5        
Source for component inputs from the US. 1       2       3       4       5        
Source for component inputs from Batam. 1       2       3       4       5        
Source for component inputs from Bintan. 1       2       3       4       5        
Source for component inputs from other ASEAN 
economies. 1       2       3       4       5        
Others: Please state 
___________________________ 1       2       3       4       5        
 
15. a) With respect to these implications, are there any locational changes to your 
production strategies and/or activities under the USSFTA? 
 Yes – Please continue below. 
 No – Please proceed to Question 16 
b) On a scale of 1 to 5, indicate the extent to which the USSFTA changes your 
locational strategies in your production activities.  Please write the number 
indicating the extent in the brackets (   ) provided.   
Also, what are the factors responsible for these changes? Please write the 
number indicating the factors in the boxes  provided. 
Factors: 
1) Low cost of land/rent in this location. 
2) Low cost of labour in this location. 
3) Regulations in this location are conducive for your firm’s operations. 
4) Sufficient amenities are available in this location for your firm’s operations. 
5) Products will become more cost competitive after locational changes. 
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6) Locational changes will facilitate input sourcing operations for your firm. 
7) Integrated Sourcing Initiative allows components and products manufactured 
in this location to qualify as Singapore origin and receive tariff-free advantages. 
8) Outward Processing Rule allows an increase in the content of the products that 
can be considered as Singapore-originating, thus qualifying for tariff-free 
advantages. 
9) Operations cannot qualify for USSFTA tariff-free advantages because it is not 
included under any part of the USSFTA. 
10) Outsourcing and relocating operations to this destination because it is located 
close to Singapore. 
11) More stringent intellectual property rights.  
12) Retain Core Competencies 
13) Too early to commit substantial investments. 
14) Cost related. (i.e. sunk costs) 
15) Incompatible facilities, skills or expertise. 
16) Others: ______________________________________ 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Increase  No Change  Decrease
 
Strategies S’pore US Batam Bintan Other ASEAN Others
New manufacturing operations. 
(         )
 
    
(         )
 
    
(         )
 
    
(         ) 
 
     
(         ) 
 
     
(         )
 
    
New assembly operations 
(         )
 
    
(         )
 
    
(         )
 
    
(         ) 
 
     
(         ) 
 
     
(         )
 
    
New R&D operations. 
(         )
 
    
(         )
 
    
(         )
 
    
(         ) 
 
     
(         ) 
 
     
(         )
 
    
Investments in existing operations 
(         )
 
    
(         )
 
    
(         )
 
    
(         ) 
 
     
(         ) 
 
     
(         )
 
    
Shift some existing manufacturing 
operations away from Singapore to 
other economies. 
 
(         )
 
    
(         )
 
    
(         ) 
 
     
(         ) 
 
     
(         )
 
    
Shift some existing assembly 
operations from Singapore to other 
economies. 
 
(         )
 
    
(         )
 
    
(         ) 
 
     
(         ) 
 
     
(         )
 
    
Outsource low-value added 
manufacturing activities from 
Singapore to other economies. 
 
(         )
 
    
(         )
 
    
(         ) 
 
     
(         ) 
 
     
(         )
 
    
High value manufacturing and other 
operations. 
(         )
 
    
(         )
 
    
(         )
 
    
(         ) 
 
     
(         ) 
 
     
(         )
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Closures of existing manufacturing 
operations. 
(         )
 
    
(         )
 
    
(         )
 
    
(         ) 
 
     
(         ) 
 
     
(         )
 
    
Closures of existing assembly 
operations. 
(         )
 
    
(         )
 
    
(         )
 
    
(         ) 
 
     
(         ) 
 
     
(         )
 
    
Closures of other existing production 
operations. 
(         )
 
    
(         )
 
    
(         )
 
    
(         ) 
 
     
(         ) 
 
     
(         )
 
    
Others: Please state 
_____________________________
_____________________________
(         )
 
    
(         )
 
    
(         )
 
    
(         ) 
 
     
(         ) 
 
     
(         )
 
    
 
16. a) With respect to these implications, are there any changes to your 
outsourcing and partnership strategies and/or activities with other firms under 
the USSFTA? 
 Yes – Please continue below. 
 No – Please proceed to Question 17. 
 
b) On a scale of 1 to 5, indicate the extent to which the USSFTA affects your 
outsourcing and partnership strategies and/or activities with other firms.  
Examine this with respect to 5 areas of your firm’s operations.  Please write the 
number indicating the extent in the brackets <   > provided.   
1) Product R&D 2) Manufacturing 3) Assembly 
4) Test 5) Marketing 
Also, what are the factors responsible for these changes? Please write the 
number indicating the factors in the boxes  provided. 
Factors: 
1) To compete more effectively against foreign, especially US firms. 
2) Facilitate manufacturing of certain products for the US market. 
3) Gains from technology transfer and other forms of expertise. 
4) Access US market. 
5) To act as a representative for their exports to the US. 
6) Lower costs of production. 
7) More stringent intellectual property rights. 
8) Lower risk. 
9) Retain Core Competencies 
10) Access Singapore and/or SEA market. 
11) Facilitate manufacturing of certain products for the Singapore and/or SEA 
market 
12) Others: Please state _________________________________ 
1 2 3 4 5 





Strategies Operation <      > 
Operation 
<      > 
Operation 
<      > 
Operation 
<      > 
Operation 
<      > 
Perform subcontract 
manufacturing activities for US 
firms 
(         ) 
 
     
(         ) 
 
     
(         ) 
 
     
(         ) 
 
     
(         ) 
 
     
Perform subcontract 
manufacturing activities for other 
foreign firms 
(         ) 
 
     
(         ) 
 
     
(         ) 
 
     
(         ) 
 
     
(         ) 
 
     
Outsource some firm activities to 
other firms. 
(         ) 
 
     
(         ) 
 
     
(         ) 
 
     
(         ) 
 
     
(         ) 
 
     
Engage in partnerships with US 
firms 
(         ) 
 
     
(         ) 
 
     
(         ) 
 
     
(         ) 
 
     
(         ) 
 
     
Engage in partnerships with 
domestic firms. 
(         ) 
 
     
(         ) 
 
     
(         ) 
 
     
(         ) 
 
     
(         ) 
 
     
Engage in partnerships with 
other foreign firms. 
(         ) 
 
     
(         ) 
 
     
(         ) 
 
     
(         ) 
 
     
(         ) 
 
     
Others: Please state 
__________________________
__ 
(         ) 
 
     
(         ) 
 
     
(         ) 
 
     
(         ) 
 
     
(         ) 
 
     
 
17. a) With respect to these implications, are there any changes to your export 
strategies and/or activities under the USSFTA? 
 Yes – Please continue below. 
 No – Please proceed to Question 18. 
b) On a scale of 1 to 5, indicate the extent to which the USSFTA affects your 
export strategies and/or operations with other firms.  Please write the number 
indicating the extent in the brackets (   ) provided.   
Also, what are the factors responsible for these changes? Please write the 
number indicating the factors in the boxes  provided. 
Factors: 
1) Exports are now tariff-free. 
2) Large market available for your products. 
3) Tariff-free advantages under the USSFTA make your products/components 
more cost competitive. 
4) Increase performance of subcontracting activities for foreign firms, hence 
increasing exports. 
5) Exports are bound for further manufacturing and assembly operations in these 
locations. 
6) Harmonization of standards under the USSFTA facilitates exports. 




1 2 3 4 5 
Increase  No Change  Decrease
 
Strategies US Batam Bintan Other ASEAN Japan Others
Exports of components. 
(         )
 
    
(         )
 
    
(         )
 
    
(         ) 
 
     
(         ) 
 
    
(         )
 
    
Exports of final/finished products. 
(         )
 
    
(         )
 
    
(         )
 
    
(         ) 
 
     
(         ) 
 
    
(         )
 
    
Others: Please state 
_____________________________
_____________________________
(         )
 
    
(         )
 
    
(         )
 
    
(         ) 
 
     
(         ) 
 
    
(         )
 
    
 
18. a) Is the role of the government and institutional support from business 
associations and networks important in stimulating changes to your firm 
strategies? 
 Yes – Please continue below 
 No – Please proceed to Question 19. 
b) In what ways is the role of the government and business associations 
important? (Please Tick) 
 Provides detailed information on the USSFTA 
 Organizes seminars and workshops to help you understand how to reap the 
advantages provided by the USSFTA. 
 Offer professional advice and aid in helping your firm to operationalize the 
 Act as a middleman in facilitating partnerships between your firm and a US firm. 
 Provides additional incentives when your firm makes use of the USSFTA. 
 Others: Please state _________________________________ 
19. a) Will the relative importance of certain firm functions in Singapore change 
after the USSFTA? 
 Yes – Please continue below 
 No – Please proceed to the end of the questionnaire 
 
b) On a scale of 1 to 5, please indicate the level of importance of each firm 
function in Singapore before and after the USSFTA.   Please write the number 
indicating the extent in the brackets (   ) provided.  
Also, what are the factors behind the changes in the level of importance of your 
firm’s functions? Please write the number indicating the factors in the boxes  
provided. 
Factors: 
1) Components/Products need to qualify for USSFTA Rules-of-Origin. 
2) Harmonization of standards. 
3) Lower costs of production. 
4) Large market available for products/components. 
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5) Stringent quality controls. 
6) Strict enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights.  
7) Retain Core Competencies 
8) More flexible Rules-of-Origin 
9) Others: Please state 
_________________________________________________ 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Very 
Important




Firm Functions Before the USSFTA After the USSFTA 
Research and Development (R&D) (         )          (         )          
Technology Development in Production (         )          (         )          
Manufacturing (         )          (         )          
Testing (         )          (         )          






SECTION C: FIRMS UNAFFECTED BY THE USSFTA 
 
20. In your opinion, why does the USSFTA have little implications on your firm 
strategies? (Please Tick) 
 Lack knowledge of the USSFTA  Unsure of how to take advantage of 
the USSFTA  
 Your firm’s products do not qualify 
for tariff-free advantages under the 
USSFTA 
 Tariff-savings under the USSFTA not 
substantial enough to affect firm 
operations 
 Lack support from government 
agencies (such as the MTI) on the means 
to utilize the USSFTA 
 Lack support from business 
associations (such as the SMa) on the 
means to utilize the USSFTA  
 The US is not a key market for your 
products 
 Removal of tariffs will not affect the 
price competitiveness of your products. 
 The Integrated Sourcing Initiative 
will not benefit your firm. 
 The Outward Processing Rule will not 
benefit your firm. 
 
21. Will the USSFTA have any future impacts/implications in your future firm 
strategies and/or production activities? 
 Yes – Please proceed below 
 Short-term (1 to 2 years) – Please proceed to Question 22. 
 Long-term (> 5 years) – Please proceed to Question 22. 
 No – Please proceed to the end of the questionnaire 
 
22. What are the implications of the USSFTA on your future firm strategies? (Please 
Tick) 
 Freer trade  Increase competition, especially from 
foreign firms 
 Improved market access to the US  Cheaper and tariff-free sourcing 
alternatives 
 Increased competitive positions of 
other firms that have benefited from the 
 Strict enforcement of Intellectual 
Property Rights. 
 
23. What are the possible changes to your firm strategies in future due to the 
USSFTA? Please Tick) 
 Increase input sourcing from Batam and Bintan because of the tariff-free incentives of the 
Integrated Sourcing Initiative. 
 Increase input sourcing from the US. 
 Locate operations in Batam and Bintan because of the tariff-free incentives of the 
Integrated Sourcing Initiative. 
 Locate operations in Batam and Bintan because the Outward Processing Rule increases 
the content of the product that qualifies as Singapore-originating. 
 Outsource low-value added operations to Batam and Bintan because the Outward 
Processing Rule increases the content of the product that qualifies as Singapore-origin. 
 Increase investments in existing operations in Singapore, US, Batam and Bintan. 
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 Locate operations in the US. 
 Increase partnerships with US firms to facilitate entry into the US market. 
 Increase exports to the US. 








Position in the Firm: _____________ 
Contact: ____________ (Tel.) ____________________________ (Email) 
 
If possible, I will like to request for an interview with you, for the purpose of better 




Thank you very much for completing the questionnaire. 
Please return it in the enclosed envelop. 
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Interviewee: Head of Product Division 
Date of Interview: 12 July 2004 
 
Established in 1993, this SME is a manufacturer of burn-in boards for its mix of US, 
Japanese and Singapore TNCs in the semiconductor segment.  The production relations 
are usually short-term arms length transactions with little technology transfer.  This SME 
stresses that competition in this aspect of the electronics industry is very stiff, and thus it is 
trying to diversify its operations into other fields.  The USSFTA does not have any impact 
on its operations, but this SME acknowledges that the USSFTA will increase competition 




Date of Interview: 28 July 2004 
 
This SME is a contract manufacturer for burn-in board and PCB subassembly.  Its 
customers are largely Singapore OEMs and transactions range from short to long term.  
This SME has a subsidiary in Batam manufacturing components required for PCB 
production.  The USSFTA does not have any impacts on the strategies of this SME.  The 
key reason is that this firm does not export its products internationally.  Rather, its market 
is 100% Singapore-based.  Also, it emphasizes the need for more information on the 
USSFTA to filter down to SMEs. 
 
o SG-SME-3 
Interviewee: General Manager 
Date of Interview: 29 July 2004 
 
This SME offers a complete range of services in the PCB segment including fabrication, 
design and assembly.  Its subsidiary in Malaysia fabricates PCB boards, while design and 
assembly is carried out in Singapore.  It acknowledges that the USSFTA has many benefits, 
but it thinks that the USSFTA will not benefit or affect its operations because the US is not 
a key market for its products.   
   
o SG-SME-4 
Interviewee: General Manager 
Date of Interview: 11 August 2004 
 
This SME was established in 2000.  It is a manufacturer and OEM sub-contractor of 
AC/DC adaptors, battery chargers, power transformers and subassemblies of wire 
harnesses, as well as PCB subassemblies.  While it has a couple of long-term production 
arrangements with Singapore TNCs, most of its production is on an ad-hoc basis, 
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dependent on the demand from its clients.  Although many of its products qualify for the 
ISI, this SME thinks that it will not benefit from the tariff advantages of the USSFTA 
because it does not conduct any export activity.. 
 
o SG-SME-5 
Interviewee: Managing Director 
Date of Interview: 16 August 2004 
 
This SME was established in 1996.  It is a component supplier specializing in the 
production of PCB, capacitors, varistors, chip resistors, resistor network array and other 
electronics component for semiconductors.  Its client base is a mix of Singapore and 
Japanese OEMs and OBMs in computer disk drives and audio equipment.  The survey data 
shows that this SME’s knowledge about the USSFTA is negligible, thus this may account 
for the USSFTA’s inability to effect any changes to its operations. 
 
o SG-SME-6 
Interviewee: Managing Director 
Date of Interview: 30 August 2004 
 
Established in 1987, this component supplier manufactures all types of connectors, wire 
harnesses and cable assemblies.  All its operations are based in Singapore to facilitate 
networking and to ensure speedy delivery of components to its customers here.  Although 
it has a diverse client base, the production relations are short-term transactions with little 
technology sharing and transfer.  This SME thinks that its lack of specialization in a 
specific component segment inhibits its capacity to negotiate for better contractual terms 
with its customers.   
 
o SG-SME-7 
Interviewee: Vice President, Sales 
Date of Interview: 14 September 2004 
 
This SME’s niche is in the manufacture and distribution of high quality imaging and 
computer supplies.  Its key product is a line of OBM inkjet cartridge and refill equipment 
retailed in the open market.  Most of the manufacturing is carried out in its Malaysia 
subsidiary while design and engineering services are retained in Singapore.  The more 
flexible ROO in the USSFTA has allowed this SME to integrate its production network 
more effective and more efficiently.  Notably, privileged access under the USSFTA 
presents immense marketing and distribution opportunities in the US market. 
 
o SG-SME-8 
Interviewee: General Manager 
Date of Interview: 22 September 2004 
 
This SME is a designer and manufacturer of electro-magnetic components used in 
consumer set-top boxes, computer peripherals, telecommunication and electronic ballasts.  
Since its founding in 1993, it has grown to be one of the leading SMEs in Singapore, 
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serving a large client base including Hewlett-Packard and Motorola.  The USSFTA created 
new opportunities for this SME to rationalize its production network centred in Singapore 
and Malaysia, as well as formalizing partnerships with its TNC clients. 
 
o SG-SME-9 
Interviewee: Chief Executive Officer 
Date of Interview: 5 October 2004 
 
This component supplier was established in 1985, specializing in the design and 
manufacture of ODM and OEM switched mode and linear power supplies.  Its client base 
comprise largely of Singapore OEMs and a few Japanese TNCs.  It shares a closer 
contractual relationship with the Singapore OEMs, while supplies to the Japanese TNCs 
are on an ad-hoc basis.  Changes created by the USSFTA opened new opportunities for 
this SME to establish itself as the preferred component supplier. 
 
o SG-SME-10 
Interviewee: Chief Executive Officer 
Date of Interview: 6 October 2004 
 
This SME designs, manufactures, packages and tests InP-based photonics devices, 
providing cost-effective solutions to telecom and datacom hardware vendors.  Since its 
establishment in 2000, this SME has developed and patented over 60 technology 
intellectual property.  Given that this SME is a niche manufacturer in photonics 
technology, it is able to establish significant R&D and manufacturing partnerships with a 
wide network of TNCs.  The USSFTA opened new opportunities for this SME to expand 
its operations in the US market. 
  
o SG-SME-11 
Interviewee: Managing Director 
Date of Interview: 26 October 2004 
 
This SME was established in 1972 to provide metal stamping services used in the 
manufacture of components in hand-held consumer electronics as well as the 
manufacturing of voice coil motor magnet return plates for the global hard disk drive 
industry.  With the USSFTA, this SME embarked on a rationalization strategy to integrate 
its operations in Johor more closely to its Singapore HQ while fragmenting the production 
process further to capitalize on the USSFTA advantages.   
 
o SG-TNC-1 
Interviewee: Managing Director 
Date of Interview: 22 June 2004 
 
Established in 1992, this TNC specializes in assembly and integration of full turnkey 
projects and precision machining.  It also provides engineering services such as design and 
prototyping pf customized equipment for the semiconductor and electronics industry.  
Some of its customers include Seagate, Singapore Technologies and Maxtor.  With the 
 256
USSFTA, it reported an increase in manufacturing and assembly partnerships with US 
firms and heightened export opportunities. 
 
o SG-TNC-2 
Interviewee: Chief Executive Officer 
Date of Interview: 23 June 2004 
 
This TNC is a leading provider of semiconductor packaging, design, assembly, test and 
distribution solutions.  It technology in mixed signal testing and advanced packaging 
technology for semiconductors serve markets in telecommunications and digital 
computing.  Its customers comprise some of the largest wafer foundries, integrated device 
manufacturers (IDMs) as well as fabless companies in the United States, Europe and Asia.  
With the USSFTA, increase in R&D and manufacturing partnerships with US firms can be 
detected.   
 
o SG-TNC-3 
Interviewee: Chief Executive Officer 
Date of interview: 27 July 2004 
 
This OBM specializes in digital entertainment products for the personal computer, audio 
and the internet.  The conducive investment climate under the USSFTA helps strengthen 
its foothold in the US market.  It also set up new manufacturing and assembly operations 
in Batam to capitalize on the more flexible ROO and tariff-savings.  In terms of 
partnerships, it retains and furthers its existing R&D partnerships with significant US firms 
to develop its products. 
 
o SG-TNC-4 
Interviewee: Managing Director 
Date of Interview: 2 August 2004 
 
Established in 1989, this TNC provides wire and cable harnesses, and PCB assembly 
services to a diverse range of customers.  It shares a strategic alliance with a NASDAQ 
listed developer and manufacturer of security equipment and medical devices.  Its Batam 
facility provides material kitting services, while material sourcing and procurement, final 
product assembly, warehousing and distribution are conducted in-house in Singapore.  
With the USSFTA, it is able to expand its strategic alliances with its current client base and 
shift some of its operations to its Batam facility. 
 
o SG-TNC-5 
Interviewee: Vice President 
Date of Interview: 6 August 2004 
 
Founded in 1984, this electronics manufacturing services provider offers OEM and 
contract manufacturing services.  Its global electronics network of 30 worldwide 
subsidiaries is underpinned by a strategy of “clusters of excellence” located in Southeast 
Asia, Northeast Asia and the US.    In the Southeast Asian region, the key “clusters of 
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excellence” is founded on facilities based in Singapore, Malaysia and the Riau Islands of 
Bintan.  With the USSFTA, it established a new assembly facility in Bintan, while 
expanding its marketing and distribution networks in Singapore and the US.   
 
o SG-TNC-6 
Interviewee: Chief Financial Controller 
Date of Interview: 12 August 2004 
 
This TNC was established in 1986 to provide electronics manufacturing services to local 
and foreign firms.  Its production facilities in Johor and Batam are responsible for turnkey 
PCB operations, box-build and back-end assembly, while its Singapore facilities conduct 
R&D and high-end manufacturing processes.  With the USSFTA, it has intentions to 
increase investments to its operations in Batam, and establish closer partnerships with US 
firms in areas of R&D and manufacturing. 
 
o SG-TNC-7 
Interviewee: Managing Director 
Date of Interview: 27 August 2004 
 
Established in 1970, it has grown from a small enterprise offering metal stamping services 
to a TNC offering customized manufacturing solutions that includes design, product 
development and manufacturing such as PCBA and product assembly, prototyping and 
batch run production.  Under the new regulatory environment of the USSFTA, this TNC 
established a new precision component outfit in Batam to complement its existing PCB 





Date of Interview: 13 September 2004 
 
Founded in 1981, is a provider of advanced contract manufacturing services in computer 
storage devices, medical equipment and electronics communication products as well as a 
manufacturer in precision machining parts in the electronics, hard disk drive and 
automotive industry.  With the USSFTA, it closed one of its assembly facility located 
outside the ASEAN region, while increasing investments to its existing operations in 




Interviewee: Managing Director 
Date of Interview: 22 September 2004 
 
This TNC established in 1986, provides contract manufacturing services in wire harness 
assemblies, cable assemblies, electro-mechanical assemblies, PCB fabrication and box-build 
operations.  Besides tightening the production network spanning its facilities in Singapore 
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and Malaysia, the USSFTA prompted this TNC to add business development capacities in 
its US representative offices to tap into business opportunities from US-SMEs seeking 
expansion in Asia.  In addition, it increased partnerships with many US OBMs to secure 
the right to export the products directly to the US market. 
 
o SG-TNC-10 
Interviewee: Chief Executive Officer 
Date of Interview: 29 September 2004 
 
This TNC is a dedicated semiconductor foundry serving a broad range of customers 
including fables companies.  Its strategy is based on collaborative technology development 
with its core customers, manufacturing R&D and flexible sourcing.  With the USSFTA, 
this TNC is planning to integrate more suppliers into its partnership network to maximize 
the benefits of the USSFTA ROO.  Furthermore, it is outsourcing its test services to a 




Interviewee: Executive Director 
Date of Interview: 30 September 2004 
 
This TNC is an electronics manufacturing services provider offering full turnkey box-build 
capabilities, design and engineering, and component procurement services.  It has 
operations in Singapore Malaysia, US and China to service its customer base comprising 
largely of US and Singapore TNCs.  The creation of a USSFTA economic space prompted 
this TNC to establish new R&D and marketing operations in the US, and a new 
manufacturing facility in the Riau Islands. 
 
o SG-TNC-12 
Interviewee: Vice President 
Date of Interview: 4 October 2004 
 
This TNC provides electronics manufacturing services for high-mix/low volume products 
and OBM products used in the semiconductor industry.  Its customers are from various 
electronic industry sectors like PCBA, surface mount equipment, industrial and office 
automation equipments.  The USSFTA prompted this TNC to establish new operations in 
the nearby Riau Islands to manufacture ISI products for export into the US. 
 
o SG-TNC-13 
Interviewee: Managing Director 
Date of Interview: 6 October 2004 
 
Established in 1991, this TNC is a designer, manufacturer and distributor of hybrid 
microcircuits.  It serves a broad range of industries such as automotive electronics, 
consumer electronics, instruments, microwave modules, sensors, power supplies and 
telecommunication electronics.  Under the USSFTA, it expanded its marketing and 
 259
distribution network in the US, and established partnerships with US firms to supply 
microcircuits on a long term basis. 
 
o SG-TNC-14 
Interviewee: Vice President 
Date of Interview: 12 October 2004 
 
This TNC is a provider of test and assembly solutions for a range of semiconductor 
devices.  It offers full turnkey services that include wafer sort, assembly, test, burn-in, 
mark-scan-pack and drop shipment, as well as value added services such as package design 
and simulation, and full reliability test.  Its customer base includes integrated device 
manufacturers, fabless companies and wafer foundries that design and manufacture 
semiconductors.  With the USSFTA, this TNC embarked on a strategy to market itself as 
the preferred test service partner to US firms in particular.   
 
o SG-TNC-15 
Interviewee: Chief Executive Officer 
Date of Interview: 18 October 2004 
 
Established in 1980, this component supplier manufactures and distributes resistors, 
capacitors, inductors and other electronic components to a diverse range of customers.  It 
has a production network spanning Singapore, Malaysia, US and Mexico.  With the 
USSFTA, it increased its marketing and distribution capabilities in the US market, while 
expanding its supplier partnerships with both US and Singapore firms. 
 
o SG-TNC-16 
Interviewee: Chief Executive Officer 
Date of Interview: 22 October 2004 
 
This TNC is a joint venture between two foreign TNCs and one institutional agency, 
offering flexible and cost effective semiconductor solutions.  Originally established to 
supply semiconductors to its parent firms, this TNC now has its own customer base 
comprising Japanese, US and European firms.  The USSFTA contributed to its decision to 
establish its first representative office in the US to service its current US customers and to 
tap into new business opportunities. 
 
o SG-TNC-17 
Interviewee: Chief Executive Officer 
Date of Interview: 25 October 2004 
 
This TNC is a hard disk drive manufacturer and distributor, and contract manufacturer for 
computer systems.  It also manufactures PC marketed under its proprietary brand name.  
With opportunities for rationalization of the production network under the more flexible 
ROO of the USSFTA, this TNC shifted its PC manufacturing operations from China back 
to Singapore.  Its input-sourcing strategies also reveal the tendency to source for 




Interviewee: Chief Executive Officer 
Date of Interview: 28 October 2004 
 
Established in 1984, this TNC is a provider of semiconductor burn-in solutions, electronics 
turnkey projects and trading in semiconductor related equipment.  To capitalize on the 
conducive investment climate created by the USSFTA, this TNC set up new marketing and 
business development operations in the US.  It also poured new investments into its 
Malaysian operations to increase the capacities, in anticipation of shifts in some Singapore 
operations to Malaysia. 
 
o SG-TNC-19 
Interviewee: Vice President 
Date of Interview: 10 November 2004 
 
This component supplier is one of the largest manufacturers of PCB and other circuit 
products.  With an established presence in the US, the protection offered by the USSFTA 
prompted this TNC to increased investments to its current R&D facility in the US.  
Furthermore, it offshored certain low value operations to neighbouring Riau and Malaysia 
to capitalize on the flexible ROO. 
 
o US-TNC-1 
Interviewee: Managing Director 
Date of Interview: 16 June 2004 
 
This OBM manufactures semiconductors for a broad range of computing and 
communications applications, from cell phones, PCs, PDAs, hard disk drives and gaming 
devices to the world’s most sophisticated wireless and wireline networks.  In addition, it 
has a new line of OBM storage devices for retail.  The USSFTA increased the outsourcing 
of low value-added manufacturing and assembly to Singapore firms (largely TNCs), while 
increasing in-house R&D operations. 
 
o US-TNC-2 
Interviewee: Managing Director 
Date of Interview: 24 June 2004 
 
This TNC manufacture high-performance analog devices and subsystems including power 
management circuits, display drivers, audio and operational amplifiers, and communication 
interface products.  Its key markets are in wireless handsets, displays, and laptops.  Its 
Regional Headquarters in Singapore is responsible for strategic decision making, and the 
coordination of its manufacturing subsidiaries in Batam, Malaysia and Thailand.  The 
USSFTA contributed to further production fragmentation as a means to rationalize the 





Interviewee: Managing Director 
Date of Interview: 7 July 2004 
 
This OBM is a manufacturer of high-tech computing and imaging devices including PCs, 
workstations, servers, printers and peripherals.  Its Regional Headquarters in Singapore is 
responsible for R&D, marketing and distribution, high-tech manufacturing and 
coordinating the production network in the region.  With the USSFTA, this OBM has 
intentions to expand their existing partnerships with Singapore OEMs to cover new 
products, while retaining marketing and distribution operations.  Furthermore, it 
established a new semiconductor facility to manufacture microchips for a line of its 
imaging products.   
 
o US-TNC-4 
Interviewee: Managing Director 
Date of Interview: 30 July 2004 
 
This TNC is a manufacturer of hard disk drives and storage system products used in a wide 
range of applications including desktops and consumer electronics.  It manufactures hard 
disk drive products for clients such as Dell, Apple, IBM, Hewlett-Packard, Philips and 
others.  The USSFTA strengthen its partnerships with Singapore firms in aspects of R&D 
and manufacturing, as well as its intra-firm relationships with its component manufacturing 
subsidiaries in Batam and Johor.     
 
o US-TNC-5 
Interviewee: General Manager 
Date of Interview: 5 August 2004 
 
This TNC is one of the world’s largest manufacturer of electronic, electrical and fiber optic 
interconnection products and systems serving the computer peripheral, telecomm, 
datacomm, consumer and industrial electronics markets.  To capitalize on the changes in 
the USSFTA regulatory environment, this TNC is increasing investments in its R&D 
facility in Singapore to strengthen its design and engineering capabilities, and 




Date of Interview: 18 August 2004 
 
This OEM is a global turnkey contract manufacturer providing one stop integrated 
electronic manufacturing services.  The USSFTA has prompted this TNC to shift the 
production of certain US-bound products to the Singapore-Malaysia manufacturing cluster, 
to capitalize on the opportunities for greater product fragmentation and tariff savings.  





Interviewee: Senior Manager for Business Development 
Date of Interview: 8 September 2004 
 
This TNC is a leading electronics manufacturing services (EMS) company offering a full 
range of integrated supply chain solutions.  The strategy of integrated collaborative design, 
lean manufacturing and post-manufacturing services offer customers competitive 
outsourcing advantages, such as access to advanced manufacturing technologies, shorter 
product time-to-market, lower total cost of ownership and more effective asset utilization.  
Notably, the USSFTA changed its outsourcing and partnership strategy, such that this 
TNC is more willing to collaborate with Singapore firms in R&D and establishing a 
network of external component suppliers rather than relying entirely on in-house sources. 
 
o US-TNC-8 
Interviewee: Vice President 
Date of Interview: 20 September 2004 
 
This TNC offers electronics manufacturing services in telecommunication equipment, 
computers and related products for business enterprises, video/audio/entertainment 
products, industrial control equipment, testing and instrumentation products and medical 
devices.  The USSFTA heightened the urgency to strengthen its partnerships with 
Singapore firms, to facilitate access to the Southeast Asian markets. 
 
o US-TNC-9 
Interviewee: Senior Manager 
Date of Interview: 27 October 2004 
 
This OBM first established itself in Singapore in 1966.  Presently, its core business includes 
the manufacturing of electronic connectors, cable assemblies, flexible circuits and static 
control systems.  The harmonization of standards under the USSFTA has increased the 
outsourcing of test services to Singapore firms (both TNC and SMEs) either through 
contractual or partnership arrangements.     
 
o US-TNC-10 
Interviewee: Vice President of Asia-Pacific 
Date of Interview: 28 October 2004 
 
This OEM is an electronics manufacturing services provider headquartered in Singapore, 
offering OEM and contract manufacturing operations.  The scope of functions includes 
R&D, manufacturing, logistics, distribution and post-manufacturing services through a 
network of more than 100 subsidiaries in 32 economies.  With greater scope for product 
fragmentation arising from the more flexible ROO of the USSFTA, this TNC set up a new 
manufacturing and assembly operation in Batam, while heightening its R&D capabilities in 
Singapore. 




Interviewee: Managing Director 
Date of Interview: 30 October 2004 
 
This TNC is one of the world’s largest manufacturers of disk drives and storage devices.  
Its presence in Singapore is marked by Regional Headquarters Status, R&D capabilities and 
high-tech manufacturing.  The USSFTA has heightened its resolve to transform its 
Singapore operations into a hub for coordinating its extensive production network in 
Southeast Asia.  In addition, it created a new R&D facility to develop a new line of 
products and is planning to enter the retail dimension with its new storage devices.   
 
o FR-TNC-1 
Interviewee: Managing Director 
Date of Interview: 9 November 2004 
 
This Japanese TNC has global spanning production networks of about 100 subsidiaries in 
North America, Latin America, Europe and Asia specializing in the production of audio, 
visual, communication and computer equipment.  Its core activities includes R&D, the 
manufacturing of high precision devices and cathode ray tubes, sales and marketing, as well 
as support services in the areas of IT, logistics, procurement and customer service 
operations. Its operations in Singapore were first established in 1973.  Since, its Singapore 
operations have grown from low-value manufacturing and assembly to Regional Corporate 
Headquarters status with high-value added manufacturing and R&D.  The USSFTA has a 
certain degree of impacts on its operations, namely the distribution of products and 
facilitating product segmentation. 
 
o FR-TNC-2 
Interviewee: Managing Director 
Date of Interview: 17 November 2004 
 
The range of services offered by this semiconductor manufacturer includes wafer 
fabrication, test and assembly, R&D, microchip design, technical application, support, sales 
and marketing.  Its products are supplied to its diverse customer base either through long-
term contractual relations or partnership arrangements.  With the USSFTA, it has 
rationalized its production network through outsourcing and off-shoring of certain 
activities to capitalize on the more flexible ROO. 
 
o FR-TNC-3 
Interviewee: Managing Director 
Date of Interview: 30 November 2004 
 
While this TNC is a stand alone operation established in 2003 as a joint venture between a 
US and a Japanese TNC, its operations are more closely aligned with that of its Japanese 
parent organization.  This TNC offers customized and full service approach to solution for 
the hard disk drive market.  Its operations in Singapore include OEM marketing, 
production management and the manufacturing of high-end disk drives and HDD head 
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stack assemblies.  A large proportion of its products are supplied to its Japanese and US 
parent.  The USSFTA saw changes in its sourcing and partnerships strategies whereby this 
TNC began to establish longer term production arrangements with other firms in the hard-
disk drive industry. 
 
o FR-TNC-4 
Interviewee: President and Managing Director of Asia Pacific 
Date of Interview: 2 December 2004 
 
This European TNC was established in 1999 as a spin-off from its parent firm, widely 
known for its line of communication products.  It designs, produces and markets 
semiconductors through the provision of application oriented solutions for sectors such as 
speech and data communications, peripherals, wireless communications, automotive and 
industrial electronics.  Although its products are marketed internationally to a broad range 
of customers, the interviewee highlighted that the USSFTA helped focus their attention on 
the US market and US customers.  Also, the USSFTA has altered their sourcing patterns 




Date of Interview: 6 December 2004 
 
This Taiwanese SME is a manufacturer of power transformer, AC adaptors, switching 
power supply, electronics assembly, PCB assembly and OEM products.  The USSFTA has 
brought unprecedented benefits to this company through cost-savings in the form of tariff 
reduction when its products are exported to the US.  Also, its input sourcing and locational 
strategies showed an increasing focus on integrating the operations of its Indonesian 
subsidiary more tightly with its Singapore operations.   
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APPENDIX C  
INSTITUTIONAL AGENCY PROFILES 
 
1) MINISTRY OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY, SINGAPORE (MTI) 
 
The MTI is the key state institution tasked with responsibilities in identifying economic 
growth opportunities and developing trade policies.  Its portfolio includes formulating and 
reviewing policies in the services and manufacturing sectors, creating a conducive 
environment for businesses as well as managing external linkages through trade 
agreements.  MTI is the main agency in-charge of negotiating and implementing FTAs.  
Two respondents involved in the FTAs divisions, an assistant director and a deputy 
director, were interviewed during the course of research.  As requested, their identities will 
remain anonymous. 
 
2) SPRING SINGAPORE 
 
SPRING Singapore is a statutory board under the parent ministry, MTI.  Its mission is 
geared towards nurturing a pro-business environment that fosters enterprise formation, the 
growth of industries, enhancing productivity and innovation, and increasing access to 
markets.  The key goal is to nurture a host of dynamic and innovative Singapore 
enterprises.  On the whole, SPRING Singapore is responsible for developing the potential 
in SMEs through a range of financial and technical assistance schemes.  In the context of 
FTAs, the role of SPRING Singapore is to reach out to SMEs to help them to acquire the 
know-how for compliance with FTA requirements.  Two respondents from the Market 
Opportunities department, holding managerial positions, were interviewed during the 
course of the research.  As requested, their identities will remain anonymous. 
 
3) INTERNATIONAL ENTERPRISE SINGAPORE (IE Singapore) 
 
IE Singapore is the leading agency (under the parent ministry, MTI) spearheading 
Singapore’s efforts to develop its external wing.  The objective of IE Singapore is to help 
Singapore-based companies to grow and internationalize successfully through the provision 
of market intelligence and strategic orientations.  In addition, IE Singapore works to 
position Singapore as a platform for foreign companies to expand into the region through 
partnerships with local companies.  Although no face-to-face interviews were conducted 
with this agency, email correspondence with the corporate communications department 
provided useful inputs that helped to shape my understanding of the role of IE Singapore 
in the USSFTA. 
 
4) SINGAPORE MANUFACTURERS’ FEDERATION (SMa) 
 
The SMa is a non-state institution representing the interests of the manufacturing 
community in Singapore.  This manufacturing community includes companies that are 
involved in manufacturing, even those companies that do not have physical manufacturing 
facilities in Singapore and companies that support the activities of manufacturers.  The 
portfolio of SMa includes organizing regular dialogue sessions with other organizations, 
 266
forging closer interactions and co-operation with local and foreign government commercial 
organization, inform members of changing commercial regulations and business 
opportunities.  In the USSFTA, the SMa is involved in industrial outreach programmes to 
heighten awareness of the USSFTA among members.  The respondent is Dr. Roger Low, 
Secretary-General of SMa. 
 
5) SINGAPORE BUSINESS FEDERATION (SBF) 
 
The SBF is a relatively new agency formed in 2002, aimed at representing the interests of 
the business community based in Singapore.  Much of SBF’s work is about building long-
term strategic alliances with the private sector as well as representing the business 
community in foras such as ASEAN and APEC.  The respondent, whom I interviewed, is 
involved in industrial outreach programmes for FTAs in general.  Upon his request, his 
identity will remain anonymous. 
 
6) AMERICAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE IN SINGAPORE (AmCham) 
 
AmCham is an American based non-state institution to promote the interests of AmCham 
members in Singapore and the region by providing advocacy, business information and 
networking opportunities.  AmCham members are either US-based businesses or other 
companies with substantial dealings with US companies.  In the USSFTA, AmCham was 
an active voice lobbying for the passing of the USSFTA bill through a series of position 
papers and seminars.  They also provided substantial industry inputs into the drafting of 
the final provisions on the IPR chapter.  The interviewee from AmCham is Nicholas de 
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• Motion Picture Association of 
America 
• Motorola 
• Mundelein Chamber of Commerce 
• National Foreign Trade Council 
• National Association of 
Manufacturers 
• National Foreign Trade Council 
• National Electrical Manufacturers  
• National Pork Producers Federation 
• New Albany Chamber of Commerce 
• New Jersey Chamber of Commerce 
• New York Life International 
• Northern Kane County COC 
• Northern Kentucky Chamber of 
Commerce 
• Northwest and Schaumburg Assoc. of 
Commerce and Industry 
• Oakland Chamber of Commerce 
• Ogilvy PR Worldwide 
• Orlando Regional Chamber of 
Commerce 
• Over-the-Rhine Chamber of 
Commerce 
• Pacific Architects and Engineers, Inc. 
• PA Chamber of Business and 
Industry 
• Pittsburgh Airport Area COC 
• Pfizer Pharmaceutical Group 
• PhRMA 
• Pike County Chamber of Commerce 
• Port of Miami 
• Pratt & Whitney 
• PricewaterhouseCoopers 
• Qualcomm 
• Radcliff-Hardin County COC 
• Rockwell Automation, Inc. 
• Rockton Chamber of Commerce 
• Riggs International Banking Corp. 
• Rushville Area Chamber of 
Commerce 
• Saline Area Chamber of Commerce 
• Schering-Plough Corp. 
• Scottsdale Chamber of Commerce 
• Securities Industry Association 
• Semiconductor Industry Association 
• Southern Indiana Chamber of 
Commerce 
• Standard Chartered Bank 
• Starbucks Coffee Corp. 
• Sterling Heights Chamber of 
Commerce 
• Sun Microsystems 
• Superior Multi-Packaging Ltd 
• Sweet Paper Sales Corp. 
• Syncad Lift 
• The Boeing Company 
• The Business Roundtable 
• The Direct Impact Company 
• Toledo Area Chamber of Commerce 
• Tucson Chamber of Commerce 
• U.S. Ass'n of Importers of Textiles 
• U.S. Chamber of Commerce 
• U.S. Council for International 
Business 
• U.S. Wheat Trade Education 
• United Parcel Service 
• United Technologies Corporation 
• Unocal Corporation 
• US - ASEAN Business Council 
• Verizon Communications 
• Vermont Chamber of Commerce 
• Vernon Hills Chamber of Commerce 
• Vilar, Duty & Montero 
• VNU 
• Wachovia Bank 
• Wal-Mart 
• The Washington Post 
• WBC Global 
• Whirlpool 
• White & Case 
• World City Business 
• York County Chamber of Commerce 
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APPENDIX E 
USSFTA TALKING POINTS  
 
• Banking and Financial Services: quotas on qualifying full bank (QFB) licenses for 
US banks will be removed, which means more of these banks will be permitted to 
provide retail services and to access Singapore’s ATM networks (BT, 26/5/2003).   
 
• Capital Controls: Singapore’s right to impose such controls has also been 
substantially curtailed.  Although Singapore is given the right to impose capital 
controls in the event of a financial emergency, Singapore will have to compensate US 
investors if it imposes capital controls that substantially impede capital transfers or if 




o Change in Tariff Classification: the focus is on the transformation of the 
imported or non-originating inputs into the finished product (MTI, 2003b: 
29).  The Harmonized System of Classification categorizes products into 
Chapters (2 – digit), headings, (4 – digit) and sub – headings (6 – digit).  
Substantial transformation under the CTC rule will require a chapter change 
at the 2 – digit level, a heading change at the 4 – digit level, and a sub – 
heading change at the 6 – digit level.  In short, the USSFTA ROO for certain 
products requires imported inputs used in the manufacture of the final 
product within Singapore are classified under a different tariff classification 
from the final product.   
o Value Added Rule: the focus is on the total local value making up the final 
value of the finished product (MTI 2003e).  For some electronics products, a 
VA rule of 30-60% must be satisfied.   
o Process Rule: the basic proposition is the product must undergo a specific 




APPENDIX F  
ANNEX 3B: GOODS INCLUDED IN THE INTEGRATED 
SOURCING INITATIVE 
 
Description of products  Tariff item US HS 
2002  
Tariff item Singapore 
HS 2003  
Chemical elements doped for use in electronics, in form of discs, wafers or similar forms; chemical 
compounds doped for use in electronics  
3818  3818  
Word processing machines  8469.11  8469.11  
Calculating machines and pocket-size data recording, reproducing and displaying machines with 
calculating functions; accounting machines, postage-franking machines, ticket-issuing machines and 
similar machines, incorporating a calculating device; cash registers;  
8470  8470  
Automatic data processing machines and units thereof; magnetic or optical readers, machines for 
transcribing data onto data media in coded form and machines for processing such data, not 
elsewhere specified or included:  
8471  8471  
Automatic teller machines  8472.90.10  8472.90.10  
Parts and accessories of the machines of heading No 8470 of the electronic calculating machines of 
subheading 8470 10, 8470 21 or 8470 29  
8473.21  8473.21 
Parts and accessories of the machines of heading No 8470 other than electronic calculating 
machines of subheading 8470 10, 8470 21 and 8470 29  
8473.29  8473.29 
Parts and accessories of the machines of heading No 8471  8473.30  8473.30  
Parts and accessories equally suitable for use with machines of two or more of the heading Nos. 
8469 to 8472  
8473.50  8473.50 





Other inductors for power supplies for automatic data processing machines and units thereof, and 
telecommunication apparatus  
8504.50.40  8504.50.11. 8504.50.21  
Electrical apparatus for line telephony or line telegraphy, including line telephone sets with cordless 
handsets and telecommunication apparatus for carrier-current line systems or for digital line 
systems; videophones; parts thereof:  
8517  8517  
Microphones having a frequency range of 300 Hz to 3.4 KHz with a diameter of not exceeding 10 
mm and a height not exceeding 3 mm, for telecommunication use  
8518.10.40  8518.10.11  
Line telephone handsets  8518.30.10  8518.30.40  
Loudspeakers, without housing, having a frequency range of 300 Hz to 3.4 KHz with a diameter of 
not exceeding 50 mm, for telecommunication use  
8518.29.40  8518.29.20  
Telephone answering machines  8520.20  8520.20  
Magnetic tapes of a width not exceeding 4 mm  8523.11  8523.11  
Magnetic tapes of a width exceeding 4 mm but not exceeding 6.5 mm  8523.12  8523.12  
Magnetic tapes of a width exceeding 6.5 mm  8523.13  8523.13  
Magnetic discs  8523.20  8523.20  
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Description of products  Tariff item US HS 
2002  
Tariff item Singapore 
HS 2003  
Other  8523.90  8523.90  
Disc for laser reading systems for reproducing phenomena other than sound or image.  8524.31  8524.31  
Other: For reproducing representations of instructions, data, sound, and image, recorded in a 
machine readable binary form, and capable of being manipulated or providing interactivity to a 
user, by means of an automatic data processing machine;  
8524.39.40  8524.39.10 
Magnetic tapes for reproducing phenomena other than sound or image.  8524.40  8524.40 
Media for reproducing phenomena other than sound or image  8524.91  8524.91  
Other: For reproducing representations of instructions, data, sound, and image, recorded in a 
machine readable binary form, and capable of being manipulated or providing interactivity to a 
user, by means of an automatic data processing machine;  
8524.99.40  8524.99.30 8524.99.90  
Transmission apparatus other than apparatus for radio-broadcasting or television  8525.10.90  8525.10.10 8525.10.22  
  8525.10.23  
  8525.10.29  
  8525.10.40  
  8525.10.50  
Transmission apparatus incorporating reception apparatus  8525.20  8525.20  
Digital still image video cameras  8525.40.40  8525.40.10  
Portable receivers for calling, alerting or paging.  8527.90.86  ex 8527.90.10  
Aerials or antennae of a kind used with apparatus for radio-telephony and radio-telegraphy  8529.10.70  8529.10.10  
Parts of: transmission apparatus other than apparatus for radio-broadcasting or television 
transmission apparatus incorporating reception apparatus digital still image video cameras, portable 
receivers for calling, alerting or paging  
8529.90.22 8529.90.99  8529.90.11 8529.90.12 
Indicator panels incorporating liquid crystal devices (LCD’s) or light emitting diodes (LED’s)  8531.20.00  8531.20  
Parts of apparatus of subheading 8531 20  8531.90.15 8531.90.75  ex 8531.90.10  
Electrical capacitors, fixed, variable or adjustable (pre-set); parts thereof:  8532  8532  
Electrical resistors (including rheostats and potentiometers), other than heating resistors; parts 
thereof:  
8533  8533  
Printed circuits  8534  8534  
Electronic AC switches consisting of optically coupled input and output circuits (Insulated thyristor 
AC switches)  
8536.50.70  8536.50.50  
Electronic switches, including temperature protected electronic switches, consisting of a transistor 
and a logic chip (chip-on-chip technology) for a voltage not exceeding 1000 volts  
8536.50.70  8536.50.50  
Electromechanical snap-action switches for a current not exceeding 11 amps  8536.50.70  8536.50.50  
Plugs and sockets for co-axial cables and printed circuits.  8536.69.40  8536.69.30  
Connection and contact elements for wires and cables  8526.90.40  ex 8536.90.10  
Diodes, transistors and similar semiconductor devices; photosensitive semiconductor devices, 
including photovoltaic cells whether or not assembled in modules or made up into panels; light-
emitting diodes; mounted piezoelectric crystals; parts thereof:  
8541  8541  
Electronic integrated circuits and microassemblies; parts thereof:  8542  8542  
Proximity cards and tags  8543.81  8543.81  
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Description of products  Tariff item US HS 
2002  
Tariff item Singapore 
HS 2003  
Electrical machines with translation or dictionary functions  8543.89.92  8543.89.20  
Other electric conductors, for a voltage not exceeding 80V, fitted with connectors, of a kind used 
for telecommunications  
8544.41.40  8544.41.11  
Other electric conductors, for a voltage not exceeding 80V, not fitted with connectors, of a kind 
used for telecommunication  
8544.49.40  8544.49.91 8544.49.92  
  8544.49.93  
  8544.49.94  
  8544.49.95  
  8544.49.99  
Other electric conductors, for a voltage exceeding 80V but not exceeding 1000V, fitted with 
connectors, of a kind used for telecommunications  
8544.51.70  
8544.51.91 8544.51.92  
  8544.51.93  
  8544.51.94  
  8544.51.99  
Optical fiber cables  8544.70.00  8544.70  
Electrostatic photocopying apparatus, operating by reproducing the original image directly onto the 
copy (direct process).  
9009.11.00  9009.11  
Other photocopying apparatus, incorporating an optical system  9009.21.00  9009.21  
Parts and accessories  9009.91  9009.90  
 9009.92   
 9009.93   
 9009.99   
Instruments and apparatus for measuring or checking the flow, level, or other variables of liquids or 
gases (for example, flow meters, level gauges, manometers, heat meters), excluding instruments and 
apparatus of heading 9014, 9015, 9028 or 9032; parts and accessories thereof:  
9026  9026  
Chromatographs and electrophoresis instruments  9027.20  9027.20  
Spectrometers, spectrophotometers and spectrographs using optical radiations (UV, visible, IR)  9027.30  9027.30  
Other instruments and apparatus using optical radiations (UV, visible, IR) of heading 9027  9027.50  9027.50  
Other instruments and apparatus of heading no 9027, (other than those of heading No. 9027.10)  9027.80  9027.80  
Parts and accessories of products of heading 9027, other than for gas or smoke analysis apparatus 




 9027.90.84   
Instruments and apparatus for measuring and checking, specially designed for telecommunications 
(for example, cross-talk meters, gain measuring instruments, distortion factor meters, 
psophometers)  
9030.40  9030.40  
Quartz reactor tubes and holders designed for insertion into diffusion and oxidation furnaces for 
production of semiconductor wafers  
7017.10.30 7020.00.30  7017.10.10 7017.10.90  
Chemical vapor deposition apparatus for semiconductor production  8479.89.84 8419.89.  8419.89.11 8419.89.12  
  8419.89.13  
  8419.89.14  
  8419.89.19  
  8419.89.20  
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description of products  Tariff item  Tariff item  
 US HS 2002  Singapore HS 2003  
Parts of chemical vapor deposition apparatus for semiconductor production  8479.90.94  8419.90.11  
 8419.90.  8419.90.12  
  8419.90.13  
  8419.90.14  
  8419.90.15  
  8419.90.19  
  8419.90.21  
  8419.90.22  
  8419.90.23  
  8419.90.24  
  8419.90.29  
Spin dryers for semiconductor wafer processing  8421.19.30  8421.19.20  
Parts of spin dryers for semiconductor wafer processing  8421.91.60  8421.91.30  
Deflash machines for cleaning and removing contaminants from the metal leads of  8424.30.90  8424.89.30  
semiconductor packages prior to the electroplating process  8424.89.50   
 8465.99.40   
 8479.89.84   
Spraying appliances for etching, stripping or cleaning semiconductor wafers  8424.89.30  8424.89.30  
Parts of spraying appliances for etching, stripping or cleaning semiconductor wafers  8424.90.90  8424.90.23  
Machines for working any material by removal of material, by laser or other light or  8456.10.60  8456.10.10  
photo-beam in the production of semi-conductor wafers    
Apparatus for stripping or cleaning semiconductor wafers  8456.99.70  8456.91.00  
Machines for dry-etching patterns on semiconductor materials  8456.91  8456.91  
Focused ion beam milling machines to produce or repair masks and reticles for patterns  8456.99.10  8456.99.10  
on semiconductor devices    
Lasercutters for cutting contacting tracks in semiconductor production by laser beam  8456.10.60  8456.99.20 8456.99.30  
  8456.99.40  
  8456.99.90  
Machines for sawing monocrystal semiconductor boules into slices, or wafers into chips  8464.10.00  8464.10.11 8464.10.12  
  8464.10.19  
  8464.10.90  
Grinding, polishing and lapping machines for processing of semiconductor wafers  8464.20.10  8464.20.11  
Dicing machine for scribing or scoring semiconductor wafers  8464.10.00  8464.90.11  
 8464.90.10   
Parts for machines for sawing monocrystal semiconductor boules into slices, or wafers  8466.91.10  8466.91.90  
into chips  8466.91.50 8466.10.40   
 8466.20.40   
 8466.30.45   
Parts of dicing machines for scribing or scoring semiconductor wafers  8466.91.10 8466.91.50  8466.91.90  
 8466.10.40   
 8466.20.40   
 8466.30.45   
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Description of products  Tariff item US HS 
2002  
Tariff item Singapore 
HS 2003  
Parts of grinding, polishing and lapping machines for processing of semiconductor wafers  8466.91.10 8466.91.50  8466.91.10  
 8466.10.40   
 8466.20.40   
 8466.30.45   
Parts of focused ion beam milling machines to produce or repair masks and reticles for patterns on 




 8466.93.85   
 8466.10.40   
 8466.20.40   
 8466.30.45   
Parts of lasercutters for cutting contacting tracks in semiconductor production by laser beam  8466.93.15 8466.93.47  8466.93.20 8466.93.30  
 8466.93.60  8466.93.90  
 8466.93.85   
 8466.10.40   
 8466.20.40   
 8466.30.45   
Parts of machines for working any material by removal of material, by laser or other light or 




 8466.93.85   
 8466.10.40   
 8466.20.40   
 8466.30.45   
Parts of apparatus for stripping or cleaning semiconductor wafers  8466.93.15 8466.93.47  8466.93.10  
 8466.93.60   
 8466.93.85   
 8466.20.40   
 8466.30.45   
Parts of machines for dry etching patterns on semiconductor wafers  8466.93.15 8466.93.47  8466.93.10  
 8466.93.60   
 8466.93.85   
 8466.20.40   
 8466.30.45   
Encapsulation equipment for assembly of semiconductors  8477.10.70 8477.40.40  8477.10.10 8477.10.31  
 8477.59.40  8477.10.32  
  8477.10.39  
Parts of encapsulation equipment  8477.90.15 8477.90.35  8477.90.10 8477.90.20  
 8477.90.55  8477.90.31  
 8477.90.75  8477.90.32  
  8477.90.39  
  8477.90.40  
Automated machines for transport, handling and storage of semiconductor wafers, wafer cassettes, 
wafer boxes and other material for semiconductor devices  8428.39.00 8428.90.00  
8479.50.10  
 8428.20.00   
 8428.33.00   
Apparatus for growing or pulling monocrystal semiconductor boules  8479.89.84  8479.89.10  
Apparatus for physical deposition by sputtering on semiconductor wafers  8543.89.10  8479.89.20 8479.89.30  
  8479.89.40  
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Description of products  Tariff item  Tariff item  
 US HS 2002  Singapore HS 2003  
Apparatus for wet-etching, developing, stripping or cleaning semi -conductor wafers and  8424.89.30  8479.89.20  
flat panel displays.  8464.90.10  8479.89.30  
 8464.90.60  8479.89.40  
 8479.89.84   
 8424.89.50   
 8479.89.87   
Die attach apparatus, tape automated bonders, and wire bonders for assembly of  8515.80.00  8479.89.20  
semiconductors  8479.89.84  8479.89.30  
  8479.89.40  
Encapsulation equipment for assembly of semiconductors  8477.10.70  8479.89.20  
 8477.40.40  8479.89.30  
 8477.59.40  8479.89.40  
Epitaxial deposition machines for semiconductor wafers  8479.89.84  8479.89.10  
Machines for bending, folding and straightening semiconductor leads  8462.21.40  8479.89.20  
 8462.29.40  8479.89.30  
  8479.89.40  
Physical deposition apparatus for semiconductor production  8543.89.10  8479.89.20  
  8479.89.30  
  8479.89.40  
Spinners for coating photographic emulsions on semiconductor wafers  8479.89.84  8479.89.20  
  8479.89.30  
  8479.89.40  
Parts of apparatus for physical deposition by sputtering on semiconductor wafers  8543.90.10  8479.90.20  
  8479.90.30  
  8479.90.40  
Parts for die attach apparatus, tape automated bonders, and wire bonders for assembly of  8515.90.10  8479.90.20  
semiconductors  8479.90.94  8479.90.30  
  8479.90.40  
Parts for spinners for coating photographic emulsions on semiconductor wafers  8479.90.94  8479.90.20  
  8479.90.30  
  8479.90.40  
Parts of apparatus for growing or pulling monocrystal semiconductor boules  8479.90.94  8479.90.10  
Parts of apparatus for wet etching, developing, stripping or cleaning semiconductor  8424.90.90  8479.90.20  
wafers and flat panel displays  8466.91.10  8479.90.30  
 8466.91.50  8479.90.40  
 8479.90.94   
 8466.20.40   
 8466.30.45   
Parts of automated machines for transport, handling and storage of semiconductor wafers,  8431.39.00  8479.90.20  
wafer cassettes, wafer boxes and other material for semiconductor devices   8479.90.30  
  8479.90.40  
Parts of encapsulation equipment for assembly of semiconductors  8477.90.15  8479.90.20  
 8477.90.35  8479.90.30  
 8477.90.55  8479.90.40  
 8477.90.75   
Parts of epitaxial deposition machines for semiconductor wafers  8479.90.94  8479.90.10  
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Description of products  Tariff item US HS 
2002  
Tariff item Singapore 
HS 2003  
Parts of machines for bending, folding and straightening semiconductor leads  8466.94.20 8466.94.40  8479.90.20 8479.90.30  
 8466.94.55  8479.90.40  
 8466.94.75   
 8466.10.40   
 8466.20.40   
 8466.30.45   
Parts of physical deposition apparatus for semiconductor production  8543.90.10  8479.90.20 8479.90.30  
  8479.90.40  
Injection and compression molds for the manufacture of semiconductor devices  8480.71.40  8480.71.20  
Resistance heated furnaces and ovens for the manufacture of semi-conductor devices on  8514.10.00  8514.10.11  
semi -conductor wafers.   8514.10.19  
Inductance or dielectric furances and ovens for the manufacture of semi-conductor  8514.20.60  8514.20.11  
devices on semi -conductor wafers.    
Apparatus for rapid heating of semiconductor wafers  8514.30.60  8514.30.11 8514.30.12  
  8514.30.19  
  8514.30.90  
Parts of resistance heated furnaces and ovens for the manufacture of semiconductor  8514.90.80  8514.90.10  
devices on semiconductor wafers    
Parts of apparatus for rapid heating of wafers  8514.90.80  8514.90.90  
Parts of furnaces ovens of heading no. 8514 10 to no. 8514 30  8514.90.80  8514.90.90  
Wafer probers  8536.90.40  8536.90.10  
Ion implanters designed for doping semiconductor materials  8543.11  8543.11  





 8479.89.84   
 8424.89.50   
 8479.89.87   
Parts of apparatus for wet etching, developing, stripping or cleaning semiconductor wafers and flat 




 8479.90.94   
 8466.20.40   
 8466.30.45   
Parts of ion implanters for doping semiconductor materials  8543.90.64 8543.90.84  8543.90.30  
Apparatus for the projection, drawing or plating circuit patterns on sensitized semiconductor 





 9010.50.60   
Parts and accessories of the apparatus of Heading No 9010 41 to 9010 49  9010.90.70  9010.90.20  
Optical stereoscopic microscopes fitted with equipment specifically designed for the handling and 
transport of semiconductor wafer or recticles  
9031.41.00  9011.10.10 9011.10.90  
Photomicrographic microscopes fitted with equipment specifically designed for the handling and 
transport of semiconducter wafers or recticles  
9031.41.00  9011.20.10 9011.20.90  
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Description of products  Tariff item  Tariff item  
 US HS 2002  Singapore HS 2003  
Parts and accessories of optical stereoscopic microscopes fitted with equipment  9031.90.54  9011.90.10  
specifically designed for the handling and transport of semiconductor wafers or recticles   9011.90.90  
Parts and accessories of photomicrographic microscopes fitted with equipment  9031.90.54  9011.90.10  
specifically designed for the handling and transport of semiconductor wafers or recticles   9011.90.90  
Electron beam microscopes fitted with equipment specifically designed for the handling  9031.80.40  9012.10.10  
and transport of semiconductor wafers or recticles   9012.10.90  
Parts and accessories of electron beam microscopes fitted with equipment specifically  9031.90.70  9012.90.10  
designed for the handling and transport of semiconductor wafers or recticles   9012.90.90  
Pattern generating apparatus of a kind for producing masks and reticles from photoresist  9017.20.50  9017.20.40  
coated substrates   9017.20.50  
  9017.20.90  
Parts and accessories for pattern generating apparatus of a kind used for producing masks  9017.90.00  9017.90.10  
or reticles from photoresist coated substrates   9017.90.20  
  9017.90.30  
  9017.90.40  
  9017.90.90  
Parts and accessories of such pattern generating apparatus  9017.90.00  9017.90.10 9017.90.20  
  9017.90.30  
  9017.90.40  
  9017.90.90  
Instruments and apparatus for measuring or checking semiconductor wafers or devices  9030.82  9030.82  
Parts and accessories of instruments and apparatus of subheading 9030.82  9030.90.64  9030.90.20  
  9030.90.30  
Parts of instruments and appliances for measuring or checking semiconductor wafers or  9030.90.84  9030.90.20  
devices   9030.90.30  
Optical instruments and appliances for inspecting semiconductor wafers or devices or for  9031.41.00  9031.41  
inspecting masks, photomasks or reticles used in manufacturing semiconductor devices  9031.49.70   
Optical instruments and appliances for measuring surface particulate contamination on  9031.49.70  9031.49.10  
semiconductor wafers   9031.49.20  
  9031.49.30  
  9031.49.90  
Parts and accessories of optical instruments and appliances for inspecting semiconductor  9031.90.54  9031.90.11  
wafers or devices or for inspecting masks, photomasks or reticles used in manufacturing    
semiconductor devices    
Parts and accessories of optical instruments and appliances for measuring surface  9031.90.54  9031.90.11  













Description of products  Tariff item  Tariff item  
 US HS 2002  Singapore HS 2003  
Computers: automatic data processing machines capable of 1) storing the processing  8471  8471  
program or programs and at least the data immediately necessary for the execution of the    
program; 2) being freely programmed in accordance with the requirements of the user; 3)    
performing arithmetical computations specified by the user; and 4) executing, without    
human intervention, a processing program which requires them to modify their execution,    
by logical decision during the processing run.    
The agreement covers such automatic data processing machines whether or not they are    
able to receive and process with the assistance of central processing unit telephony    
signals, television signals, or other analogue or digitally processed audio or video signals.    
Machines performing a specific function other than data processing, or incorporating or    
working in conjunction with an automatic data processing machine, and not otherwise    
specified under Attachment A or B, are not covered by this agreement.    
Electric amplifiers when used as repeaters in line telephony products falling within this  8518.40.10  8517.50  
agreement, and parts thereof.  8518.90.20   
 8518.90.60   
Flat panel displays (including LCD, Electro, Luminesence, Plasma and other  8471.60.10  8531.20.00  
technologies) for products falling within this agreement, and parts thereof.  8471.60.30  8471.60.29  
 8471.60.45  8471.60.60  
 8471.49.24  8471.60.90  
 8471.49.15  8473.30.10  
 8471.49.29  8473.30.20  
 8473.30.10  8473.30.90  
 8473.30.20  8531.90.10  
 8473.30.50  8531.90.91  
 8531.20.00  8531.90.92  
 8531.90.15  8531.90.99  
 8531.90.75  8543.90.10  
 8543.89.92  8543.90.20  
 8543.90.64  8543.90.30  
 8543.90.84  8543.90.40  
 9013.80.70  8543.90.50  
 9013.90.50  8543.90.60  
  8543.90.70  
  8543.90.80  
  8543.90.90  
Network equipment: Local Area Network (LAN) and Wide Area Network (WAN)  8471.80.10  8471.50  
apparatus, including those products dedicated for use solely or principally to permit the  8471.80.40   
interconnection of automatic data processing machines and units thereof for a network  8471.80.90   
that is used primarily for the sharing of resources such as central processor units , data  8471.49.60   
storage devices and input and output units – including the adapters, hubs, in – line    
repeaters, converters, concentrators, bridges and routers, and printed circuit assemblies  8517.50.60   






Description of products Tariff item Tariff item 
 US HS 2002 Singapore HS 2003 
Monitors: display units of automatic data processing machines with a cathode ray tube  8471.60.10  8471.60  
with a dot screen pitch smaller than 0.4 mm not capable of receiving and processing  8471.60.35   
television signals or other analogue or digitally processed audio or video signals without  8471.60.45   
assistance of a central processing unit of a computer as defined in this agreement. The  8471.49.15   
agreement does not, therefore, cover televisions, including high definition televisions.  8471.49.26   
 8471.49.29   
Optical disc storage units, for automatic data processing machines (including CD drives  8471.49.50  8471.70  
and DVD drives), whether or not having the capability of writing/ recording as well as  8471.70.60   
reading, whether or not in their own housings.  8471.70.90   
Paging alert devices, and parts thereof  8527.90.86  8527.90.10  
 8525.20.30  8527.90.91  
 8529.10.70  8527.90.92  
 8529.90.22  8527.90.99  
 8529.90.75  8529.90.91  
 8529.90.86  8529.90.92  
  8529.90.93  
  8529.90.99  
Plotters whether input or output units of HS heading No 8471 or drawing or drafting  8471.60.51  8471.60.11  
machines of HS heading No 9017.  8471.60.52  8471.60.12  
 8471.60.53  8471.60.13  
 8471.60.54  8471.60.19  
 8471.60.55  8471.60.21  
 8471.60.56  8471.60.29  
 8471.60.57  8471.60.20  
 8471.60.61  8471.60.40  
 8471.60.62  8471.60.50  
 8471.60.63  8471.60.60  
 8471.60.64  8471.60.90  
 8471.60.65  9017.20.10  
 8471.60.66  9017.20.20  
 8471.60.67  9017.20.30  
 8471.49.31  9017.20.40  
 8471.49.32  9017.20.50  
 8471.49.33  9017.20.90  
 8471.49.34   
 8471.49.35   
 8471.49.36   
 8471.49.37   
 9017.10.40   
 9017.20.70   









Description of products  Tariff item  Tariff item  
 US HS 2002  Singapore HS 2003  
Printed Circuit Assemblies for products falling within this agreement, including such  8471.50.00  8473.10  
assemblies for external connections such as cards that conform to the PCMCIA standard.  8473.30.10  8473.21  
Such printed circuit assemblies consist of one or more printed circuits of heading 8534  8473.50.30  8473.29  
with one or more active elements assembled thereon, with or without passive elements “  8473.10.20  8473.30.10  
Active elements” means diodes, transistors, and similar semiconductor devices, whether  8473.21.00  8473.40  
or not photosensitive, of the heading 8541,and integrated circuits and micro assemblies of  8473.29.00  8473.50  
heading 8542.  8473.40.10  8504.90  
 8504.40.60  8517.90  
 8504.40.85  8518.90  
 8504.90.20  8522.90.10  
 8504.90.65  8529 90.31  
 8517.50.10  8529 90.32  
 8517.90.08  8529 90.33  
 8517.90.36  8529 90.34  
 8517.90.38  8529 90.35  
 8517.90.44  8529 90.36  
 8518.90.20  8529 90.37  
 8518.90.60  8529 90.39  
 8520.20.00  8531.90  
 8522.90.45  8538.90  
 8529.90.22  8543.90  
 8531.90.15 9009.90  
 
 
8538.90.10  9013.90  
 8543.90.64  9017.90  
 9009.99.80  9026.90  
 9009.99.40  9027.90  
 9013.90.50  9030.90  
 9017.90.00   
 9026.90.20   
 9026.90.60   
 9027.90.45   
 9027.90.54   
 9027.90.64   
 9027.90.84   
 9030.90.64   
 9030.90.84   
 9031.90.54   
 9031.90.70   
Projection type flat panel display units used with automatic data processing machines  8528.30.62  8471.60  







Description of products  Tariff item  Tariff item  
 US HS 2002  Singapore HS 2003  
Proprietary format storage devices including media therefor for automatic data processing  8471.70  8471.70  
machines, with or without removable media and whether magnetic, optical or other  8471.49.50  8523.20.90  
technology, including Bernoulli Box, Syquest, or Zipdrive cartridge storage units.  8523.20.00  8523.20.20  
 8523.90.00  8523.90.10  
 8524.31.00  8523.90.90  
 8524.39.40  8524.31  
 8524.91.00  8524.39  
 8524.99.40  8524.91  
  8524.99.10  
  8524.99.30  
  852499.90)  
Multimedia upgrade kits for automatic data processing machines, and units thereof, put  8517.50.10  8473.30  
up for retail sale, consisting of, at least, speakers and/or microphones as well as a printed  8471.80.40   
circuit assembly that enables the ADP machines and units therof to process audio signals    
(sound cards).    
Set top boxes which have a communication function; a microprocessor-based device  8517.50.10  8517.50  
incorporating a modern for gaining access to the internet, and having a function of  8525.10.10   
interactive information exchange  8528.12.92   
Instruments and appliances used in medical, surgical, dental or veterinary sciences,  9018.11  9018  
including scintigraphic apparatus, other electro-medical apparatus and sight testing  9018.12   
instruments; parts and accessories thereof:  9018.13   
 9018.14   
 9018.19   
Mechano-therapy appliances; massage apparatus; psychological aptitude-testing  9019  9019  
apparatus; ozone therapy, oxygen therapy, aerosol therapy, artificial respiration or other    
therapeutic respiration apparatus; parts and accessories thereof:    
Orthopedic appliances, including crutches, surgical belts and trusses; splints and other  9021  9021  
fracture appliances; artificial parts of the body; hearing aids and other appliances which    
are worn or carried, or implanted in the body, to compensate for a defect or disability;    
parts and accessories thereof:    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
